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11 November 2025

When Time Is Short: Terminal Illness and the Court’s Discretion in Financial Remedy Cases

In OO v QQ [2025] EWFC 310 (B), His Honour Judge Hyde faced one of the most delicate balancing acts in family law: how to achieve fairness when one party is terminally ill. The case is a poignant reminder that behind every financial remedy judgment lies a human story — and that the court’s wide discretion under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 allows justice to be shaped by compassion as well as calculation.

The Background

The parties were married for almost 20 years. Both were in their mid-50s, with total assets just under £1 million. Tragically, the wife had been diagnosed with terminal cancer. Her prognosis was poor, and medical evidence suggested she had limited time remaining.

The husband argued that the court should recognise this by limiting her award, since her financial “needs” would be short-lived. The wife, however, sought security and dignity — not only for her remaining life but also to ensure her affairs were settled with stability and her adult children were not left with uncertainty.

The Court’s Approach

Under section 25, the court must consider all the circumstances of the case, including each party’s needs, resources, age, and health. Health is often relevant in assessing earning capacity or ongoing expenditure — but where a party faces terminal illness, it becomes central.

HHJ Hyde accepted that the wife’s needs were immediate and pressing. She required a secure home, funds for care, and the ability to live her remaining time free from financial anxiety. The judge also noted that the husband, in good health and with ongoing earning capacity, was better placed to recover financially.

Accordingly, the court divided the assets 56% to the wife and 44% to the husband — a departure from equality justified by her exceptional health circumstances and the need to ensure her welfare and peace of mind.

Balancing Fairness and Humanity

This judgment demonstrates that “needs” are not purely mathematical. They must be understood in context. A party with a limited life expectancy has needs that are immediate, intensive, and deserving of priority.

HHJ Hyde’s decision reflects the broader principle that fairness in family law is not confined to equal division. It also encompasses empathy and recognition of personal circumstances. As the court observed, the aim is not to achieve actuarial precision but a just and humane outcome.

Why OO v QQ Matters

OO v QQ reinforces several key principles:

  • The court’s discretion under section 25 is wide enough to reflect human realities.
  • Health and life expectancy can justify a significant departure from equality.
  • “Needs” in family law extend beyond duration — they include intensity, security, and dignity.

Ultimately, this case captures the compassionate side of family justice. It shows that even in cases governed by figures and percentages, the court’s true task remains to do what is fair — especially when time is short.

Published by James Thornton in Blog
Tags: case law, needs, terminal illness
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7 November 2025

Competing Divorces and the ‘Forum Non Conveniens’ Test: Lessons from A v B [2025] EWFC 377 (B)

When separating couples have international connections, it’s not unusual for one spouse to start divorce proceedings in England while the other files abroad. The recent decision in A v B [2025] EWFC 377 (B) shines a spotlight on what happens next — and how the Family Court decides whether to stay English divorce proceedings in favour of an overseas case.

Background: Competing Divorce Petitions in England and Egypt

In A v B, both husband and wife were Egyptian nationals. The wife had lived in England since 2013 with their two children and issued her English divorce petition in December 2023. The husband, meanwhile, had begun proceedings in Egypt — but his case was not formally registered until five days after the wife’s petition was filed in England.

He asked the English court to stay the divorce proceedings, arguing that Egypt was the proper jurisdiction. The wife opposed, saying her life, home, and assets were all in England, and that she would face serious procedural and practical difficulties in the Egyptian courts.

The Law on Staying Divorce Proceedings

The power to stay a divorce petition arises under section 5(6) and Schedule 1, paragraph 9 of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973. The court may stay English proceedings if there are ongoing proceedings elsewhere and if “the balance of fairness (including convenience)” supports the foreign forum.

This is where the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes in — a principle used to decide which country’s court is the most appropriate place to determine the dispute.

Leading authorities on this issue include:

The Arguments

The husband contended that both parties were Egyptian by nationality and that the Egyptian proceedings were first in time. He said the English court lacked jurisdiction.

The wife argued that:

  • She had been habitually resident and domiciled in England for over a decade.
  • The children’s lives and family assets were based in the UK.
  • The Egyptian process was plagued by procedural flaws and service issues.
  • She was unlikely to achieve a fair financial outcome in Egypt, where women face significant legal hurdles in divorce cases.

The Decision: England Is the Proper Forum

HHJ Cope dismissed the husband’s application for a stay. The court found that:

  • Both parties were domiciled and habitually resident in England by 2023.
  • The bulk of the assets and their family home were in the UK.
  • The Egyptian proceedings had serious procedural defects, including invalid service.
  • England had the most real and substantial connection to the parties’ lives.

The judge concluded that the husband had not shown Egypt was “clearly more appropriate.” England was “plainly the natural forum.”

In a postscript, HHJ Cope commented that, having lost the stay application, it would be “unconscionable” for the husband to continue his proceedings in Egypt.

Forum Non Conveniens in Family Law

This case is a timely reminder that English courts take a holistic and practical approach to questions of jurisdiction. The forum non conveniens test is not about who files first, but about where the marriage truly belongs — where the parties live, where their assets are held, and where substantial justice can be done.

Parties cannot rely on tactical filings abroad to delay or frustrate proceedings here. Once the English court finds that it is the proper jurisdiction, it will not hesitate to refuse a stay — particularly where there are concerns about fairness, enforcement, or due process abroad.

Published by James Thornton in Blog
Tags: A v B 2025 EWFC 37, Competing divorce petitions, Cross border divorce disputes, Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, English divorce jurisdiction, Forum non conveniens, International divorce jurisdiction, Stay of divorce proceedings
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6 November 2025

Can You Redact Payee Details from Bank Statements in Family Proceedings?

One of the most common disclosure disputes in financial remedy cases concerns redactions — particularly when a party removes payee details from their bank statements before producing them to the other side. Some claim these details are “irrelevant” or “private.” But is it actually permissible to do that?

The Duty of Full and Frank Disclosure

The starting point is simple and absolute: each party in financial remedy proceedings owes a duty of full and frank disclosure. Practice Direction 9A to the Family Procedure Rules (FPR) makes clear that parties must provide a complete and honest picture of their finances so that the court can achieve a fair outcome.

That duty extends to every material document, including 12 months of bank statements for all accounts disclosed in Form E. The Form E statement of truth is not just a formality — it’s a personal confirmation that the disclosure is “full, frank, clear and accurate.” Any attempt to conceal or withhold information undermines that duty.

The Rules on Redaction

Redacting payee details amounts to withholding part of a document. The FPR don’t allow a party to decide unilaterally which parts of their disclosure the other side can see. If a party genuinely believes they have a right or duty to withhold part of a document — for example, to protect legally privileged information or a third party’s confidentiality — there is a formal process to follow.

Under FPR 21.3(3):

“A party who wishes to claim a right or duty to withhold inspection of a document, or part of a document, must state in writing (a) the right or duty claimed, and (b) the grounds on which that right or duty is claimed.”

That written statement must be sent to the other side, who can then challenge the redaction under FPR 21.3(5). If the matter is disputed, the court may inspect the document itself and decide whether the information can properly be withheld.

In short: there is a mechanism for limited redaction, but it must be done transparently and — if necessary — with the court’s approval. Simply blacking out names or transactions because they are “personal” or “irrelevant” is not permitted.

Why Payee Details Matter

Payee information often provides vital context: who a party is paying, whether assets have been transferred, or whether money has been dissipated. Even regular spending patterns can help the court assess lifestyle and credibility. What one party views as “irrelevant” may in fact be highly significant to the other or to the court’s assessment of needs and fairness.

Consequences of Improper Redaction

Unjustified redactions can amount to non-disclosure. The court may draw adverse inferences, order further disclosure, or even make a costs order against the party responsible. In serious cases, non-disclosure discovered after judgment can justify an application to set aside the final order.

As the Court of Appeal emphasised in Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908, disclosure in family cases must be handled through proper procedures — not through unilateral decisions about what should or should not be revealed.

The Bottom Line

Unless a party follows the proper process under FPR Part 21, it is not procedurally permissible to redact payee details from bank statements before disclosure. The default position is clear: full, frank, and open disclosure is the rule — not the exception.

Where genuine confidentiality concerns exist, the right approach is to raise them transparently and, if needed, invite the court to decide. Anything less risks serious procedural and evidential consequences.

 

Published by James Thornton in Blog
Tags: case law, fpr part 21, practice and procedure, redact, redaction
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22 October 2025

When Divorce Crosses Borders: Financial Relief After a Foreign Divorce in TY v XA [2025] EWFC 349

When marriages span multiple countries, untangling financial obligations can become a jurisdictional labyrinth. The recent High Court judgment of TY v XA (No. 2) [2025] EWFC 349 by Mr Justice Cusworth is a compelling example of how England’s Part III Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 powers operate when one spouse seeks financial relief after an overseas divorce — here, in Germany.

The case stands as a reminder that Part III applications are not a second bite of the cherry, but a safety net against injustice where a foreign financial settlement leaves one party inadequately provided for.

The International Background

TY and XA — an Austrian husband and French wife — married in Austria, lived across Europe, and divorced in Germany in 2019. The German court approved a notarised Separation Deed, under which the wife received maintenance for a fixed term and payment of rent, but no capital settlement. The husband, meanwhile, retained substantial wealth.

After relocating to London with the children (with permission from the German court), the wife applied in England for Part III relief, arguing that the German settlement was unfair and left her in financial hardship. Her application was supported by significant evidence of mental and physical health difficulties, limiting her earning capacity.

The Legal Challenge: What Can England Do After a Foreign Divorce?

The central legal question was whether the English court could revisit — or vary — the German Deed. Under Part III of the 1984 Act, the court can make financial orders after a foreign divorce if there is a sufficient English connection and if it is appropriate to do so, having regard to all the circumstances (Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] 1 AC 628).

However, the Maintenance Regulation (EU 4/2009) still applied to this case, meaning English courts could not review the substance of the German order (Art. 42), but could vary it if circumstances had changed (Art. 21).

Mr Justice Cusworth held that the German Deed was valid and binding under German law, but that subsequent changes in circumstance—notably the wife’s health deterioration, relocation, and ongoing needs—justified modification of the maintenance terms, not a wholesale re-opening of the settlement.

A Question of Fairness and Forum

The court drew heavily on Agbaje principles, emphasising that Part III is not a tool for forum shopping. A mere disparity between a foreign award and what would have been achieved in England is not enough. Yet where unmet needs remain, and where England has become the parties’ clear home, the court may intervene to ensure fairness.

In TY v XA, both parties and their children were now habitually resident in London, and the German court no longer had jurisdiction. Against this backdrop, Mr Justice Cusworth ordered enhanced maintenance provision for the wife and children — recognising real change in their financial and medical circumstances since 2019.

Why This Case Matters

This judgment underlines several key points for practitioners and internationally mobile families:

  1. Part III relief is exceptional, not routine. It is a remedy for unfairness, not an opportunity to re-litigate a foreign divorce.
  2. Foreign settlements remain binding — but not untouchable. English courts can modify maintenance where there has been a genuine change of circumstances.
  3. Timing and motive matter. Delays in applying and perceived forum-shopping will weigh against applicants.
  4. Evidence is everything. The wife’s success rested on clear, medical evidence demonstrating her deteriorating health and inability to earn.

Cross-Border Fairness in the Modern Family Court

TY v XA shows the delicate balance English courts strike between respecting foreign judgments and ensuring fairness for families who have since made their lives here. The decision reinforces that Part III jurisdiction is not about English generosity — it’s about English justice.

Published by James Thornton in Blog
Tags: agbaje, case law, foreign divorce, part III MFPA 1984, Part III relief
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20 October 2025

When Mum Becomes an Intervenor: Third-Party Interests and the Family Home

The recent case of HX v WX [2025] EWFC 338 (B) offers a textbook example of how third-party interests—often involving family members—are determined within financial remedy proceedings. Here, District Judge Davies grappled with whether a 92-year-old mother-in-law, referred to as IX, had an equitable interest in her daughter’s former matrimonial home after funding the construction of an annexe in which she lived.

The judgment provides practical insight into how proprietary estoppel claims are treated when family finances and property mix, and it also highlights the importance of proper pleadings and evidence when third parties are joined to financial remedy cases.

The Facts: Family Ties and Financial Contributions

The former matrimonial home was jointly owned by husband (HX) and wife (WX). In 2020, IX sold her own cottage and paid around £176,000 for an annexe to be built at the property, intending to live there for life. The parties agreed she would have a “home for life,” and IX moved in the following year.

After the couple’s separation, relations deteriorated and IX claimed that, having spent over £211,000, she was entitled not just to occupy the annexe but also to a share of the property. She argued she had relied on assurances from both HX and WX, suffered detriment, and that it would be unconscionable for them to retain the benefit of her contribution without recognition of her equity.

The Law: Establishing a Third-Party Interest

The court applied the TL v ML [2005] EWHC 2860 (Fam) framework for intervenor claims within financial remedies and the familiar three-part test for proprietary estoppel:

  1. Assurance or representation – a promise or understanding that creates an expectation of an interest;
  2. Reliance – the claimant acts on that promise;
  3. Detriment – the claimant suffers loss or disadvantage by doing so.

If those elements are proved, the court must fashion an equitable remedy that prevents unconscionability—though not necessarily granting the full amount spent or a proportional share.

The Outcome: An 18% Interest and a Life Interest

HX conceded during the hearing that IX had a life interest, but denied any ownership share. District Judge Davies disagreed, finding all elements of proprietary estoppel were satisfied. However, instead of awarding a pound-for-pound reimbursement, the court grounded its remedy in fairness and proportionality.

Based on evidence that IX’s contribution enhanced the home’s value by £100,000, the judge held that she was entitled to an 18% beneficial interest, alongside her right to live there for life. Following delivery of this judgment, all parties came to terms to conclude matters by consent.

Practical Lessons: The Path for Intervenors

This case is a useful reminder that when a third party—often a parent—claims an interest in a matrimonial home, the court will:

  • Require formal pleadings (points of claim and defence) per TL v ML;
  • Expect clear evidence of the alleged agreement or promise;
  • Focus on detrimental reliance and the equitable balance of fairness;
  • Avoid granting automatic reimbursement, instead fashioning a remedy that reflects the reality of the parties’ intentions and contributions.

Why It Matters

Intervenor claims are increasingly common as family wealth is shared across generations, often without formal documentation. HX v WX underscores that equity protects fairness, not generosity—and that where family contributions enhance value or create expectations, the court will step in to prevent injustice.

For practitioners, the case illustrates the need to identify and manage third-party interests early in proceedings and to ensure the evidence satisfies the strict criteria of proprietary estoppel.

Published by James Thornton in Blog
Tags: 3rd party, estoppel, intervenor, third party, third party interests, tl v ml 2006
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8 October 2025

HA v EN: Another Chapter in the Xydhias Story

Financial remedy cases often settle through negotiation long before a consent order is sealed. But what happens when the parties reach “agreement in principle” yet still argue over the details? The Xydhias line of cases provides the answer—and the recent High Court decision in HA v EN [2025] EWHC 2436 (Fam) adds an important new layer.

The Background

In HA v EN, the husband and wife had reached terms that were accepted to amount to a Xydhias agreement. But all was not plain sailing. The wife’s legal costs and the mechanics of selling the family home (FMH) remained hotly contested. The FMH sale price also looked uncertain, raising the risk of a shortfall.

The court therefore had to decide:

  • What exactly had the parties agreed?
  • Could the court “fill in the gaps” on unresolved implementation issues?
  • Was there scope to revisit the agreement if the FMH realised less than expected?

The Xydhias Principle

The leading case of Xydhias v Xydhias [1999] established that once parties have reached a clear agreement in financial remedy proceedings, neither can simply walk away before a consent order is drawn. However, unlike in pure contract law, the agreement is not automatically enforceable: the court must still approve it as fair under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

Subsequent cases (Rose v Rose, Kicinski v Pardi) have distinguished between:

  • Xydhias agreements – binding in principle, but still subject to fairness and judicial approval.
  • Rose orders – agreements actually approved by a judge at FDR or in court, which carry even greater weight.

What’s New in HA v EN?

Deputy High Court Judge Richard Todd KC confirmed the core Xydhias approach: where the broad terms are agreed, the court can resolve peripheral disputes (like costs or sale mechanics) without unravelling the deal.

But he went further. He noted that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, sections 34–35, provides a statutory mechanism to vary or rescind “maintenance agreements” in certain circumstances. While rarely used, Deputy High Court Judge Richard Todd KC suggested these provisions could, in principle, allow the court to revisit a Xydhias agreement if fairness so required—for example, if the FMH sold for far less than assumed when the deal was struck.

This opens the door to a nuanced safety valve: most Xydhias agreements will hold firm, but if events make the outcome manifestly unjust, limited variation may be possible.

Why It Matters

  • Flexibility with certainty: HA v EN confirms that courts will give effect to Xydhias agreements, ironing out drafting and implementation issues rather than letting parties resile.
  • The fairness filter: As ever, the court must still test the outcome against section 25 MCA 1973.
  • Variation is possible: The judgment points to a rarely-discussed route (ss.34–35 MCA) to vary agreements if circumstances change dramatically.
  • Contractual debate continues: Deputy High Court Judge Richard Todd KC also revisited Soulsbury v Soulsbury, which recognised a contract outside the MCA context, highlighting the blurred line between contractual enforceability and family law discretion.

Final Thought

HA v EN shows the Xydhias doctrine is still evolving. For practitioners, the message is twofold: record agreements clearly, but be aware that the court retains both the power and duty to ensure fairness—and, in rare cases, to adjust agreements if unforeseen events threaten to make them unjust.

Published by James Thornton in Blog
Tags: case law, consent order, richard todd kc, rose v rose, soulsbury v soulsbury, xydhias
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29 September 2025

Enforcing and Varying Financial Orders: What Collardeau v Fuchs Teaches Us

In family law, the term “final order” is sometimes misleading. The recent decision in Collardeau v Fuchs [2025] EWFC 307 shows how even a carefully crafted final financial remedy order can be revisited when enforcement problems and major breaches arise.

Background

This case is the latest in the long-running litigation between Alvina Collardeau and Michael Fuchs. Following the breakdown of their marriage, Mostyn J made a Final Order in June 2023, based heavily on the couple’s prenuptial agreement. W was granted continued occupation of the West London family home (“WLH”) until 2039, with H obliged to pay the mortgage and other household outgoings.

But H failed to comply. Mortgages went unpaid, properties were repossessed or sold off, and W faced mounting costs. In March 2025 she applied to enforce and vary the Final Order.

Enforcement – the limits of compliance

The Court heard evidence of repeated non-compliance by H. He failed to pay mortgage instalments, did not transfer properties as ordered, and even engaged in transactions designed to frustrate enforcement. Mr Justice Poole was blunt: H had been “prepared to see his children be compelled to leave their family home rather than comply with his obligations.”

Enforcement orders were therefore essential – requiring H to meet arrears, pay costs, and indemnify W in relation to certain liabilities .

Variation – section 31 MCA 1973 and the Thwaite jurisdiction

The more complex issue was whether the Final Order could be varied. Under s.31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, periodical payments orders (including those framed as undertakings) can be varied or capitalised into a lump sum. The Court applied the principles from Pearce v Pearce [2003], capitalising periodical payments using the Duxbury formula.

Separately, the Court considered the so-called Thwaite jurisdiction (Thwaite v Thwaite [1981] 2 FLR 280). Where an order is still executory (not yet fully implemented) and there has been a significant change in circumstances, the Court may vary it if it would be inequitable not to. Here, the loss of WLH through repossession and H’s persistent default amounted to just such a change .

What was ordered?

  • H’s undertaking to pay the mortgage until 2039 was discharged and replaced with a capitalised lump sum of £11m, reflecting what he should have paid.
  • Other claimed costs (such as legal fees and property expenses) were not included, as they went beyond the scope of the Final Order.
  • Periodical payments linked to staff and household costs were replaced with quantified orders, making enforcement simpler.

Practical lessons

  1. Final doesn’t always mean final – Where an order remains executory, the Court can revisit it under Thwaite if compliance breaks down.
  2. Evidence is key – W succeeded in part, but failed on some claims because she could not prove the sums were properly incurred. Even in high-value cases, documentary evidence matters.
  3. Capitalisation as protection – Courts may prefer a lump sum to uncertain periodical payments where a payer repeatedly defaults.
  4. Procedure is flexible – Although W’s application was technically issued under the wrong procedure, the Court cured the defect to avoid injustice.

Conclusion

Collardeau v Fuchs is a striking reminder that family law orders are living instruments. They can be enforced with teeth, but also adapted when circumstances fundamentally change. For practitioners, it reinforces the importance of distinguishing between true finality and executory obligations – and of ensuring applications are backed by clear, persuasive evidence.

Published by James Thornton in Blog
Tags: case law, Collardeau v Fuchs, enforcement, s.31 mca 1973, ultra hnw, variation
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23 September 2025

Can You Marry Without Being There? Lessons from KU v BI on Overseas Marriages

When it comes to family law, questions about the validity of foreign marriages can be some of the trickiest. A recent case, KU v BI [2025] EWFC 296 (B), shows just how complex things can become when English courts are asked to recognise a marriage celebrated overseas—in this instance, in Nigeria—without either party even being present.

The Background

The parties had lived together in England since 2013 and had three children together. The wife (KU) argued that they were married in a Nigerian customary ceremony in March 2013, which entitled her to seek a divorce. The husband (BI), however, denied that any valid marriage had taken place, pointing to the fact that neither of them had even travelled to Nigeria for the alleged wedding.

Complicating matters further, BI was still married to someone else under English law at the time—something KU said she only discovered later.

The Legal Issues

The court had to grapple with whether the Nigerian ceremony amounted to a valid marriage, capable of recognition under English law. The starting point is clear:

  • Locus regit actum – if a marriage is valid in the place where it is celebrated, it will generally be valid everywhere else .
  • English courts distinguish between a valid marriage, a void marriage (where defects exist, e.g. polygamy), and a non-marriage (where what happened cannot be regarded as a marriage at all) .

An expert in Nigerian law was appointed. He explained that under Nigerian customary law there are three requirements:

  1. Capacity to marry.
  2. Payment of a bride price (dowry).
  3. A marriage ceremony involving the formal handing over of the bride to the husband’s family .

The problem? The wife did not attend the ceremony in Nigeria, raising doubts about whether the “handing over” requirement was satisfied.

The Court’s Approach

Despite this, the judge noted that:

  • Both parties intended to be married and had lived for a decade as husband and wife.
  • There was video evidence of a large celebration with both families, dowry payments, and references to the parties as “in-laws.”
  • It would be unreasonable to conclude there was no marriage at all simply because KU was not physically present in Nigeria.

The court therefore held that the marriage was valid in Nigeria, and thus recognised in England. KU could proceed with her divorce petition.

Why This Matters: The RI v NG Comparison

The contrast with RI v NG [2025] EWFC 9 (B) is striking. In that case, an unmarried couple disputed ownership of jewellery, leading the court to dust off the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 to decide who owned what. There, because no marriage existed, the court could only resolve property rights—not wider financial claims.

Together, these cases highlight the crucial threshold question: are the parties married in law?

  • If yes (KU v BI), the full financial remedies jurisdiction under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 applies.
  • If no (RI v NG), parties are limited to property law routes like MWPA 1882 or TOLATA.

Key Pointers for Practitioners

  • Always check local law: The validity of an overseas ceremony depends on compliance with the law where it was celebrated.
  • Void vs. non-marriage matters: A void marriage still opens the door to financial claims; a non-marriage does not.
  • Evidence of intention and recognition helps: Community acceptance and family testimony can be crucial in customary marriages.
  • Early advice is key: Couples who assume they are married abroad may later discover otherwise—potentially limiting their rights.

Wider Principles

KU v BI illustrates several important points:

  • Foreign marriages are judged by the law of the place of celebration. English courts won’t impose their own requirements, but they will apply English remedies (e.g. nullity or divorce) if the marriage is recognised.
  • The line between a void marriage and a non-marriage matters. A void marriage still allows financial claims; a non-marriage does not.
  • Evidence of intention and community recognition can carry weight, particularly in customary systems where formal documentation may be lacking.
  • Complications arise where one party is already married. Under s11 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, a polygamous marriage can be void if entered into by someone domiciled in England —but here, the Nigerian law was treated differently.

Final Thought

KU v BI shows the family courts’ willingness to recognise genuine foreign marriages, even where the formalities look unusual by English standards. It also underlines the stark difference in outcomes depending on whether a relationship is classed as a marriage, a void marriage, or a non-marriage—a distinction neatly illustrated by comparing this decision with that in RI v NG.

Published by James Thornton in Blog
Tags: case law, nigeria, overseas marriage, validity, void marriage
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18 September 2025

Child Maintenance Beyond 18

A recent High Court decision, Re H (A Child) [2025] EWHC 2361 (Fam), provides useful guidance on when child maintenance can be extended beyond the age of 18, and how this interacts with the Child Maintenance Service (CMS) regime.

The Case

The dispute arose after HHJ Oliver extended an existing child maintenance order until August 2028, covering the child’s tertiary education. The father appealed, arguing he had not been properly notified of the application to extend the order, and that the order went beyond what the law allowed.

On appeal, Ms Justice Henke dismissed his arguments. She found that:

  • Although the application to extend was made informally, it was clearly flagged in the mother’s skeleton argument and discussed in open court before the child turned 18.
  • Section 29 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 allows the court to extend maintenance while a child remains in education or training.
  • The order to August 2028 matched the expected end of the child’s university course and was therefore justified.

The Legal Framework

In most cases, child maintenance is dealt with by the CMS, which has exclusive jurisdiction once an assessment is in place. However, the court retains limited powers:

  • Under s.29 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (and similarly under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989), maintenance orders can be extended beyond 18 if a child is in education or training, or where there are exceptional circumstances (e.g. disability).
  • The court can only step in where there is no CMS assessment in force or where specific circumstances justify an order.
  • Case law such as UD v DN [2021] EWCA Civ 1947 confirms that an application made before the child turns 18 can still lead to an order covering the period beyond majority.

Informal Applications – Are They Enough?

One striking feature of this case was that the mother’s application was made within her skeleton argument for an enforcement hearing, rather than by formal application notice. The father argued this was procedurally unfair. The court disagreed, holding that:

  • Informal applications can suffice, provided the other party is aware of them and has the chance to respond.
  • This echoes earlier authorities, including Tattersall v Tattersall [2018] EWCA Civ 1978, where the Court of Appeal recognised the flexibility of the family courts when dealing with variation or extension applications.

Why It Matters

For parents and practitioners, the case reinforces several points:

  • Child maintenance doesn’t necessarily end at 18 – support often continues while a child is at university or in vocational training.
  • Timing is crucial – an application made before the 18th birthday preserves the court’s jurisdiction, even if determined later.
  • Informality has limits – while the court allowed an application raised in a skeleton argument here, best practice remains to make a clear, formal application.

The CMS vs Court Orders

The interplay between the CMS and the court remains complex. The CMS generally has priority, but the court retains a role where:

  • There is already a court order in place (as here), or
  • The case involves education beyond 18, or
  • There are exceptional needs that fall outside CMS jurisdiction.

Final Thought

This case underlines the flexibility but also the discipline of the family courts: they will extend child maintenance beyond 18 where justified, but applications must be grounded in evidence and raised in time. For separated parents, it is a reminder not to assume financial responsibility ends on a child’s 18th birthday—especially where university or further training lies ahead.

Published by James Thornton in Blog
Tags: case law, child maintenance, cms, court ordered child maintenance, top up child maintenance
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12 September 2025

The Long Goodbye – Matrimonial Home Disputes After Decades Apart – G v N [2025] EWFC 286

The case of G v N [2025] EWFC 286 (B) is a striking reminder of how the family courts approach the matrimonial home when it is the sole remaining asset – and how long periods of separation, combined with non-engagement, can heavily influence the outcome.

The Facts

The husband and wife had divorced many years earlier, but no financial order had ever been made. Nearly thirty years ago, the wife walked out of the former matrimonial home (FMH), leaving the husband to raise their two children and meet all the financial obligations alone.

At the time she left, the house was almost entirely mortgaged – the equity was around 10%. Over the ensuing decades, the husband paid off the mortgage, maintained the property, and supported the children without any contribution from the wife. She made no child maintenance payments, offered no financial assistance, and had no involvement in the children’s lives.

Fast forward to 2025, the husband sought a financial remedies order to transfer the FMH into his sole name, arguing that it was inequitable for the wife to retain any interest given her long absence and lack of contribution.

The Wife’s Silence

The wife was served with all the necessary documents, but she neither filed evidence nor attended the final hearing. Her only recorded contact was a last-minute phone call to say she would not attend due to ill health. She made no application to adjourn. As a result, the husband’s evidence went entirely unchallenged.

The Court’s Approach

District Judge Shackleton considered the familiar section 25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 factors, but noted that many were of little relevance given the unusual facts. With no dependent children and no competing financial claims, the focus was on fairness in the distribution of the only asset.

Key points:

  • The wife had abandoned the home and family nearly 30 years earlier.
  • The husband had paid 90% of the mortgage and all household outgoings since.
  • There was no evidence of any ongoing needs or contributions by the wife.
  • Conduct was not pleaded, but the court could not ignore the practical effect of the wife’s choices: the husband had borne the full financial and parental burden.

The judge concluded the wife had “no claim whatsoever” to the property. The FMH was ordered to be transferred into the husband’s sole name, with the court itself authorised to sign the TR1 transfer if the wife refused. Importantly, a clean break was imposed, ensuring finality.

Key Lessons for Practitioners

  1. The matrimonial home is not sacrosanct – in the right circumstances, one party may be awarded the entire property, especially after long separation and sole financial responsibility.
  2. Non-engagement is risky – silence from the wife meant her position went unheard, and the husband’s evidence was accepted unchallenged.
  3. Time matters – three decades of unilateral responsibility weighed heavily in the husband’s favour.
  4. Clean breaks remain a priority – courts will seize the opportunity to conclude financial ties, particularly in older cases with no dependent children.

Conclusion

G v N is unusual but illustrative. While courts often strive for fairness through division of the matrimonial home, here the facts left little room for sharing. For practitioners, it underlines the importance of advising clients that absence and non-engagement may lead to the extinguishing of claims – and that finality is always the court’s goal.

Published by James Thornton in Blog
Tags: case law, fmh, former matrimonial home, matrimonial home
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