2 February 2026

When Conduct Undermines a Prenup: Lessons from Loh v Loh Gronager [2025] EWFC 483

Pre‑nuptial agreements are often presented as the ultimate form of certainty in financial remedy proceedings. Properly drafted, independently advised, and entered into freely, they are intended to provide clarity, limit dispute, and avoid costly litigation. But Loh v Loh‑Gronager is a powerful reminder that even the strongest prenup is not a licence to behave badly — and that conduct can still play a decisive role where fairness is put at risk.

The background

The parties entered into a detailed and sophisticated pre‑nuptial agreement which the court accepted was fully compliant with the principles in Radmacher v Granatino. The agreement disapplied sharing and compensation and limited the husband’s entitlement by reference to the length of the marriage. On its face, that would have produced an award of around £6.4 million.

However, the husband’s ultimate award was reduced to approximately £2.3 million. The reason lay not in needs, nor in any technical defect in the agreement, but in his conduct — both during the marriage and in the litigation itself.

Prenups do not authorise self‑help

One of the most striking features of the judgment is the court’s rejection of the husband’s apparent belief that the prenup entitled him to treat joint funds as his own. Cusworth J was clear that joint accounts and jointly held monies have a defined purpose, and unilateral withdrawals for personal use — even where one party asserts tacit approval or lack of objection — are not justified.

The court was unimpressed by arguments that the wife could have monitored the accounts more closely or that silence amounted to consent. A prenup may regulate what happens on divorce, but it does not rewrite the basic principles governing joint property during the marriage.

When conduct crosses the threshold

Conduct arguments in financial remedy cases rarely succeed, and the bar remains high. This case illustrates precisely what is required to meet the statutory test of conduct that would be “inequitable to disregard” under section 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

Cusworth J found that the husband’s behaviour went well beyond ordinary marital or litigation friction. It included:

  • repeated misuse of joint and ring‑fenced funds;
  • secretive financial dealings;
  • intimidation and harassment;
  • and, most seriously, the fabrication and manipulation of documentary evidence.

This was not conduct being punished for its own sake. The judge carefully linked it to fairness, credibility, and the integrity of the proceedings, concluding that it would be unjust to allow the husband to receive the full benefit of the prenup in those circumstances.

Fabricated evidence: a line rarely crossed

Findings of fabricated evidence are unusual and profoundly damaging. Cusworth J described this as among the most serious forms of litigation misconduct encountered in the Family Court. Once such findings were made, the husband’s credibility was fatally undermined and his case infected throughout.

The judgment is a stark warning that attempts to manufacture or doctor evidence are likely to backfire catastrophically, affecting not just costs but the substantive outcome itself.

Fairness under Radmacher

Importantly, the court did not treat conduct and the enforceability of the prenup as separate exercises. Instead, Cusworth J analysed whether it would be fair to hold the parties to the agreement in light of the husband’s behaviour. In doing so, he effectively aligned the Radmacher fairness test with the statutory conduct principles, demonstrating how the two operate together rather than in isolation.

Costs and proportionality

The case also stands as a sobering illustration of litigation excess. The parties incurred almost £4.8 million in legal costs to determine an entitlement ultimately fixed at £2.3 million. The judge observed that something had “gone very wrong”, highlighting the destructive potential of entrenched positions and aggressive litigation strategies.

Why this case matters

Loh v Loh‑Gronager is not simply a high‑net‑worth cautionary tale. It reinforces several key principles:

  • prenups do not excuse financial misconduct;
  • conduct can still materially affect outcome in truly exceptional cases;
  • dishonesty in proceedings is likely to be met with severe consequences; and
  • litigation strategy can be just as important as legal entitlement.

For clients and practitioners alike, the message is clear: certainty only works when matched with integrity. A prenup may set the framework, but fairness — and behaviour — still matter.

26 January 2026

When Conduct Changes Everything: Fraud, Coercive Control and Financial Penalties

In financial remedy proceedings, the court is famously reluctant to allow “conduct” to influence outcomes. The bar is deliberately set high. Most behaviour — even unpleasant, unfair or morally questionable conduct — is excluded from the financial equation.

But LP v MP [2025] EWFC 473 is one of those rare cases where conduct was so serious, so sustained and so financially consequential that it fundamentally altered the distribution of assets. The result? The wife’s financial award was reduced by 40%.

This judgment is an important reminder that while conduct arguments are rarely successful, when they succeed, the impact can be dramatic.

The Legal Test: Why Conduct Rarely Matters

Under section 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the court may take account of conduct only if: “it would be inequitable to disregard it.”

This is an exceptionally high threshold. The authorities make clear that:

  • Bad behaviour during the marriage is usually irrelevant
  • Emotional wrongdoing rarely qualifies
  • Financial misconduct must be gross, obvious and directly linked to financial outcomes

Most conduct arguments fail. But not this one.

The Allegations: Fraud and Coercive Control

The husband alleged that throughout the marriage and financial proceedings, the wife had engaged in:

  • Fraudulent financial behaviour
  • Systematic deception
  • Coercive and controlling conduct
  • Manipulation of financial structures
  • Deliberate obstruction of disclosure

The court undertook a detailed forensic examination of:

  • banking records
  • company accounts
  • financial transfers
  • patterns of behaviour
  • credibility across multiple hearings

The findings were stark. The wife had, over a prolonged period:

  • hidden and manipulated assets
  • misrepresented her financial position
  • exerted coercive control to dominate financial decision-making
  • and attempted to distort the litigation process itself

This was not incidental misconduct. It was a sustained financial strategy.

Why This Crossed the Conduct Threshold

The court found that the wife’s conduct:

  1. Directly affected the asset base, and
  2. Deliberately undermined the court’s ability to achieve fairness

This was not simply unpleasant behaviour — it corrupted the financial exercise itself. As the judge made clear, allowing the wife to benefit fully from sharing principles in these circumstances would: “offend the court’s sense of justice”. That is the precise point at which section 25(2)(g) is triggered.

The Outcome: A 40% Reduction in Award

Ordinarily, this was a case that would have produced an equal division of assets. Instead, the court imposed a 40% reduction in the wife’s entitlement. This is an enormous adjustment by family law standards. The court was explicit: this was not punitive, but corrective — designed to:

  • strip out the financial advantage gained through fraud,
  • neutralise the economic effects of coercive control, and
  • restore fairness to the overall outcome.

Cusworth J’s Restatement of the Law on Conduct

In setting out the legal framework, Cusworth J drew together the leading modern authorities on conduct in financial remedy proceedings. He adopted the structured approach in OG v AG [2020] EWFC 52, where Mostyn J identified four distinct categories in which conduct may become relevant, and emphasised the need to avoid double-counting. He further relied on Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2023] EWFC 130, in which Peel J confirmed that conduct must be strictly proved, must cross a high statutory threshold, and must have a clear causative financial consequence. That approach was reinforced by the Court of Appeal in Goddard-Watts v Goddard-Watts [2023] EWCA Civ 115, confirming that conduct is not punitive and ordinarily requires measurable financial impact, with litigation misconduct normally addressed through costs. Finally, he noted Peel J’s clarification in N v J [2024] EWFC 184, which reaffirmed that even where misconduct is serious, it should only affect the substantive award where there is a demonstrable financial consequence.

Coercive Control: A Growing Theme in Financial Remedies

This judgment is particularly significant for its treatment of coercive and controlling behaviour in the financial context. Traditionally, coercive control has featured primarily in:

  • domestic abuse cases
  • child arrangements proceedings

LP v MP shows how coercive control can also be highly relevant to financial remedy proceedings, particularly where it:

  • distorts financial decision-making
  • suppresses the other spouse’s autonomy
  • and drives unfair financial outcomes

This reflects a broader judicial recognition that financial dominance can be a powerful and abusive dynamic, deserving serious scrutiny.

Why This Case Matters

LP v MP is exceptional — but that is exactly why it matters. It confirms that:

  1. Conduct arguments remain alive — but only in extreme cases

The threshold is high, but not unreachable.

  1. Fraud and coercive control are now firmly within the court’s financial radar

This is not just about hidden bank accounts — it is about financial power and manipulation.

  1. Courts will impose heavy financial consequences where fairness demands it

A 40% adjustment is rare — and speaks volumes.

  1. Litigation conduct and marital conduct can overlap

Where behaviour corrupts the financial process itself, the court will intervene.

The Bigger Message

Family law is fundamentally a jurisdiction of fairness. While it avoids moral judgment, it cannot ignore deliberate financial wrongdoing. LP v MP sends a clear warning: those who manipulate, deceive or financially dominate their spouse risk losing the protection of the sharing principle altogether. In extreme cases, conduct does not merely influence the outcome — it reshapes it.

22 July 2025

When Does Conduct Matter? Two Recent Cases Clarify the Rules in Financial Remedies

Conduct arguments in financial remedy cases are famously hard to win. The bar is high, the principles are narrow, and the courts are cautious. But two recent decisions—MRU v ECR [2025] EWFC 218 (B) and Y v Z [2025] EWFC 221—help clarify the parameters of what counts, when conduct should be pleaded, and how a court might be persuaded that it should make a difference.

Case 1: MRU v ECR — Imprisonment and its Aftermath

In MRU v ECR, the wife had served a prison sentence for attempting to interfere with a judicial process in earlier Children Act proceedings. At final hearing, the husband sought to rely on this as conduct within section 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The judge found that the wife’s actions had caused significant disruption and anxiety to the family and could not be ignored when considering the fair division of assets.

Although the case did not result in a punitive financial order, it did result in the husband keeping the former matrimonial home and the parties' pensions being equalised, reflecting his increased needs and financial vulnerability post-incident.

Key point: Serious criminal conduct, especially when linked to the family breakdown, can be relevant even in low-asset cases—particularly if it affects the other party's ability to rebuild financially or psychologically.

Case 2: Y v Z — Conduct vs. Nuptial Agreements

In contrast, Y v Z involved a dispute over how to interpret a pre-nuptial agreement (PNA) in light of the husband's alleged financial misconduct. The wife claimed he had taken millions from her accounts without consent and even doctored emails to hide it. But the question for Mr Justice Cusworth was procedural: should this be pleaded formally as conduct under section 25(2)(g), even though it was about how the PNA should be implemented?

The court held that yes, the wife should be allowed to amend her pleadings to include conduct, but that this was not a radical change—she had always intended to argue that fairness required a deduction from the husband's entitlement due to his financial behaviour. Still, the judgment highlights the fine lines between:

  • Unfair behaviour affecting what’s "owed" under an agreement; and
  • Gross or obvious conduct justifying a punitive financial adjustment.

Key point: If you're alleging dishonest or improper financial conduct, plead it properly under s.25(2)(g)—but courts may still consider fairness outside that framework if behaviour undermines the structure of an agreement or the division of assets.

Lessons for Practitioners: How to Succeed With a Conduct Case

Conduct will only bite financially in limited circumstances—but where it does, it must be:

  • Particularised with clarity (dates, figures, documents);
  • Linked to a financial consequence (loss, cost, waste); and
  • Pled early and explicitly under the correct statutory route.

You can’t smuggle in a conduct case “by the back door.” As Peel J warned in Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2023] EWFC 130:

“It is wholly inappropriate to advance matters at final hearing as being part of the general circumstances of the case which do not meet the high threshold for conduct...”

But Y v Z also reminds us that:

“There have hitherto been a number of situations where a question of how a party has behaved may well have been relevant...without either party invoking the conduct provisions.”

That nuance matters. Courts are mindful that bad behaviour may affect the fair implementation of pre-nups or entitlement to share—but that’s not the same as punishing it under s.25(2)(g).

Final Word

Together, MRU v ECR and Y v Z show us both ends of the conduct spectrum—from clearcut wrongdoing with real-world fallout, to sophisticated financial gamesmanship that might affect entitlement but not necessarily trigger punishment.

If you’re going to plead conduct, do it early, do it properly, and make sure you can prove both what happened and why it matters financially. If you’re opposing it, challenge its scope and the causal link to the outcome. The courts will listen—but only if the case is made carefully, not emotionally.

5 August 2024

Navigating Financial Remedy Claims: Domestic Abuse Allegations in Focus – A v R [2024] EWFC 218

The case A v R [2024] EWFC 218 of involves financial remedy proceedings following a marital breakdown, with the applicant (A) making allegations of domestic abuse against the respondent (R). These allegations include coercive and controlling behaviour, which A sought to introduce as a conduct claim in the financial settlement process. The primary issue addressed in the judgment is whether A's conduct claim should proceed to trial or be excluded from further consideration.

Legal Framework

The judgment discusses the legal standards for incorporating conduct, particularly domestic abuse, into financial remedy proceedings under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. It references the case of N v J [2024] EWFC 184, emphasising that conduct must be of a highly exceptional nature to be considered and that there must be a clear financial impact resulting from the alleged conduct.

Key Points from the Judgment

  1. Conduct Case Management:
    • The conduct case management hearing on 26 July 2024 was crucial in deciding whether A's allegations should proceed.
    • The judge reviewed whether the alleged conduct met the threshold for inclusion in financial remedy considerations.
  2. Allegations by A:
    • A issued her Form A on 27 March 2023 and highlighted conduct issues in her Form E filed on 7 June 2023.
    • A's allegations, if proven, would constitute a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, qualifying as domestic abuse.
  3. Response by R:
    • R denies all allegations and seeks to exclude the conduct claim from the proceedings.
  4. Decision Criteria:
    • The judge applied a two-stage process to determine the relevance of the conduct:
      1. Establishing whether the alleged conduct meets the high threshold of exceptionality.
      2. Evaluating the financial impact of the alleged conduct.
  5. Outcome:
    • The judge decided to exclude A's conduct claim from further consideration, stating that the allegations did not meet the necessary threshold of exceptionality to be relevant in the financial remedy proceedings.

Key Points from the Case

  1. High Threshold for Conduct Claims: Domestic abuse must be of a highly exceptional nature to be considered in financial remedy proceedings. General allegations of misconduct or abuse without clear financial implications are unlikely to meet this threshold.
  2. Case Management Efficiency: The judgment emphasises the importance of early and efficient case management to avoid unnecessary litigation costs and to focus on relevant issues.
  3. Financial Impact Requirement: There must be a demonstrable financial impact linked to the conduct for it to be considered in financial settlements. Emotional or psychological impacts, while significant, are insufficient without clear financial consequences.
  4. Legal Precedents and Guidance: The judgment aligns with recent legal precedents, including the principles set out in N v J [2024] and other relevant cases, ensuring consistency in how domestic abuse allegations are treated in financial remedy cases.
  5. Proportionality and Fairness: The court must balance the need for thorough investigation of serious allegations with the principles of proportionality and fairness, ensuring that resources are appropriately allocated and that parties are on equal footing.

This case highlights the complexities involved in integrating allegations of domestic abuse into financial remedy proceedings and underscores the rigorous standards that must be met for such claims to be considered by the court.

york-skyline-color
york-skyline-color
york-skyline-color

Get in touch for your free consultation

James-Thornton-Family-Law_white

Where innovation meets excellence

Our mission is clear: to redefine the standards of legal representation by seamlessly integrating unparalleled expertise with cutting-edge innovation.

01904 373 111
info@jamesthorntonfamilylaw.co.uk

York Office

Popeshead Court Offices, Peter Lane, York, YO1 8SU

Appointment only

James Thornton Family Law Limited (trading as James Thornton Family Law) is a Company, registered in England and Wales, with Company Number 15610140. Our Registered Office is Popeshead Court Offices, Peter Lane, York, YO1 8SU. Director: James Thornton. We are authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, SRA number 8007901, and subject to the SRA Standards and Regulations which can be accessed at www.sra.org.uk

Privacy Notice  |  Complaints  |  Terms of Business

Facebook
X (Twitter)
Instagram

©2024 James Thornton Family Law Limited