15 July 2025

Too Late to Wait: When Non-Compliance Justifies Setting Aside a Pension Sharing Order

In AP v TP [2025] EWFC 190 (B), His Honour Judge Farquhar delivered a pointed and practical judgment showing that while final orders are meant to be just that—final—there are limits to judicial patience, especially where one party repeatedly obstructs their implementation.

This decision illustrates the continuing relevance of the Thwaite jurisdiction in family law and offers important clarity on when a Pension Sharing Order (PSO) can be set aside—not because circumstances have changed, but because one party has simply refused to cooperate.

The Background: Final Order, Endless Delay

The parties had reached a financial settlement in April 2023 that included:

  • The sale of the family home (split 47/53);
  • A Pension Sharing Order of 48.94% in favour of the wife (TP) from the husband's Aviva pension (worth £193,000).

But two years later, the husband (AP) remained in limbo. Now 70, in poor health, and unable to access his pension, AP faced the stark reality that he could not retire—not because of the court order, but because the PSO had never been implemented. The reason? The wife refused to complete the basic paperwork, despite being chased, ordered, and reminded repeatedly.

The Thwaite Jurisdiction: Equity in Action

Unable to vary the order under section 31 MCA 1973 (because the Decree Absolute had been granted years before), AP turned to the Thwaite jurisdiction, stemming from Thwaite v Thwaite [1981]. This line of authority allows the court to refuse to enforce or adjust executory parts of an order where it would be inequitable to enforce them due to subsequent developments—particularly deliberate frustration.

Judge Farquhar canvassed several key authorities:

  • Bezeliansky v Bezelianskaya [2016] EWCA Civ 76: endorsing the ability to adjust executory orders obstructed by one party;
  • BT v CU [2021] and SR v HR [2018]: Mostyn J’s scepticism of the doctrine;
  • Hersman v de Verchere [2024] and Rotenberg v Rotenberg [2024]: more recent judgments reaffirming its viability.

His conclusion? The Thwaite jurisdiction remains good law, though to be used carefully. And this was a textbook case.

Why Not Barder?

Interestingly, the court explicitly declined to rely on the more stringent Barder test. That doctrine, used to set aside orders due to unforeseen and fundamental changes of circumstance (e.g., sudden death, collapse of a business), did not fit here. This wasn’t about change—it was about non-compliance.

The Result: Final Warning Before the Final Cut

Judge Farquhar ruled that it would be inequitable to uphold the PSO when the wife had spent two years refusing to implement it. He proposed to set aside the PSO entirely unless she complied within 28 days.

The warning was stark—and printed directly into the order:

This will result in you losing the benefit of approximately £94,000 worth of pension benefits… Your ability to obtain this pension benefit will be lost forever.”

The judge considered and rejected a Pension Attachment Order, as that would undermine the clean break agreed by both parties and lacked jurisdictional support.

Key Points for Practitioners

  • Non-compliance can void orders: If a party actively obstructs an executory provision, the court may remove it entirely.
  • Thwaite lives on: Despite some judicial scepticism, the doctrine remains available—especially where enforcing the original order would now be inequitable.
  • Clean break still holds weight: The court was reluctant to undo the clean break to salvage the PSO—underscoring the importance of structuring settlements properly from the start.
  • Final means final, but fair must remain fair: The Family Court retains equitable discretion to undo unfairness—but only when the behaviour is egregious and the solution proportionate.

Final Thought

AP v TP reminds us that court orders are not mere aspirations—they are meant to be implemented. When they’re not, and especially when one party stands in deliberate obstruction, the courts are willing to act—even if that means ripping up a carefully negotiated pension share.

For lawyers and clients alike, the case is a clear message: a signed order is not the end of the story if it’s never allowed to begin.

29 May 2025

Set Aside or Sit Tight? When Market Shifts Don’t Justify Reopening Financial Orders

In X v Y [2025] EWFC 144 (B), District Judge Stone delivered a forensic and educational judgment on a topic that regularly vexes family lawyers: can a final financial remedy order be reopened or varied simply because the property market dips?

Spoiler alert: the answer is no—at least not on the facts of this case.

Background: A House, a Fixed Sum, and a Change of Heart

The parties had agreed (and the court ordered) that the former matrimonial home in Cornwall would be sold, with the wife (Mrs Y) receiving £410,000 and the husband (Mr X) receiving the balance, after deducting various sale-related costs and a minor costs award.

At the time of the final hearing in December 2023, the property was valued at £800,000 based on a joint expert report. Both parties expected it might sell for more, but the court stuck with the expert figure. Notably, both had opted for fixed sums rather than percentage-based awards—Mr X specifically proposing to take the risk (or gain) if the property sold for less (or more).

When the market softened and the best offer received was £795,000, Mr X brought an application to set aside or vary the order, arguing that the change in property value was a material development rendering the order inequitable. He framed the claim under the Thwaite jurisdiction.

The Legal Framework: Barder and Thwaite

  • Barder v Caluori [1988] AC 20 sets a high bar: to set aside a financial order due to a supervening event, the event must be unforeseen, exceptional, and undermine the basis of the order. It must occur shortly after the order and not prejudice third parties.
  • Thwaite v Thwaite [1982] Fam 1 is a narrower route, applicable only where the order remains executory (i.e. not fully implemented) and it would be inequitable to enforce it due to a significant change of circumstances. Crucially, if parties’ claims have already been dismissed, the court cannot substitute a new order, only refuse enforcement.

Here, Mr X had opted for Thwaite, recognising Barder was doomed to fail.

The Decision: Variation Refused, Order Upheld

DJ Stone dismissed the application. He found:

  • The property’s small reduction in value was not a sufficiently significant change. Mr X stood to lose a maximum of £13,000, and in some scenarios might even benefit due to elapsed mortgage penalties.
  • Mr X had proposed this very model of fixed-sum order—he took the upside risk, and must also accept the downside.
  • There was no suggestion of wrongdoing or delay by Mrs Y.
  • There was no expert evidence that the property’s value had truly dropped—just a single estate agent letter referencing a hesitant buyer.

Most importantly, the judge noted that even if he found the order inequitable, the court lacked jurisdiction to replace it because both parties’ financial claims had been dismissed outright in the original order. The application had nowhere to go.

Key Points for Family Lawyers

  1. Be careful with fixed-sum orders based on property values. If the market shifts, there's no guarantee the court will reopen the deal—particularly where a percentage-based award might have self-adjusted.
  2. Barder remains a high bar—it requires a genuinely unforeseen, devastating event.
  3. Thwaite is alive but limited: It applies only to executory orders and mainly allows courts to refuse enforcement—not rewrite orders—unless claims remain live.
  4. Dismissing claims outright? Double-check that the structure of your order doesn’t box your client out of relief if the sale goes awry.
  5. Market changes are not enough on their own—courts expect parties to accept ordinary risks.

Conclusion

This judgment is a useful clarification of the narrow—and narrowing—routes by which parties can revisit final orders. Mr X gambled on the market and lost slightly, but the court refused to let him reshuffle the deck. For family lawyers, the message is clear: structure settlement orders carefully, and don’t assume market movements will justify a second bite at the cherry.

14 April 2025

Posthumous Wealth and Divorce: Can a Financial Remedy Order Be Changed After Judgment?

In X v Y [2025] EWHC 727 (Fam), the Family Division of the High Court was asked to revisit a financial remedy order after a final judgment—but before the order was perfected—because of a significant change in circumstances: the death of the husband’s father, leaving a sizeable inheritance.

The decision is a rich case study in the limits of post-judgment variation, the principles of finality, and how the courts deal with the impact of newly realised wealth after a financial remedy determination. Although this wasn’t a classic Barder application (where a party dies), it touches on similar principles—namely, whether a major event shortly after judgment should allow the court to reopen and revise its decision.

Background

In December 2023, HHJ Spinks delivered a reserved judgment after a three-day final hearing. He awarded the husband 62.5% of the net proceeds of the former matrimonial home due to his significantly lower earning capacity and housing needs, less a modest adjustment.

Then, just three weeks later, the husband’s father died—leaving the husband an estimated interest worth over £1 million, held in trust. The wife made a so-called Barrell application to reopen the judgment before the order was sealed, arguing that fairness now required a more equal division.

The Legal Framework: Barrell Applications and the Finality Principle

The court reaffirmed the legal tests laid down in:

These confirm that:

  1. Courts have discretion to alter a judgment before the final order is perfected.
  2. The finality principle is important—particularly in financial remedy cases.
  3. Applications based on new evidence must meet a high threshold, including a test of due diligence.
  4. Courts must weigh these factors against the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly.

Judge Spinks was found to have correctly applied the law—especially by asking whether the new evidence justified reopening a carefully balanced judgment after a full trial.

The Appeal: Was the Inheritance Enough to Justify Reopening?

The wife argued that:

  • The husband’s inheritance substantially altered his financial needs.
  • She should not be left with a lesser share of the matrimonial home now that the husband had future security.
  • The new financial information wasn’t fully considered.

However, the court found:

  • The inheritance was uncertain, tied up in a trust and not immediately accessible.
  • The judge had already considered the likelihood of future family support.
  • A retrial would incur significant delay, cost, and stress.
  • The husband's trust interest, while valuable, did not clearly eliminate his current financial need.

Ultimately, Mr Justice Trowell upheld the original decision: finality and judicial discretion prevailed.

Key Practice Points for Family Lawyers

  1. The death of a relative is not enough on its own to reopen a financial order.
    If the person who dies is not a party to the proceedings, and their estate is held in trust or subject to delay, the impact may be too speculative.
  2. Inheritance prospects are not certainty.
    The court recognised that even a significant inheritance may not be realised in time to affect current needs.
  3. The ‘finality principle’ is weighty—especially post-judgment.
    Even before an order is sealed, courts are reluctant to unwind a carefully balanced decision unless clear injustice can be shown.
  4. Procedural fairness is key.
    The judge’s approach was upheld partly because both parties agreed the matter could be dealt with on paper, and there was no application for more time despite late-stage disclosures.
  5. Be cautious with tactical applications post-judgment.
    Clients who regret the outcome of a financial remedy hearing must show more than just a change in fortune to succeed on appeal.

Final Thoughts

X v Y is a cautionary tale: inheritance issues—especially post-trial—must be handled with extreme care. It shows how even substantial post-judgment developments may fall short of justifying a revision of the order.

For family law practitioners, the case is a reminder to:

  • Anticipate and explore inheritance issues during litigation;
  • Frame any post-judgment challenge within strict legal boundaries; and
  • Uphold the client’s expectations around finality and fairness.

If your client is considering challenging a financial remedy outcome due to a death or inheritance, make sure the evidence is strong, the timing is justified, and the proposed change truly meets the Barrell threshold.

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