In DH v RH [2025] EWFC 175, Mr Justice MacDonald delivered a powerful message to recalcitrant litigants in financial remedy cases: refusal to cooperate doesn’t stop the court—it just means the court steps in for you.
This case wasn’t about redrawing financial lines or recalculating assets. It was about enforcement—getting a final order actually implemented. And in this case, that required the court to sign property transfer documents on behalf of the non-compliant party.
The Background: A Final Order Ignored
The court had already made a comprehensive final financial remedy order in May 2024, awarding the wife around £6.2 million, structured carefully to provide both parties with housing and financial security. But one year later, the wife had refused to implement the order, particularly the transfers of real estate in the US, despite repeated attempts by the husband to resolve matters.
Her conduct was described as “deliberately obstructive”, and included:
- Ignoring orders to engage in joint tax mitigation;
- Filing a blizzard of unmeritorious applications, some without notice;
- Refusing to sign key documents needed to transfer the properties; and
- Even failing to attend the final enforcement hearing—offering no credible medical reason not to.
The Court's Response: Signing for Her
Relying on section 39 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court did what had to be done: it signed the property transfer documents itself, in her place.
This was not a surprise. The final order had anticipated this possibility and included a specific clause (paragraph 27(g)) allowing for judicial execution of documents in default of cooperation. As Mr Justice MacDonald put it, the court’s intervention was the only way to ensure the order had meaning:
“Without the court using its powers… the wife will continue to refuse to implement the order.”
This wasn’t punitive—it was practical justice, delivered with precision.
Not Just About Signatures: The Cost of Non-Compliance
The judgment also tackled the wife’s application to set aside the final order, citing claims of tax miscalculation, asset undervaluation, and fraud. But these were found to be recycled arguments from her dismissed appeal, unsupported by any credible new evidence.
In dismissing that application, the court emphasised:
- The high threshold for set-aside: fraud, mistake, non-disclosure, or a Barder event.
- The strong public policy in finality of litigation, especially where delay is self-inflicted.
- Her repeated breaches of directions, especially on the tax issues she claimed to contest.
She was also ordered to pay indemnity costs, reflecting the court’s frustration with her litigation conduct.
Why This Case Matters for Family Lawyers
- Enforcement is real. If you build contingencies into your final order (as here), you can save months of delay when one party drags their feet.
- Section 39 is powerful. The court’s ability to execute documents has real teeth. It’s a crucial clause to include in orders involving property transfers.
- Adjournments require more than just a letter. The court showed a firm approach to late medical-based adjournment requests, especially where there's a history of obstruction.
- The limits of set-aside. You can’t relitigate a final order just because you don’t like the outcome—especially if the problems were caused by your own non-compliance.
Final Thought
DH v RH is a masterclass in how the court enforces finality, not just by dismissing baseless set-aside applications, but by stepping in to sign the dotted line when necessary. It’s a reminder that in family law, “final order” means just that—and if you refuse to cooperate, the court has a pen ready to take your place.
