12 September 2025

The Long Goodbye – Matrimonial Home Disputes After Decades Apart – G v N [2025] EWFC 286

The case of G v N [2025] EWFC 286 (B) is a striking reminder of how the family courts approach the matrimonial home when it is the sole remaining asset – and how long periods of separation, combined with non-engagement, can heavily influence the outcome.

The Facts

The husband and wife had divorced many years earlier, but no financial order had ever been made. Nearly thirty years ago, the wife walked out of the former matrimonial home (FMH), leaving the husband to raise their two children and meet all the financial obligations alone.

At the time she left, the house was almost entirely mortgaged – the equity was around 10%. Over the ensuing decades, the husband paid off the mortgage, maintained the property, and supported the children without any contribution from the wife. She made no child maintenance payments, offered no financial assistance, and had no involvement in the children’s lives.

Fast forward to 2025, the husband sought a financial remedies order to transfer the FMH into his sole name, arguing that it was inequitable for the wife to retain any interest given her long absence and lack of contribution.

The Wife’s Silence

The wife was served with all the necessary documents, but she neither filed evidence nor attended the final hearing. Her only recorded contact was a last-minute phone call to say she would not attend due to ill health. She made no application to adjourn. As a result, the husband’s evidence went entirely unchallenged.

The Court’s Approach

District Judge Shackleton considered the familiar section 25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 factors, but noted that many were of little relevance given the unusual facts. With no dependent children and no competing financial claims, the focus was on fairness in the distribution of the only asset.

Key points:

  • The wife had abandoned the home and family nearly 30 years earlier.
  • The husband had paid 90% of the mortgage and all household outgoings since.
  • There was no evidence of any ongoing needs or contributions by the wife.
  • Conduct was not pleaded, but the court could not ignore the practical effect of the wife’s choices: the husband had borne the full financial and parental burden.

The judge concluded the wife had “no claim whatsoever” to the property. The FMH was ordered to be transferred into the husband’s sole name, with the court itself authorised to sign the TR1 transfer if the wife refused. Importantly, a clean break was imposed, ensuring finality.

Key Lessons for Practitioners

  1. The matrimonial home is not sacrosanct – in the right circumstances, one party may be awarded the entire property, especially after long separation and sole financial responsibility.
  2. Non-engagement is risky – silence from the wife meant her position went unheard, and the husband’s evidence was accepted unchallenged.
  3. Time matters – three decades of unilateral responsibility weighed heavily in the husband’s favour.
  4. Clean breaks remain a priority – courts will seize the opportunity to conclude financial ties, particularly in older cases with no dependent children.

Conclusion

G v N is unusual but illustrative. While courts often strive for fairness through division of the matrimonial home, here the facts left little room for sharing. For practitioners, it underlines the importance of advising clients that absence and non-engagement may lead to the extinguishing of claims – and that finality is always the court’s goal.

22 August 2025

From Second Chances to Final Orders: TYB v CAR and the Perils of Non-Disclosure

In family finance cases, the golden rule is simple: disclose everything. The courts cannot divide what they cannot see. Yet the recent sequel judgment in TYB v CAR (Non-Disclosure) (No 2) [2025] EWFC 263 shows what happens when one party repeatedly refuses to play by the rules.

The Backstory – TYB v CAR [2023] EWFC 261 (B)

Back in 2023, Deputy District Judge Hodson faced a difficult choice. The husband had failed to provide proper financial disclosure, despite repeated opportunities. Instead of ploughing on to a final hearing with incomplete information, the judge reluctantly granted him one last chance. The message was clear: comply now, or face serious consequences.

Fast Forward to 2025 – Non-Disclosure Continues

Unfortunately, little changed. By the time the case returned in 2025, the husband had still not provided a full picture of his finances. The court had no reliable disclosure, no credible explanation, and no sign of engagement with the process.

This time, patience had run out. The judge concluded that the only way forward was to make findings based on the available evidence, drawing adverse inferences where necessary.

The Outcome

The judgment demonstrates the firm but fair tools available to the court in dealing with non-disclosers:

  • Maintenance: The husband was ordered to pay £5,500 per month in maintenance to the wife. This figure reflected his historic earnings and lifestyle, rather than his (unsubstantiated) claims of financial difficulty.
  • Arrears & Indemnities: He was required to clear arrears and indemnify the wife against debts he had wrongly left in her name.
  • Costs: A costs order of nearly £39,000 was made against him, reflecting the unnecessary litigation caused by his failure to cooperate.
  • Capital Claims Adjourned: The wife’s capital claims were adjourned for up to ten years, leaving the door open in case hidden assets surface.

Why This Matters for Practitioners

The two judgments taken together chart the journey from judicial forbearance to judicial firmness:

  • Initial tolerance: Courts are reluctant to make final orders without disclosure, giving parties every chance to comply.
  • Finality: Eventually, though, the need for closure outweighs the hope of voluntary compliance. The court will use its powers to infer, to adjust, and to penalise.
  • Adverse inferences are powerful: When disclosure is withheld, judges can and will draw conclusions from lifestyle, spending, and the absence of evidence.
  • Strategic risk: Non-disclosure doesn’t just fail — it often backfires, leading to worse outcomes than honest disclosure might have produced.

Final Thought

TYB v CAR is a cautionary tale in two parts. In 2023, the husband was given a reprieve; in 2025, the court called time. The lesson is as old as family finance itself: disclosure is not optional. Inch by inch, excuse by excuse, a non-discloser may delay the process — but eventually, the court will reach the finishing line, and it rarely ends well for the obstructive party.

21 August 2025

Inch by Inch: When Dispositions Cross the Line in Divorce Claims

The recent decision in IN v CH [2025] EWFC 265 offers a textbook example of how the family courts tackle attempts to sidestep financial claims in divorce through asset dispositions. The case concerned the husband’s efforts to move assets out of reach of the wife’s claim—transactions the court found to be intended to defeat her entitlement.

The Facts
Following the breakdown of the marriage, the husband entered into a series of transfers and arrangements which, viewed individually, might have seemed modest. But inch by inch, they created a picture of deliberate manoeuvring designed to frustrate the wife’s claim for financial relief.

The wife applied under Section 37 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which allows the court to set aside transactions where there is an intention to defeat a spouse’s financial remedy claim. The threshold is not that the transfer has to succeed in defeating the claim—only that the intention was there.

The Court’s Approach
The judge carefully analysed the pattern of conduct:

  • Timing of transfers, aligned with litigation milestones.
  • The lack of credible commercial justification for some arrangements.
  • The cumulative effect of the dealings, which reduced the pot available for division.

This “inch by inch” strategy backfired. The court was satisfied the husband’s actions engaged s.37, and steps were taken to preserve assets for the wife’s claim.

Key Legal Principles

  • Section 37 MCA 1973: empowers the court to set aside dispositions intended to defeat claims, even if they don’t actually succeed in doing so.
  • Intention is enough: the test is not whether the transaction did defeat the claim, but whether it was meant to.
  • Timing and context matter: suspiciously timed transactions, especially once proceedings are on foot, will be closely scrutinised.

Why It Matters
This judgment underscores the court’s willingness to step in where one party seeks to erode the asset base in a piecemeal fashion. For practitioners, it highlights the importance of:

  • Promptly monitoring and investigating asset movements;
  • Using s.37 strategically to safeguard assets at risk;
  • Advising clients that tactical dispositions are likely to be exposed and unwound.

Final Thought
IN v CH is a reminder that family courts take a dim view of financial manoeuvres designed to tilt the playing field. A spouse cannot, inch by inch, chip away at the marital assets in the hope of leaving their partner short. The law is equipped to unwind such moves—and often does.

8 August 2025

Deadlines Matter: When a Missed Statement Costs You Your Voice in Court

In the fast-paced, paper-heavy world of family law litigation, deadlines are more than administrative niceties — they are the procedural backbone of fairness. The recent case of AB v CD [2025] EWFC 253 (B) is a textbook example of what happens when parties ignore court directions and then scramble for leniency.

The Issue: Too Late, Too Weak, Too Bad

This was meant to be a straightforward final hearing in financial remedy proceedings — until it wasn’t. The wife (AB) had failed to file her Section 25 witness statement by the deadline ordered by District Judge Malik. Worse, she also failed to apply for permission to rely on a late statement until the hearing had already begun.

District Judge Dodsworth had no difficulty identifying the scale of the non-compliance:

  • The witness statements were late.
  • The hearing bundle exceeded page limits without permission.
  • Position statements were filed far outside the permitted window.
  • The excuse for lateness — vague references to difficulties with previous counsel and late disclosure from the husband — was unsupported by any real evidence.

The court noted that the failure was intentional, without any good explanation, and had the effect of prejudicing the husband’s ability to respond. In short: this wasn’t just a delay — it was a breakdown of procedural fairness.

The Rules: No Statement, No Oral Evidence

Under the Family Procedure Rules 2010, specifically FPR 22.10, a party who fails to serve a witness statement by the ordered deadline cannot call that witness without the court’s permission. The rule is crystal clear. Permission must be sought — and granted — for late compliance.

Furthermore, FPR 4.5(3) makes clear that even if both parties agree to late service, that doesn’t fix it. The court’s permission is the only way forward.

Applications for relief from sanctions fall under FPR 4.6, which mirrors the well-known Denton test from civil litigation. Courts must consider:

  1. The seriousness of the breach;
  2. Why it occurred;
  3. All the circumstances, including the interests of justice and the need for rules compliance.

In AB v CD, the court found the breach to be serious, the explanation weak, and the resulting prejudice significant. Unsurprisingly, the application failed.

Lessons for Practitioners and Parties Alike

This case is a reminder that:

  • Deadlines are not suggestions. Miss them, and you may lose the right to make your case.
  • Excuses must be real and supported by evidence. Vague statements in a box on Form D11 won’t cut it.
  • Relief from sanctions is not automatic. Judges expect discipline, especially in overburdened family courts.

As District Judge Dodsworth aptly noted, ignoring directions is “effectively a form of cheating” — echoing language from Xanthopoulos v Rakshina [2022] EWFC 30.

Final Word: Fairness Requires Compliance

The Family Court system is under immense pressure, and judicial patience for procedural laxity is wearing thin. If a party wants to be heard, they must take their procedural obligations seriously. AB v CD is a harsh but fair reminder that the cost of default can be silence.

7 August 2025

When £15 Million Isn’t Enough: Valuation, Illiquidity and Tax Risk in HNW Financial Remedy Cases

In Michael v Michael (No 3) [2025] EWFC 245, His Honour Judge Hess dealt with the tangled web of asset valuation, liquidity, tax exposure, and non-matrimonial property in a case where the wife emerged with over £15 million—but still raised grounds of unfairness.

This is a case that reminds us how complexity doesn’t disappear with wealth—it just changes shape.

  1. Illiquidity: The Risk of ‘Paper Wealth’

The wife’s complaint was rooted in the fact that the majority of her award was illiquid—tied up in company shares and private assets—while the husband retained greater accessible cash. The court acknowledged that illiquidity could pose real-world difficulties, but ultimately found that in the context of such large sums, the imbalance did not render the award unfair.

The court is unlikely to accept illiquidity as a basis to disturb an otherwise generous settlement—especially when the party has received many millions, even if not immediately spendable.

  1. Tax Risk: Hypothetical or Real?

The wife raised concerns over latent tax liabilities associated with her share of the business assets. The court reiterated the well-established principle: speculative tax risks won’t generally reduce the award unless there is a clear and quantifiable liability.

Myerson v Myerson [2009] EWCA Civ 282 remains good law: parties must live with the ups and downs of asset valuation, especially where shares are retained as part of the agreed or ordered outcome.

  1. Valuation of Private Companies

A significant theme in the case was the valuation of a private business—standard fare in HNW divorces. Notably, the court endorsed the single joint expert’s conclusions, and rejected the idea of a second valuation, in line with the Daniels v Walker principles. The dispute centred not just on quantum, but on the structure of how business assets were to be divided or retained.

  1. Non-Matrimonial Assets and Contribution

A recurring argument from the husband was that certain business interests and inherited property fell outside the matrimonial pot. The judge acknowledged the concept of non-matrimonial property but found that over such a long marriage, and due to the intermingling of finances, much of the distinction had become blurred.

  1. Overall Fairness in Ultra-HNW Settlements

The court took a wide-lens view: although the wife received just under 40% of the overall wealth, she was awarded £15.25 million in assets—a sum that exceeded her assessed needs by some distance.

This underscores the principle that “needs” are not capped at bare necessities in high-value cases, but also that sharing may still be moderated where non-matrimonial property dominates the asset base.

Conclusion

Michael v Michael is not groundbreaking, but it offers a valuable reaffirmation of core financial remedy principles:

  • Fairness does not demand equality in every scenario.
  • Illiquidity and hypothetical tax should be carefully evidenced.
  • The court will balance contributions, needs, and asset origin—but not at the expense of pragmatism.

A strong case to cite when clients equate perceived imbalance with unfairness—especially when the sums involved are comfortably in the eight-figure bracket.

4 August 2025

Soft Loans, Hard Truths: Untangling Family Debt in Divorce

In JB v RB [2025] EWFC 194 (B), Recorder Allen KC was asked to answer a deceptively tricky question: when is a loan not a loan? The case delves into the increasingly common issue of "soft loans" from family members, and whether they should be treated as liabilities or mere gifts when dividing the matrimonial pot.

This case is a useful reminder for practitioners: not all IOUs are created equal—and unless properly evidenced, a loan may find itself at the back of the queue.

The Background

The husband (H) in JB v RB contended that two significant loans from his family—amounting to over £300,000—should be treated as matrimonial liabilities and reduce the net assets available for division. The wife (W) disputed this, claiming they were either gifts or at most soft loans unlikely to be repaid.

As is typical in these disputes, the “creditors” were H’s close family, and there was no independent documentation or third-party enforcement.

The Legal Framework: What Makes a Loan “Soft”?

The court in JB v RB adopted the approach endorsed in P v Q (Financial Remedies) [2022] EWFC B9 (HHJ Hess) and cited by Mr Justice Mostyn in P v Q [2022] EWFC 93, considering a range of factors when evaluating whether a loan should be treated as a genuine liability:

  • Was there a written agreement?
  • Were there any terms of repayment?
  • Was there interest?
  • Has any repayment actually been made?
  • Would enforcement be pursued?
  • Is the lender in the habit of enforcing such arrangements?

Where the answers to these questions suggest a “soft” arrangement—particularly where the parties would not expect the money to be repaid unless convenient—the court is more likely to treat it as a gift.

What the Court Found

In JB v RB, the judge concluded that the husband's claimed loans did not satisfy the criteria of a hard liability. Key points:

  • There was no loan agreement, no repayment schedule, and no evidence of enforcement.
  • The judge doubted the lender (the husband's mother) would pursue repayment if it meant her son being disadvantaged.
  • No repayments had been made.
  • The timing of the funds coincided suspiciously with the breakdown of the marriage.

The result? The sums were excluded from the schedule of liabilities. The husband's argument that they should be “added back” into the net asset pool failed.

Practical Guidance for Practitioners

  1. Get it in writing: If family money is intended to be a repayable loan, make sure there’s documentation.
  2. Ask the hard questions early: Consider early on whether the client’s claims about loans will stand up to judicial scrutiny.
  3. Timing matters: Late-stage “loans” appearing post-separation are especially vulnerable.
  4. Be wary of litigation risks: Contesting soft loans can be expensive and often yields little benefit.
  5. Disclosure and evidence: Bank transfers alone won’t prove a debt exists. Courts want to see the paper trail and intentions behind the payment.

Conclusion: A Hard Line on Soft Loans

JB v RB confirms what family lawyers increasingly know: courts are sceptical of informal family loans, especially where they surface late in the day or are unsupported by clear documentation.

For spouses trying to insulate wealth or shrink the marital pot with a conveniently timed IOU, this case is a warning. If it walks like a gift and quacks like a gift—it probably won’t be treated as a loan.

22 July 2025

When Does Conduct Matter? Two Recent Cases Clarify the Rules in Financial Remedies

Conduct arguments in financial remedy cases are famously hard to win. The bar is high, the principles are narrow, and the courts are cautious. But two recent decisions—MRU v ECR [2025] EWFC 218 (B) and Y v Z [2025] EWFC 221—help clarify the parameters of what counts, when conduct should be pleaded, and how a court might be persuaded that it should make a difference.

Case 1: MRU v ECR — Imprisonment and its Aftermath

In MRU v ECR, the wife had served a prison sentence for attempting to interfere with a judicial process in earlier Children Act proceedings. At final hearing, the husband sought to rely on this as conduct within section 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The judge found that the wife’s actions had caused significant disruption and anxiety to the family and could not be ignored when considering the fair division of assets.

Although the case did not result in a punitive financial order, it did result in the husband keeping the former matrimonial home and the parties' pensions being equalised, reflecting his increased needs and financial vulnerability post-incident.

Key point: Serious criminal conduct, especially when linked to the family breakdown, can be relevant even in low-asset cases—particularly if it affects the other party's ability to rebuild financially or psychologically.

Case 2: Y v Z — Conduct vs. Nuptial Agreements

In contrast, Y v Z involved a dispute over how to interpret a pre-nuptial agreement (PNA) in light of the husband's alleged financial misconduct. The wife claimed he had taken millions from her accounts without consent and even doctored emails to hide it. But the question for Mr Justice Cusworth was procedural: should this be pleaded formally as conduct under section 25(2)(g), even though it was about how the PNA should be implemented?

The court held that yes, the wife should be allowed to amend her pleadings to include conduct, but that this was not a radical change—she had always intended to argue that fairness required a deduction from the husband's entitlement due to his financial behaviour. Still, the judgment highlights the fine lines between:

  • Unfair behaviour affecting what’s "owed" under an agreement; and
  • Gross or obvious conduct justifying a punitive financial adjustment.

Key point: If you're alleging dishonest or improper financial conduct, plead it properly under s.25(2)(g)—but courts may still consider fairness outside that framework if behaviour undermines the structure of an agreement or the division of assets.

Lessons for Practitioners: How to Succeed With a Conduct Case

Conduct will only bite financially in limited circumstances—but where it does, it must be:

  • Particularised with clarity (dates, figures, documents);
  • Linked to a financial consequence (loss, cost, waste); and
  • Pled early and explicitly under the correct statutory route.

You can’t smuggle in a conduct case “by the back door.” As Peel J warned in Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2023] EWFC 130:

“It is wholly inappropriate to advance matters at final hearing as being part of the general circumstances of the case which do not meet the high threshold for conduct...”

But Y v Z also reminds us that:

“There have hitherto been a number of situations where a question of how a party has behaved may well have been relevant...without either party invoking the conduct provisions.”

That nuance matters. Courts are mindful that bad behaviour may affect the fair implementation of pre-nups or entitlement to share—but that’s not the same as punishing it under s.25(2)(g).

Final Word

Together, MRU v ECR and Y v Z show us both ends of the conduct spectrum—from clearcut wrongdoing with real-world fallout, to sophisticated financial gamesmanship that might affect entitlement but not necessarily trigger punishment.

If you’re going to plead conduct, do it early, do it properly, and make sure you can prove both what happened and why it matters financially. If you’re opposing it, challenge its scope and the causal link to the outcome. The courts will listen—but only if the case is made carefully, not emotionally.

14 July 2025

Set Aside Under Pressure: When Billion-Pound Deals Unravel in Divorce

In PN v SA [2025] EWFC 141, the Family Court delivered a landmark judgment in what is believed to be the third-largest financial remedy case in English legal history. Behind the billion-pound headlines lies a powerful cautionary tale about pressure, emotional coercion, and the proper legal scrutiny of post-separation agreements.

The Case in Numbers

  • Estimated marital wealth at separation: over £1.5 billion
  • Legal costs spent: approximately £5.5 million
  • Final settlement: over £460 million in divisible assets
  • Payment made pre-judgment (to maximise tax advantages): $95 million offshore

But it wasn’t just the size of the estate that caught the court’s attention—it was the way the wife had been manoeuvred into signing a post-separation agreement under intense emotional and psychological pressure.

2023 Settlement Agreement: Fair Bargain or Coerced Consent?

The case turned on two agreements: a 2021 Post-Nuptial Agreement (PNA), which provided for equal division, and a 2023 Settlement Agreement signed after the parties separated. The husband argued the latter reflected a considered, updated agreement on asset division. The wife claimed she had signed under duress.

Mr Justice Cobb agreed with her.

Drawing on Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 and Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, the judge was clear: while separation agreements carry weight, they must be freely entered into. And here, the wife’s will had been “overborne”. The court accepted she had been subject to emotional, psychological, and financial pressure, including threats that the husband would “explode” the offshore trust structures and “destroy” their fortune through punitive tax events if she did not comply.

Legal Principles Reaffirmed

  • Undue Pressure: As per Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44, coercion need not amount to duress to be actionable. Persistent psychological pressure—especially in the context of an emotionally fraught divorce—may suffice.
  • Set Aside Jurisdiction: The court reiterated that even “signed” agreements may be displaced if enforcing them would result in injustice.
  • Edgar Factors: In weighing the agreement, the court considered knowledge, legal advice, bargaining position, and changes in circumstance.

High Value, Higher Scrutiny

The court was also unimpressed by the suggestion that fairness had been achieved simply because both parties would receive over £200 million each. Fairness is not just about quantum, but process—and whether each party freely and knowingly entered into the deal.

Lessons for Practitioners

  • Don’t Assume Size Shields: Even in ultra-high net worth (UHNW) cases, the basic principles of fairness and free will apply.
  • Be Alert to Emotional Dynamics: Particularly where one party is financially or emotionally vulnerable post-separation.
  • Process Matters: Attempts to short-circuit independent legal advice or use pressure tactics—even subtly—can invalidate agreements.
  • Beware “Exploding Trust” Threats: This modern metaphor for financial destruction was critical to the court’s finding of pressure.

Final Thought

This case is a timely reminder that even where couples share phenomenal wealth, the emotional currents of divorce can distort negotiations. Agreements reached under pressure—however cleverly disguised—will not be rubber-stamped by the court. Family law’s guiding principle remains the same: fairness, not force.

30 June 2025

When Trusts Become Trouble: Family Business, Dispositions, and the Cost of Conflict

In BM v MB & Ors [2025] EWFC 129, Fiona Hay (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) presided over a case that had it all: dynastic business assets, disputed share transfers, intergenerational family conflict—and over £1.1 million in legal fees.

It is a masterclass in how financial remedy litigation can escalate dangerously when asset protection measures intersect with family breakdown.

The Setup: Complex Structures and S.37 MCA 1973

The case centred around a longstanding family business, held by the husband (H) and various family members. Crucially, just months before the parties separated, H moved:

  • 25% of his shares in the business into a discretionary trust for the benefit of the children;
  • Multiple parcels of land into a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) structure.

The wife (W) argued these were calculated attempts to defeat her financial claims, and sought to set aside the transactions under section 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973—a provision empowering the court to unwind dispositions made to frustrate financial relief.

What the Court Found

Judge Hay found that although the trust and LLP structures had been under discussion for some time, their implementation closely aligned with the breakdown of the marriage. Crucially:

  • The wife was not fully informed of the transfers;
  • The husband failed to demonstrate that the transactions weren’t motivated by a desire to reduce W’s claim;
  • While pitched as inheritance tax planning, the timing and secrecy raised red flags.

The court set aside both the share transfer to the trust and the transfer of land to the LLP under s.37.

The Cost of Litigation

One of the most sobering aspects of the case was the scale of legal costs:

  • W: £480,248
  • H: £392,642
  • H’s mother and others: over £237,000 combined

As the judge noted, the dispute “could and should have been resolved” without this financial destruction. She quoted Baroness Hale in Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60, who emphasised that adversarial financial disputes are corrosive not only to wealth but to the family itself.

The damage here extended beyond finances: the adult children were drawn into the litigation, cross-examined against their parents, and the family fabric unravelled.

Lessons for Practitioners

  1. Disclosure still rules: Attempts to ring-fence assets before or during divorce must be transparent. Even long-considered tax plans will be scrutinised if implemented around separation.
  2. Timing matters: The court will look closely at when and why transactions occurred. Close proximity to marital breakdown may indicate intention to defeat financial relief.
  3. Litigation restraint is key: The case is a warning against unbridled adversarialism, especially when adult children are involved.
  4. Proper planning requires proper process: H's failure to inform or include W, even nominally, undermined his case. Asset protection strategies must anticipate future scrutiny.
  5. Section 37 remains potent: Though rarely invoked, s.37 can unravel sophisticated structures where they frustrate fairness.

Final Thoughts

BM v MB is not just about trusts and land transfers. It’s about what happens when private family succession planning collides with public duties of disclosure and fairness. While the structures were technically competent, they failed on transparency and timing.

For family lawyers, the case is a reminder: substance, not just form, governs outcomes—and that litigation, left unchecked, can cost more than it’s worth.

27 June 2025

Can You Strike It Out? M v B and the Limits of Summary Justice in Family Law

When is a bad application so hopeless that it can be struck out without a full hearing? That question lies at the heart of M v B [2025] EWFC 182, a case that dives deep into the contested territory of strike out powers in financial remedy proceedings.

This judgment, delivered by Sir Jonathan Cohen, is more than just procedural housekeeping—it's a clear-eyed look at a developing legal battleground: whether and how family courts can dispose of unmeritorious applications summarily, and what safeguards must be observed.

The Background

The case began with a substantial consent order: the husband (H) agreed to pay his wife (W) £5.5 million across three instalments. In 2020, following business losses, H applied to vary the order under the Thwaite jurisdiction (on the basis that the order was still executory). That led to a reduced payment agreed in 2021.

In 2024, H returned again, citing further financial deterioration. W responded with a strike out application under FPR 4.4(1)(a) and (b), arguing that H's new application was hopeless and an abuse of process. The issue was whether the court could—legally and fairly—terminate the application before a substantive hearing.

The Core Issue: Does Summary Justice Exist in Family Law?

At the centre of the case was whether FPR 4.4 and PD 9A para 13.8 give family courts the power to strike out or summarily dispose of a set aside or variation application.

Sir Jonathan Cohen's conclusion: the answer remains unclear, and courts must tread carefully.

He highlighted conflicting views:

  • Roberts J (AB v CD [2022]): She accepted that PD 9A para 13.8 permits summary disposal of applications to set aside financial remedy orders, where appropriate.
  • Francis J (Ma v Roux [2024]): He supported a real prospect of success test akin to CPR summary judgment principles, arguing that new rules and PDs supersede earlier limitations.
  • Cohen J's view: Practice Directions cannot create new powers not conferred by the rules. Following Roocroft v Ball, the court should avoid using “summary strike out” procedures that sidestep proper process—especially where the effect is to foreclose on a potentially legitimate claim.

What is the Main Practice Point?

Despite W's argument that H was in flagrant default and raising no new issues, the court refused to strike out the application summarily. Instead, Cohen J opted for an abbreviated hearing later on—recognising both parties’ right to be heard and the danger of short-circuiting justice.

This approach avoids appeal risk and delay. It also affirms a key principle: in financial remedy cases, procedural shortcuts must not undermine fairness.

Strike Out Procedure: A Quick Refresher

Under FPR 4.4(1), the court may strike out a statement of case if:

  • (a) it discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the application;
  • (b) it is an abuse of process or likely to obstruct justice;
  • (c) there has been a failure to comply with rules or orders;
  • (d) both parties consent (in matrimonial applications).

But this power is narrower in the family law context than in civil claims. As Vince v Wyatt and Roocroft v Ball remind us, family proceedings are uniquely sensitive to fact-specific fairness and procedural equality.

Final Thought

M v B confirms that while the strike out rules exist, their reach is limited and heavily scrutinised. As tempting as it may be to rid the system of hopeless applications, family courts must continue to ensure that parties are heard, not just managed.

For practitioners, the message is clear: if you're seeking to strike out a set aside or variation application, expect a high bar—and always prepare for an abbreviated hearing instead.

york-skyline-color
york-skyline-color
york-skyline-color

Get in touch for your free consultation

James-Thornton-Family-Law_white

Where innovation meets excellence

Our mission is clear: to redefine the standards of legal representation by seamlessly integrating unparalleled expertise with cutting-edge innovation.

01904 373 111
info@jamesthorntonfamilylaw.co.uk

York Office

Popeshead Court Offices, Peter Lane, York, YO1 8SU

Appointment only

James Thornton Family Law Limited (trading as James Thornton Family Law) is a Company, registered in England and Wales, with Company Number 15610140. Our Registered Office is Popeshead Court Offices, Peter Lane, York, YO1 8SU. Director: James Thornton. We are authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, SRA number 8007901, and subject to the SRA Standards and Regulations which can be accessed at www.sra.org.uk

Privacy Notice  |  Complaints  |  Terms of Business

Facebook
X (Twitter)
Instagram

©2024 James Thornton Family Law Limited