13 June 2025

Disclosure, Costs, and Fairness in OS v DT

In OS v DT [2025] EWFC 156 (B), His Honour Judge Edward Hess presided over a high-net-worth financial remedy dispute that, beneath its glittering spreadsheets and asset schedules, boiled down to something less glamorous—but no less vital: transparency, trust, and the true cost of confusion.

The case concerned a couple whose finances spanned multiple jurisdictions and asset classes. Yet what set it apart was not simply the scale (assets exceeding £9m), but the obstacle course the wife had to navigate in order to understand what was truly matrimonial property—a problem that stemmed from the husband’s management of his parents’ finances, and his initial resistance to fully explaining them.

The Disclosure Debacle

At the heart of the dispute was the husband’s assertion that various funds and investments were not his, but were held on behalf of his parents—particularly his father. This claim, he argued, exempted significant sums from the wife’s sharing claim.

But Judge Hess was unimpressed by how long it took the husband to present a coherent and well-evidenced account of these financial arrangements. In one striking paragraph, the judge wrote:

“The husband’s attitude could be characterised as being ‘just trust me, why are you troubling me with these unnecessary questions’ rather than attempting a proper explanation of a confusing situation with, potentially, significant amounts of money at stake.”

The eventual resolution of many of these issues only came after the failed private FDR, which significantly increased legal costs on both sides. Despite this, the judge declined to penalise either party in costs—finding that the wife had been justified in pursuing answers, and the husband had eventually provided clarity, albeit belatedly.

Costs: Not Just a Bottom Line

A particularly notable element of the case was the disparity in legal costs: the husband spent almost £490,000 on legal fees, while the wife spent £244,000. Both figures are eye-watering, but the difference between them sparked a debate: should the court adjust the asset division to reflect one party’s overspend?

The court ultimately said no—at least, not here. Despite citing established authority on adjusting for disproportionate costs (RH v RH, LS v SJ, YC v ZC), HHJ Hess found this wasn’t one of the “obvious” cases where penalising a party for excessive costs was justified.

This illustrates a key point for practitioners: the threshold for adjusting distribution due to costs is high, even when one party’s spending is arguably excessive. The court needs more than just a large figure—it needs clear evidence that those costs were wasteful or incurred unreasonably.

Practical Pointers

For family lawyers, the case offers several practical lessons:

  • Third-party wealth is a red flag: If a party claims to manage assets on behalf of relatives, press for clarity early—and get it in writing. Vague assertions of “it’s not mine” won’t fly.
  • Cost disparity alone won’t justify an adjustment: But a confusing or uncooperative approach to disclosure might.
  • Transparency pays dividends: The husband’s eventual transparency helped his case—but only after significant financial and procedural cost.

Final Thought

OS v DT reminds us that even in high-value cases, the bedrock of fairness is procedural clarity. In a world of RSUs, offset accounts, and startup investments, the simplest principle still applies: if you're holding someone else’s money, you'd better be able to prove it. And if you can’t—or don’t try—you may end up paying for the confusion, one way or another.

11 June 2025

Expert Evidence in Divorce: When Is One Report Not Enough?

In financial remedy proceedings, expert valuation of businesses can make or break a case. But what happens when one party no longer agrees with the expert they jointly instructed? That was the question at the heart of JMD v SPD [2025] EWFC 154 (B), where the husband sought to challenge the Single Joint Expert (SJE)’s valuation of his business and persuade the court to allow him to instruct his own.

The case is a valuable reminder of how carefully the court guards the integrity and efficiency of financial remedy litigation—especially when it comes to expert evidence.

Background: A Joint Expert Disputed

The parties jointly instructed a forensic accountant to value the husband’s property development business. The SJE’s valuation (at £18.2 million) differed sharply from the husband’s own expectations, largely because the expert chose not to accept the valuations of the company’s property assets from a separate property valuer. The SJE took the view that these incomplete developments would not be sold at a forced sale value and based their assessment on full, completed values.

The husband’s position: this approach inflated the company’s value and failed to reflect the true economic reality. He argued that this divergence—plus the failure to communicate with the property valuer—was so significant that it justified a fresh expert.

The Legal Framework: Daniels v Walker and Beyond

District Judge Parker carefully applied the principles from Daniels v Walker [2000] and other authorities, including GA v EL [2023] EWFC 187 and Cosgrove v Pattison. The key points?

  • A party may seek permission to instruct a further expert only where the original SJE’s report is deficient in a way that can’t be addressed through questions or cross-examination.
  • It is a discretionary exercise, and courts will consider factors such as:
    • The importance and centrality of the issue;
    • Proportionality and costs;
    • The ability to challenge the existing report;
    • Whether there would be an "understandable sense of grievance" if permission were refused.

In this case, DJ Parker found the SJE had disregarded the valuations from the property expert—an expert whose input was supposed to form the foundation of the business valuation. That, said the judge, was “concerning” and justified a second expert.

What This Means for Practitioners

  1. Don’t treat SJE reports as untouchable—but tread carefully.

Courts are open to allowing further expert evidence where there's a real risk of injustice, especially if a joint expert has stepped outside their remit or failed to consult appropriately.

  1. Shadow expert opinions are not enough.

You’ll need more than dissatisfaction or a critique. Courts will expect a structured approach: questions first, application second.

  1. Proportionality still matters.

The husband in JMD v SPD was ordered to fund the second expert himself, a reminder that if you ask for more evidence, you may foot the bill.

  1. Coordination between experts is key.

This case shows the risks of siloed reporting—where one expert disregards another’s work. Joint expert coordination can prevent disputes later on.

Conclusion

JMD v SPD reminds us that even a single joint expert can get it wrong—or at least raise enough doubt to justify a second opinion. But courts will protect the discipline of the Daniels framework, requiring a structured, proportionate approach. The lesson for family lawyers? If you want a new expert, you’ll need a better reason than just a bad result.

29 May 2025

Set Aside or Sit Tight? When Market Shifts Don’t Justify Reopening Financial Orders

In X v Y [2025] EWFC 144 (B), District Judge Stone delivered a forensic and educational judgment on a topic that regularly vexes family lawyers: can a final financial remedy order be reopened or varied simply because the property market dips?

Spoiler alert: the answer is no—at least not on the facts of this case.

Background: A House, a Fixed Sum, and a Change of Heart

The parties had agreed (and the court ordered) that the former matrimonial home in Cornwall would be sold, with the wife (Mrs Y) receiving £410,000 and the husband (Mr X) receiving the balance, after deducting various sale-related costs and a minor costs award.

At the time of the final hearing in December 2023, the property was valued at £800,000 based on a joint expert report. Both parties expected it might sell for more, but the court stuck with the expert figure. Notably, both had opted for fixed sums rather than percentage-based awards—Mr X specifically proposing to take the risk (or gain) if the property sold for less (or more).

When the market softened and the best offer received was £795,000, Mr X brought an application to set aside or vary the order, arguing that the change in property value was a material development rendering the order inequitable. He framed the claim under the Thwaite jurisdiction.

The Legal Framework: Barder and Thwaite

  • Barder v Caluori [1988] AC 20 sets a high bar: to set aside a financial order due to a supervening event, the event must be unforeseen, exceptional, and undermine the basis of the order. It must occur shortly after the order and not prejudice third parties.
  • Thwaite v Thwaite [1982] Fam 1 is a narrower route, applicable only where the order remains executory (i.e. not fully implemented) and it would be inequitable to enforce it due to a significant change of circumstances. Crucially, if parties’ claims have already been dismissed, the court cannot substitute a new order, only refuse enforcement.

Here, Mr X had opted for Thwaite, recognising Barder was doomed to fail.

The Decision: Variation Refused, Order Upheld

DJ Stone dismissed the application. He found:

  • The property’s small reduction in value was not a sufficiently significant change. Mr X stood to lose a maximum of £13,000, and in some scenarios might even benefit due to elapsed mortgage penalties.
  • Mr X had proposed this very model of fixed-sum order—he took the upside risk, and must also accept the downside.
  • There was no suggestion of wrongdoing or delay by Mrs Y.
  • There was no expert evidence that the property’s value had truly dropped—just a single estate agent letter referencing a hesitant buyer.

Most importantly, the judge noted that even if he found the order inequitable, the court lacked jurisdiction to replace it because both parties’ financial claims had been dismissed outright in the original order. The application had nowhere to go.

Key Points for Family Lawyers

  1. Be careful with fixed-sum orders based on property values. If the market shifts, there's no guarantee the court will reopen the deal—particularly where a percentage-based award might have self-adjusted.
  2. Barder remains a high bar—it requires a genuinely unforeseen, devastating event.
  3. Thwaite is alive but limited: It applies only to executory orders and mainly allows courts to refuse enforcement—not rewrite orders—unless claims remain live.
  4. Dismissing claims outright? Double-check that the structure of your order doesn’t box your client out of relief if the sale goes awry.
  5. Market changes are not enough on their own—courts expect parties to accept ordinary risks.

Conclusion

This judgment is a useful clarification of the narrow—and narrowing—routes by which parties can revisit final orders. Mr X gambled on the market and lost slightly, but the court refused to let him reshuffle the deck. For family lawyers, the message is clear: structure settlement orders carefully, and don’t assume market movements will justify a second bite at the cherry.

23 May 2025

Unequal but Fair: When the Breadwinner Pays the Price in Divorce

In GR v AR [2025] EWFC 143 (B), His Honour Judge Edward Hess handed down a comprehensive judgment that serves as a reminder: the sharing principle may start at 50:50, but it doesn’t always end there—especially when one spouse brought significantly more wealth to the marriage.

This case is a textbook example of non-matrimonial property, the nuance of contributions, and the real-world difficulty of assigning mathematical fairness in long marriages where wealth is complex and pre-acquired.

Case Summary

  • Marriage length: Just over 9 years (including long cohabitation).
  • Parties: A high-earning wife with substantial pre-marital wealth, and a husband who stepped away from work to focus on parenting after a successful business career.
  • Total asset base: Over £41 million, largely held by the wife (£36m).
  • Outcome: Husband awarded a lump sum of £11 million, or 39% of the total liquid assets.

Key Issues and Judicial Reasoning

  1. Matrimonial vs Non-Matrimonial Property

The core of the dispute was how much of the wife’s wealth should be shared. She had accumulated significant wealth before marriage, mostly via shares in a major investment company. The judge rejected strict mathematical models offered by each side and instead followed Hart v Hart [2017] and Miller/McFarlane [2006], applying a broad evaluative approach. Ultimately, approximately two-thirds of her Swiss bank holdings and investments were deemed matrimonial acquest.

  1. The Family Home Counts—Even in Sole Names

The wife bought the home in her sole name, but Judge Hess followed well-established principles (Miller, Standish v Standish [2024]) that the family home—even if pre-owned—generally counts as matrimonial property. The husband was awarded 50% of the equity, adding over £1 million to his award.

  1. The "Sharp" Argument Rejected

The wife’s legal team leaned on Sharp v Sharp [2017] to argue that their separate finances during the marriage (splitting bills down the middle, etc.) should reduce any claim by the husband. But the judge declined to apply Sharp-style logic to a long marriage with a child, instead preferring the broader fairness lens of XW v XH [2020].

  1. Add-Backs and Alleged Spending

The husband sought “add-backs” for post-separation spending, including a watch and a gift from the wife to her mother. The court declined, emphasising that these were not so exceptional as to warrant financial penalty, and mirrored the husband’s own discretionary spending.

  1. Career Choices and Earning Capacity

The husband had declined work offers post-separation, citing a desire to focus on co-parenting. The wife suspected strategic unemployment. The court struck a balanced tone, noting his continued high earning capacity—but not penalising him for past choices. This aligns with the non-discriminatory approach of White v White [2000].

Practical Points for Practitioners

  • Tracing the marital element in complex investments requires realism: Judges are increasingly wary of "spreadsheet wars" that mask rather than reveal fairness.
  • Family homes remain special—even if owned in one name.
  • Pre-marital wealth still matters, but courts don’t always leave it untouched if it’s been mixed, grown, or relied on.
  • Keeping finances separate during marriage doesn't always carry the weight separating parties hope for—context is king.
  • Reasonable needs are not the only measure in HNW cases; sharing and fairness remain central.

Conclusion

GR v AR is a reminder that even in cases involving immense wealth, the court still wrestles with human judgment, not just arithmetic. The wife, whose fortune dwarfed the husband’s, retained the lion’s share—but not all of it. A clean break was achieved with a substantial lump sum that reflected the marriage's shared economic life, without punishing pre-marital success.

The result? Not 50/50, but fair—and that, ultimately, is the goal.

20 May 2025

“Covert Recordings, Public Consequences” — What Family Lawyers Need to Know About the New FJC Guidance (May 2025)

In May 2025, the Family Justice Council (FJC) released long-awaited guidance on covert recordings in family proceedings concerning children. As Sir Andrew McFarlane acknowledges in the foreword, this is a “growing area for the courts” with limited prior guidance — and increasing complexity due to modern technology.

Whether it’s a parent bugging a child’s backpack, secretly taping social workers, or a covert smartphone recording mid-contact handover, this document seeks to bring clarity — and consistency — to a controversial but increasingly common issue.

What’s the Big Deal?

Covert recordings are often born of mistrust: parents feeling disbelieved, professionals under scrutiny, and children caught in the crossfire. The court is now regularly asked to weigh the evidential value of a secret tape against the ethical and emotional damage its making may cause — especially to children.

The new guidance covers:

  • The legal framework (including data protection and human rights concerns)
  • Case management issues around admissibility
  • The welfare implications for children
  • The views of young people, who overwhelmingly find the idea intrusive and upsetting

Key Principles for Practitioners

  1. Lawfulness Isn’t Enough

Just because a recording might not be illegal doesn’t mean it’s admissible — or wise. In family proceedings, the court is guided by welfare and fairness, not simply evidence-gathering tactics.

  1. Children Should Almost Never Be Recorded

The guidance is blunt: recording children is rarely justifiable. Peter Jackson J described it as “almost always likely to be wrong.” Not only are these recordings usually unhelpful in content, but the fact that a parent spied on a child may itself be damaging evidence of their inability to prioritise the child’s welfare.

  1. Covert Recordings of Professionals Are a Mixed Bag

Some famous cases (Medway Council v A & Ors (Learning Disability; Foster Placement) [2015] EWFC B66 (2 June 2015), Re F (Care Proceedings: Failures of Expert) [2016] EWHC 2149) show that recordings have exposed malpractice. But many are partial, misleading, or simply time-wasting. Courts are urged to ensure proper case management and avoid “satellite litigation” over admissibility.

  1. Publication is a Legal Minefield

Sharing recordings — especially on social media — could breach data protection law, amount to contempt of court, or even attract civil or criminal liability. The risks are real and rarely worth the perceived reward.

  1. Professionals Should Develop Overt Recording Policies

Rather than fearing every phone in a parent’s pocket, the FJC recommends agencies consider transparent recording policies, allowing agreed recordings with safeguards. This could reduce tensions and avoid covert behaviour entirely.

A Practical Checklist for Lawyers

If your client has made or received a covert recording:

  1. Advise caution: It could backfire in court.
  2. Assess intent and content: Why was it made? What does it actually prove?
  3. Disclose early: Avoid ambush. The court expects transparency.
  4. Beware of data risks: Storing or sharing personal data without basis could breach GDPR.
  5. Consider the impact on the child: Not just legally, but emotionally and relationally.

Final Thought

The FJC’s guidance doesn't ban covert recordings, but it issues a clear warning: use with extreme care. In most cases, it is the act of recording — not what is recorded — that matters most.

For lawyers, this means stepping back from the adrenaline rush of “gotcha” evidence and reminding clients that in family proceedings, trust, welfare, and fairness remain the watchwords.

19 May 2025

The Sham That Wasn’t? When Debts and Divorce Collide in Family Law

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Awolowo v Awolowo and Linkserve [2025] EWCA Civ 641 is a masterclass in forensic scrutiny of alleged debts in financial remedy proceedings. It also serves as a reminder of the court’s critical role in sifting fact from fiction when third-party claims threaten to swallow the marital pot.

This case centres around whether a £1.6 million “loan” from the husband’s brother’s company was real—or a legal construct designed to keep assets out of the wife’s reach in her financial claim.

Background: A Debt Appears (Conveniently Late)

The case originated in financial relief proceedings under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, following an overseas divorce. The husband asserted that a family home in the UK—seemingly unencumbered—was in fact held on trust for his brother’s Nigerian company, due to a historic £1.6 million loan.

The wife, seeing the equity in the property evaporate, applied to set aside the loan and related judgments under section 23 MFPA 1984 (mirroring section 37 MCA 1973), arguing that the debt was a sham intended to defeat her claim.

At first instance, Her Honour Judge Vincent found the debt genuine, holding that the wife had not proved the loan was a fabrication.

What the Court of Appeal Found

The Court of Appeal disagreed—and firmly. Lord Justice Moylan delivered a damning analysis of the original decision. Key findings included:

  • The judge had misunderstood the effect of a Nigerian judgment, wrongly treating it as having determined the debt's legitimacy. In fact, it merely reflected an uncontested settlement agreement—not a finding of fact.
  • The court below had failed to account for the almost total lack of financial documentation, such as company accounts or bank transfers that might corroborate the debt.
  • Crucially, the judge discounted the wife’s evidence for lack of supporting documentation, even though such documents were in the control of the husband or his brother—a serious error in reasoning.

The matter was remitted to the High Court for full reconsideration.

Legal Themes of Note

  1. Sham Transactions and the Burden of Proof

The appellate court reiterated that proving a sham is a high bar, but also noted that if evidence creates enough suspicion, the evidential burden may shift. If a husband claims a company debt, he must come armed with documents to prove it.

  1. Foreign Judgments and Enforcement

This case also spotlights the limits of foreign judgment recognition, especially where there’s no adjudication of the underlying facts. Family courts must not be cowed by overseas decisions that amount to rubber-stamped settlements.

  1. The Balance of Interests

The Harman v Glencross and Kremen v Agrest lines of authority were crucial: where assets are insufficient to satisfy both a spouse and a creditor, the court must balance competing claims—not simply defer to a charging order.

Why This Case Matters

This decision underscores how creative debt claims can derail financial remedy cases—and the importance of judicial vigilance. When the origin of a debt is murky, and the creditor is a relative with no commercial incentive, alarm bells should ring. Especially when:

  • The loan terms are uncommercial (interest-free, undocumented);
  • The lender and debtor appear to act in concert;
  • Critical financial documentation is absent.

Key Points for Family Lawyers

  • Challenge debts robustly: If they surface late and lack documentation, seek full disclosure and test the evidence rigorously.
  • Don’t assume finality in registered foreign judgments—look at the process behind them.
  • Know your tools: Section 23 MFPA 1984 and section 37 MCA 1973 remain powerful weapons to prevent dispositions designed to defeat legitimate claims.
  • Press for joined hearings: As here, courts can and should consider financial remedy claims and third-party enforcement claims together, to ensure fairness.

Conclusion

Following the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the case has been remitted to the High Court for rehearing. This means that the wife will have another opportunity to argue that the alleged debt is a sham and that the property should remain available to meet her financial claim. The court will now hear full evidence—likely including cross-examination of the husband and his brother—and reach a fresh decision on the legitimacy of the loan and whether the previous judgments should be set aside. For family law practitioners, the upcoming hearing may provide further guidance on how English courts navigate offshore debt claims in matrimonial contexts.

But for now, the Court of Appeal has made it clear that family justice is not a playground for manufactured debts. If there’s an elephant in the room claiming to be a creditor, the court will—eventually—ask for proof that it isn’t just a man in a costume.

16 May 2025

What Is Maintenance Pending Suit – And Should I Apply?

If you're separating from your spouse and struggling financially, you may have heard about something called Maintenance Pending Suit or MPS. But what is it, and when is it actually worth applying for?

What is Maintenance Pending Suit (MPS)?

MPS is short-term, court-ordered financial support paid by one spouse to the other after separation—but before your full divorce finances are sorted out. It's designed to help with day-to-day living expenses while your case is ongoing.

Think of it as a “holding payment” to keep things stable until the final decision is made.

When Might MPS Be Appropriate?

You may be able to apply for MPS if:

  • You don’t have enough income to cover your basic living costs.
  • You’re waiting for the court to divide your assets, but that process will take several months.
  • You’ve lost access to joint funds or support since the separation.

For example:

  • A stay-at-home parent with no income might apply for MPS to cover rent or groceries.
  • Someone who had previously relied on a higher-earning spouse may need short-term help until the financial settlement is reached.

What Does the Court Look At?

The court doesn’t do a full analysis of assets at this stage. Instead, it looks at:

  • Your current income and reasonable outgoings.
  • The other party’s income and ability to pay.
  • Whether your request is reasonable and fair, not excessive.

The test isn’t about what you “want” or what you’ll eventually get—it’s about meeting essential needs in the short term.

When Might It Not Be Worthwhile?

Courts take a dim view of small or tactical applications—especially if:

  • The final hearing is just around the corner.
  • You have savings or income to meet your needs in the meantime.
  • The cost of applying is more than the amount you’re asking for.

In a recent case, DSD v MJW [2025], a wife applied for £500 per month for three months—just £1,500 in total. But the legal costs ended up being over £12,000. The judge called it a “bad application” and warned against wasting court time and money on low-value claims.

Top Tips Before Applying for MPS

  • Be realistic about what you need and what the court will allow.
    Apply early—preferably at or just after your first court appointment.
    Talk to your solicitor about alternatives (e.g. interim payments from joint savings).
    Be mindful of costs—don’t spend £5,000 to argue for £1,000.

Final Word

MPS can be a vital financial lifeline—but it’s not for everyone. If you're unsure whether it's right for you, speak to your solicitor early in the process. A well-timed, reasonable request can help keep things steady. A last-minute, tactical application could do more harm than good.

15 May 2025

Top-Up Child Maintenance in HNW Cases: Where Lifestyle Meets Logic

For family lawyers advising high-net-worth clients, the concept of “top-up” child maintenance is often one of the most contested elements in financial proceedings. The decision in James v Seymour [2023] EWHC 844 (Fam) adds further clarity (and complexity) to the landscape—reconciling parental affluence, fairness, and legislative boundaries.

But what exactly is a top-up order? And how far should the English courts go to ensure that a child’s lifestyle mirrors that of the richer parent?

What Is a “Top-Up” Order?

Under the Child Support Act 1991, the Child Maintenance Service (CMS) calculates maintenance obligations up to a gross annual income of £156,000. For earnings above this cap, the court regains jurisdiction under section 8(6), allowing it to make “top-up” orders. The rationale? In ultra-wealthy cases, CMS figures don’t touch the sides of the child’s actual needs or expectations.

James v Seymour: Conventional Awards vs Lifestyle Claims

In James v Seymour, the mother sought to increase maintenance to over £2,000 per month per child based on a “disparity of lifestyle” with the father, a successful private equity executive. But Mr Justice Mostyn wasn’t persuaded, stating:

“The amount that would be payable under the formula... is plainly excessive and not reasonably proportionate.”

Mostyn J preferred a conventional needs-based assessment, applying what he termed an “Adjusted Formula Methodology” (AFM) for high-income cases up to £650,000, acknowledging both its utility and its flaws.

CB v KB [2019]: Enter the Formula

This earlier case set the ball rolling. Mostyn J suggested that the CMS formula should provide a logical starting point—even for incomes up to £650,000. The so-called “Mostyn formula” offered predictability, but it was soon criticised for producing arbitrary per-child results and failing to reflect economies of scale in larger families.

Collardeau-Fuchs v Fuchs [2022]: Introducing HECSA

In Collardeau-Fuchs, the court made a crucial distinction between:

  • Conventional child support awards, calculated by reference to proportionate expenses.
  • Household Expenditure Child Support Awards (HECSAs), where the award reflects broader household running costs and lifestyle parity.

Top-up orders in HECSA cases go beyond food and clothing—they cover multiple properties, drivers, nannies, and international schooling. But such awards must still meet the fairness test under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

What Did James v Seymour Add?

Mostyn J’s most valuable contribution may be his proposed AFM framework, with adjustments based on:

  • School fees and other grossed-up costs;
  • Pension contributions;
  • Number of children and level of shared care.

This model aims to avoid disproportionate outcomes and offers guidance for incomes between £156,000 and £650,000.

He also acknowledged its limits:

  • It shouldn’t apply to variation applications;
  • It doesn’t work well for unearned income or capital-rich respondents;
  • It mustn’t override the discretionary test under s.25.

Practical Tips for Practitioners

  1. Budget First: A detailed child-focused budget remains the cornerstone of any claim. Don’t assume income alone drives quantum.
  2. HECSA or Not?: Be clear whether the claim is for a HECSA-style award (lifestyle parity) or a conventional needs-based sum.
  3. Use the AFM Sparingly: As a reference tool—not a rule.
  4. Don’t Overreach: Courts are alive to inflated claims. In James v Seymour, the court saw through attempts to use the father’s wealth as a blank cheque.
  5. Equalisation Isn't a Goal: Lifestyle parity may be a factor, but it's not the legal test. The court won’t iron out every disparity, particularly post-divorce.

Conclusion

In the HNW world, child maintenance can range from the modest to the majestic. But James v Seymour reminds us that fairness, not fortune, is the measure—and that clear, proportionate claims still carry the day. Practitioners should embrace the guidance while remembering that even in luxury, legal principles must still apply.

14 May 2025

Tying Up Loose Ends: THR v WAT and the Realities of High-Net-Worth Divorce

In THR v WAT [2025] EWHC 1125 (Fam), His Honour Judge Hess was faced with the unenviable task of transforming a multi-million-pound Xydhias agreement into a final financial remedy order—navigating disputed terms, hidden costs, forgotten interest, and inflated child maintenance schedules. The judgment offers practitioners a rare insight into the pitfalls of rushed settlements and the court’s insistence that “a deal is a deal”—even if you think you left something out.

The Context: A Quick Settlement in a Heavyweight Case

This was a “big money” case with substantial assets on both sides. The parties had six bundles of documents and a 10-day final hearing listed, but they reached an agreement on day one—what both sides called a binding Xydhias agreement. The problem? Not everything was spelled out clearly.

Over the next few days, the drafting revealed five points of contention:

  1. Whether a company loan should reduce the wife's lump sum.
  2. Whether estimated legal fees should be adjusted post-settlement.
  3. Whether the lump sums should attract interest.
  4. Whether the wife should receive additional security.
  5. What level of child periodical payments (CMS top-up) the husband should pay.

Xydhias Means Finality, Not Flexibility

The husband had agreed to pay the wife £36 million, less “what she already had”—a sum which his own documents put at £2.09 million. But he later argued this was a mistake, particularly because it didn’t reflect the (supposed) value of the wife’s interest in a company called X Ltd or her reduced legal fees.

The court disagreed.

Judge Hess reminded both parties that once they reached a Xydhias agreement, the court’s role was not to re-write the deal unless there had been fraud or clear mistake. The husband, having made a firm offer based on £2.09 million, was held to it. His Honour was clear:

“There was time to raise this if it was important... a deal is a deal.”

No Interest Means... No Interest

The wife’s team attempted to insert a clause for interest on the deferred lump sums—months after the deal was struck. Judge Hess ruled this was an afterthought, not part of the agreed terms. Despite being asked to add 3.75% interest on unpaid instalments, he refused:

“If the wife’s team wanted those to be an essential part of the deal, there was plenty of time... They did not.”

Security Provisions: Reasonable, Not Total

The husband offered partial security against the lump sums, which the wife wanted increased to 100%. The judge declined, noting the husband had already paid £5 million early and was not shown to be a flight risk or unwilling to comply. The court endorsed the principle that perfect security is not always necessary where trustworthiness is evident.

Top-Up Maintenance in the HNW World

Both parties agreed the case warranted a CMS top-up order under section 8(6) of the Child Support Act 1991. But the figures were miles apart:

  • Wife’s position: £50,000 per child, per annum (£150,000 total).
  • Husband’s position: £20,000 per child, per annum (£60,000 total).

Judge Hess landed in the middle at £25,000 per child—totalling £75,000 per year—and made some trenchant comments about the inflated and unrealistic budget put forward by the wife. Among the claims: £120,000 on holidays, £6,000 for children’s computers, and £2,000 on Christmas gifts.

We are dealing with children aged six, six, and three... the needs of children must be finite whatever the payer’s income.”

This aligns with the James v Seymour approach—where top-up maintenance is assessed from first principles (s.25 MCA 1973) rather than simply applying a cap or CMS formula.

Key Lessons for Practitioners

  • Don’t leave “loose ends” in a Xydhias deal—spell out issues like interest, security, and assumptions about asset values at the time of agreement.
  • Final means final—the court won’t revisit a deal just because one side gets buyer’s remorse.
  • Avoid “aspirational” budgets—top-up child maintenance claims must be grounded in actual need, even in ultra-wealthy families.
  • Security must be proportionate—perfect cover isn’t always required if the payer has a history of compliance.

Final Word

THR v WAT is a textbook example of the messiness that can follow an expensive, high-stakes settlement reached too quickly. For those dealing with big numbers and complex structures, it’s a reminder: if you want clarity, earn it at the drafting table—not by asking the court to fix what you forgot to ask for.

13 May 2025

When Final Orders Don’t Mean Finality – Revisiting Joint Lives Maintenance GH v IH 2025 EWFC 120

The decision in GH v IH [2025] EWFC 120 (B) provides a revealing look at the long tail of family financial orders, where joint lives maintenance collides with real-life messiness: patchy compliance, unclear enforcement, varying income, and the challenge of aging parties still locked in litigation over a marriage that ended more than a decade ago.

District Judge Hatvany’s extempore judgment is a detailed and pragmatic application of section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, offering clarity on when variation is appropriate—and a cautionary note about maintenance orders that refuse to die quietly.

The Context: A Long Marriage, Long Orders, and Long Running Problems

The parties married in 1993 and divorced in 2012. The original financial order included joint lives maintenance of £2,000 per month, linked to RPI. But over a decade later, the wife brought enforcement proceedings claiming nearly £17,000 in unpaid RPI increases. The husband countered that he had “overpaid” by continuing to cover her private health insurance and mobile bills.

Meanwhile, both parties were approaching retirement age, the 2012 pension sharing orders hadn’t yet been implemented, and a jointly owned property was still awaiting sale. The wife lived mortgage-free; the husband remained self-employed with multiple properties and ongoing family obligations.

Notable Issues in the Judgment

  1. Joint Lives Maintenance Under Pressure

DJ Hatvany acknowledged that the original decision to order joint lives maintenance might not reflect modern practice, particularly where no long-term disability is involved. But with the wife nearing 66, holding a blue badge, and having health challenges, the original decision to make a joint lives order wasn’t inappropriate.

However, the judge was clear that indefinite £2,000 monthly payments were no longer justified, especially given the husband’s declining income and the wife’s own unacknowledged income from a solar farm.

  1. Credibility of Needs Claims

The wife claimed her needs were over £5,000 per month—including £900 for private health insurance—despite living alone in a mortgage-free property. The judge pegged her actual needs closer to £3,000 per month, noting that recent expenditures on kitchen renovations, new carpets, and landscaping were not indicative of hardship.

  1. What Counts as “Payment”?

The husband’s defence to the enforcement claim was novel but accepted: while he hadn’t paid the RPI-linked uplift, he had continued to cover the wife’s private health insurance, dental plan, and phone bills. On balance, the court found these payments exceeded what was due—so the enforcement application failed.

  1. Variation Principles and Forward Planning

From April 2025, the husband was ordered to pay £1,000 per month—not £2,000—reflecting the wife’s growing income from pensions and notional solar farm profit. But the judge expressed real concern about the lack of finality and urged the parties to consider agreeing a Duxbury-style capitalisation of the remaining maintenance obligation.

“Otherwise, I fear the door may be left open to the husband making a further variation application as he approaches retirement, or for the wife to make a further application if her circumstances change.”

Key Points for Family Law Practitioners

  • Maintenance variation must reflect needs and affordability. The court closely scrutinised both parties’ lifestyles and income, including under-declared income sources.
  • Creative compliance can be accepted. Payments made outside the strict terms of the order (e.g., health insurance) may still discharge the obligation if clearly linked and recorded.
  • Clean breaks are preferable. This case is a textbook example of the cost and stress of lingering maintenance obligations—especially with pensions and properties still unresolved more than a decade on.
  • Judicial restraint on costs. The judge pointedly asked for “no claim for costs” at the next hearing, to avoid incurring further legal expense over small differences.

Final Thought

GH v IH is a reminder that joint lives orders are often slow-burning sources of litigation, particularly when combined with unimplemented pension sharing, contested enforcement, and shifting needs as parties age. A Duxbury lump sum may not feel satisfying in the moment—but compared to another decade of claims, counterclaims, and spreadsheets—it can be a gift of finality.

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