20 May 2025

“Covert Recordings, Public Consequences” — What Family Lawyers Need to Know About the New FJC Guidance (May 2025)

In May 2025, the Family Justice Council (FJC) released long-awaited guidance on covert recordings in family proceedings concerning children. As Sir Andrew McFarlane acknowledges in the foreword, this is a “growing area for the courts” with limited prior guidance — and increasing complexity due to modern technology.

Whether it’s a parent bugging a child’s backpack, secretly taping social workers, or a covert smartphone recording mid-contact handover, this document seeks to bring clarity — and consistency — to a controversial but increasingly common issue.

What’s the Big Deal?

Covert recordings are often born of mistrust: parents feeling disbelieved, professionals under scrutiny, and children caught in the crossfire. The court is now regularly asked to weigh the evidential value of a secret tape against the ethical and emotional damage its making may cause — especially to children.

The new guidance covers:

  • The legal framework (including data protection and human rights concerns)
  • Case management issues around admissibility
  • The welfare implications for children
  • The views of young people, who overwhelmingly find the idea intrusive and upsetting

Key Principles for Practitioners

  1. Lawfulness Isn’t Enough

Just because a recording might not be illegal doesn’t mean it’s admissible — or wise. In family proceedings, the court is guided by welfare and fairness, not simply evidence-gathering tactics.

  1. Children Should Almost Never Be Recorded

The guidance is blunt: recording children is rarely justifiable. Peter Jackson J described it as “almost always likely to be wrong.” Not only are these recordings usually unhelpful in content, but the fact that a parent spied on a child may itself be damaging evidence of their inability to prioritise the child’s welfare.

  1. Covert Recordings of Professionals Are a Mixed Bag

Some famous cases (Medway Council v A & Ors (Learning Disability; Foster Placement) [2015] EWFC B66 (2 June 2015), Re F (Care Proceedings: Failures of Expert) [2016] EWHC 2149) show that recordings have exposed malpractice. But many are partial, misleading, or simply time-wasting. Courts are urged to ensure proper case management and avoid “satellite litigation” over admissibility.

  1. Publication is a Legal Minefield

Sharing recordings — especially on social media — could breach data protection law, amount to contempt of court, or even attract civil or criminal liability. The risks are real and rarely worth the perceived reward.

  1. Professionals Should Develop Overt Recording Policies

Rather than fearing every phone in a parent’s pocket, the FJC recommends agencies consider transparent recording policies, allowing agreed recordings with safeguards. This could reduce tensions and avoid covert behaviour entirely.

A Practical Checklist for Lawyers

If your client has made or received a covert recording:

  1. Advise caution: It could backfire in court.
  2. Assess intent and content: Why was it made? What does it actually prove?
  3. Disclose early: Avoid ambush. The court expects transparency.
  4. Beware of data risks: Storing or sharing personal data without basis could breach GDPR.
  5. Consider the impact on the child: Not just legally, but emotionally and relationally.

Final Thought

The FJC’s guidance doesn't ban covert recordings, but it issues a clear warning: use with extreme care. In most cases, it is the act of recording — not what is recorded — that matters most.

For lawyers, this means stepping back from the adrenaline rush of “gotcha” evidence and reminding clients that in family proceedings, trust, welfare, and fairness remain the watchwords.

19 May 2025

The Sham That Wasn’t? When Debts and Divorce Collide in Family Law

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Awolowo v Awolowo and Linkserve [2025] EWCA Civ 641 is a masterclass in forensic scrutiny of alleged debts in financial remedy proceedings. It also serves as a reminder of the court’s critical role in sifting fact from fiction when third-party claims threaten to swallow the marital pot.

This case centres around whether a £1.6 million “loan” from the husband’s brother’s company was real—or a legal construct designed to keep assets out of the wife’s reach in her financial claim.

Background: A Debt Appears (Conveniently Late)

The case originated in financial relief proceedings under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, following an overseas divorce. The husband asserted that a family home in the UK—seemingly unencumbered—was in fact held on trust for his brother’s Nigerian company, due to a historic £1.6 million loan.

The wife, seeing the equity in the property evaporate, applied to set aside the loan and related judgments under section 23 MFPA 1984 (mirroring section 37 MCA 1973), arguing that the debt was a sham intended to defeat her claim.

At first instance, Her Honour Judge Vincent found the debt genuine, holding that the wife had not proved the loan was a fabrication.

What the Court of Appeal Found

The Court of Appeal disagreed—and firmly. Lord Justice Moylan delivered a damning analysis of the original decision. Key findings included:

  • The judge had misunderstood the effect of a Nigerian judgment, wrongly treating it as having determined the debt's legitimacy. In fact, it merely reflected an uncontested settlement agreement—not a finding of fact.
  • The court below had failed to account for the almost total lack of financial documentation, such as company accounts or bank transfers that might corroborate the debt.
  • Crucially, the judge discounted the wife’s evidence for lack of supporting documentation, even though such documents were in the control of the husband or his brother—a serious error in reasoning.

The matter was remitted to the High Court for full reconsideration.

Legal Themes of Note

  1. Sham Transactions and the Burden of Proof

The appellate court reiterated that proving a sham is a high bar, but also noted that if evidence creates enough suspicion, the evidential burden may shift. If a husband claims a company debt, he must come armed with documents to prove it.

  1. Foreign Judgments and Enforcement

This case also spotlights the limits of foreign judgment recognition, especially where there’s no adjudication of the underlying facts. Family courts must not be cowed by overseas decisions that amount to rubber-stamped settlements.

  1. The Balance of Interests

The Harman v Glencross and Kremen v Agrest lines of authority were crucial: where assets are insufficient to satisfy both a spouse and a creditor, the court must balance competing claims—not simply defer to a charging order.

Why This Case Matters

This decision underscores how creative debt claims can derail financial remedy cases—and the importance of judicial vigilance. When the origin of a debt is murky, and the creditor is a relative with no commercial incentive, alarm bells should ring. Especially when:

  • The loan terms are uncommercial (interest-free, undocumented);
  • The lender and debtor appear to act in concert;
  • Critical financial documentation is absent.

Key Points for Family Lawyers

  • Challenge debts robustly: If they surface late and lack documentation, seek full disclosure and test the evidence rigorously.
  • Don’t assume finality in registered foreign judgments—look at the process behind them.
  • Know your tools: Section 23 MFPA 1984 and section 37 MCA 1973 remain powerful weapons to prevent dispositions designed to defeat legitimate claims.
  • Press for joined hearings: As here, courts can and should consider financial remedy claims and third-party enforcement claims together, to ensure fairness.

Conclusion

Following the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the case has been remitted to the High Court for rehearing. This means that the wife will have another opportunity to argue that the alleged debt is a sham and that the property should remain available to meet her financial claim. The court will now hear full evidence—likely including cross-examination of the husband and his brother—and reach a fresh decision on the legitimacy of the loan and whether the previous judgments should be set aside. For family law practitioners, the upcoming hearing may provide further guidance on how English courts navigate offshore debt claims in matrimonial contexts.

But for now, the Court of Appeal has made it clear that family justice is not a playground for manufactured debts. If there’s an elephant in the room claiming to be a creditor, the court will—eventually—ask for proof that it isn’t just a man in a costume.

16 May 2025

What Is Maintenance Pending Suit – And Should I Apply?

If you're separating from your spouse and struggling financially, you may have heard about something called Maintenance Pending Suit or MPS. But what is it, and when is it actually worth applying for?

What is Maintenance Pending Suit (MPS)?

MPS is short-term, court-ordered financial support paid by one spouse to the other after separation—but before your full divorce finances are sorted out. It's designed to help with day-to-day living expenses while your case is ongoing.

Think of it as a “holding payment” to keep things stable until the final decision is made.

When Might MPS Be Appropriate?

You may be able to apply for MPS if:

  • You don’t have enough income to cover your basic living costs.
  • You’re waiting for the court to divide your assets, but that process will take several months.
  • You’ve lost access to joint funds or support since the separation.

For example:

  • A stay-at-home parent with no income might apply for MPS to cover rent or groceries.
  • Someone who had previously relied on a higher-earning spouse may need short-term help until the financial settlement is reached.

What Does the Court Look At?

The court doesn’t do a full analysis of assets at this stage. Instead, it looks at:

  • Your current income and reasonable outgoings.
  • The other party’s income and ability to pay.
  • Whether your request is reasonable and fair, not excessive.

The test isn’t about what you “want” or what you’ll eventually get—it’s about meeting essential needs in the short term.

When Might It Not Be Worthwhile?

Courts take a dim view of small or tactical applications—especially if:

  • The final hearing is just around the corner.
  • You have savings or income to meet your needs in the meantime.
  • The cost of applying is more than the amount you’re asking for.

In a recent case, DSD v MJW [2025], a wife applied for £500 per month for three months—just £1,500 in total. But the legal costs ended up being over £12,000. The judge called it a “bad application” and warned against wasting court time and money on low-value claims.

Top Tips Before Applying for MPS

  • Be realistic about what you need and what the court will allow.
    Apply early—preferably at or just after your first court appointment.
    Talk to your solicitor about alternatives (e.g. interim payments from joint savings).
    Be mindful of costs—don’t spend £5,000 to argue for £1,000.

Final Word

MPS can be a vital financial lifeline—but it’s not for everyone. If you're unsure whether it's right for you, speak to your solicitor early in the process. A well-timed, reasonable request can help keep things steady. A last-minute, tactical application could do more harm than good.

15 May 2025

Top-Up Child Maintenance in HNW Cases: Where Lifestyle Meets Logic

For family lawyers advising high-net-worth clients, the concept of “top-up” child maintenance is often one of the most contested elements in financial proceedings. The decision in James v Seymour [2023] EWHC 844 (Fam) adds further clarity (and complexity) to the landscape—reconciling parental affluence, fairness, and legislative boundaries.

But what exactly is a top-up order? And how far should the English courts go to ensure that a child’s lifestyle mirrors that of the richer parent?

What Is a “Top-Up” Order?

Under the Child Support Act 1991, the Child Maintenance Service (CMS) calculates maintenance obligations up to a gross annual income of £156,000. For earnings above this cap, the court regains jurisdiction under section 8(6), allowing it to make “top-up” orders. The rationale? In ultra-wealthy cases, CMS figures don’t touch the sides of the child’s actual needs or expectations.

James v Seymour: Conventional Awards vs Lifestyle Claims

In James v Seymour, the mother sought to increase maintenance to over £2,000 per month per child based on a “disparity of lifestyle” with the father, a successful private equity executive. But Mr Justice Mostyn wasn’t persuaded, stating:

“The amount that would be payable under the formula... is plainly excessive and not reasonably proportionate.”

Mostyn J preferred a conventional needs-based assessment, applying what he termed an “Adjusted Formula Methodology” (AFM) for high-income cases up to £650,000, acknowledging both its utility and its flaws.

CB v KB [2019]: Enter the Formula

This earlier case set the ball rolling. Mostyn J suggested that the CMS formula should provide a logical starting point—even for incomes up to £650,000. The so-called “Mostyn formula” offered predictability, but it was soon criticised for producing arbitrary per-child results and failing to reflect economies of scale in larger families.

Collardeau-Fuchs v Fuchs [2022]: Introducing HECSA

In Collardeau-Fuchs, the court made a crucial distinction between:

  • Conventional child support awards, calculated by reference to proportionate expenses.
  • Household Expenditure Child Support Awards (HECSAs), where the award reflects broader household running costs and lifestyle parity.

Top-up orders in HECSA cases go beyond food and clothing—they cover multiple properties, drivers, nannies, and international schooling. But such awards must still meet the fairness test under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

What Did James v Seymour Add?

Mostyn J’s most valuable contribution may be his proposed AFM framework, with adjustments based on:

  • School fees and other grossed-up costs;
  • Pension contributions;
  • Number of children and level of shared care.

This model aims to avoid disproportionate outcomes and offers guidance for incomes between £156,000 and £650,000.

He also acknowledged its limits:

  • It shouldn’t apply to variation applications;
  • It doesn’t work well for unearned income or capital-rich respondents;
  • It mustn’t override the discretionary test under s.25.

Practical Tips for Practitioners

  1. Budget First: A detailed child-focused budget remains the cornerstone of any claim. Don’t assume income alone drives quantum.
  2. HECSA or Not?: Be clear whether the claim is for a HECSA-style award (lifestyle parity) or a conventional needs-based sum.
  3. Use the AFM Sparingly: As a reference tool—not a rule.
  4. Don’t Overreach: Courts are alive to inflated claims. In James v Seymour, the court saw through attempts to use the father’s wealth as a blank cheque.
  5. Equalisation Isn't a Goal: Lifestyle parity may be a factor, but it's not the legal test. The court won’t iron out every disparity, particularly post-divorce.

Conclusion

In the HNW world, child maintenance can range from the modest to the majestic. But James v Seymour reminds us that fairness, not fortune, is the measure—and that clear, proportionate claims still carry the day. Practitioners should embrace the guidance while remembering that even in luxury, legal principles must still apply.

14 May 2025

Tying Up Loose Ends: THR v WAT and the Realities of High-Net-Worth Divorce

In THR v WAT [2025] EWHC 1125 (Fam), His Honour Judge Hess was faced with the unenviable task of transforming a multi-million-pound Xydhias agreement into a final financial remedy order—navigating disputed terms, hidden costs, forgotten interest, and inflated child maintenance schedules. The judgment offers practitioners a rare insight into the pitfalls of rushed settlements and the court’s insistence that “a deal is a deal”—even if you think you left something out.

The Context: A Quick Settlement in a Heavyweight Case

This was a “big money” case with substantial assets on both sides. The parties had six bundles of documents and a 10-day final hearing listed, but they reached an agreement on day one—what both sides called a binding Xydhias agreement. The problem? Not everything was spelled out clearly.

Over the next few days, the drafting revealed five points of contention:

  1. Whether a company loan should reduce the wife's lump sum.
  2. Whether estimated legal fees should be adjusted post-settlement.
  3. Whether the lump sums should attract interest.
  4. Whether the wife should receive additional security.
  5. What level of child periodical payments (CMS top-up) the husband should pay.

Xydhias Means Finality, Not Flexibility

The husband had agreed to pay the wife £36 million, less “what she already had”—a sum which his own documents put at £2.09 million. But he later argued this was a mistake, particularly because it didn’t reflect the (supposed) value of the wife’s interest in a company called X Ltd or her reduced legal fees.

The court disagreed.

Judge Hess reminded both parties that once they reached a Xydhias agreement, the court’s role was not to re-write the deal unless there had been fraud or clear mistake. The husband, having made a firm offer based on £2.09 million, was held to it. His Honour was clear:

“There was time to raise this if it was important... a deal is a deal.”

No Interest Means... No Interest

The wife’s team attempted to insert a clause for interest on the deferred lump sums—months after the deal was struck. Judge Hess ruled this was an afterthought, not part of the agreed terms. Despite being asked to add 3.75% interest on unpaid instalments, he refused:

“If the wife’s team wanted those to be an essential part of the deal, there was plenty of time... They did not.”

Security Provisions: Reasonable, Not Total

The husband offered partial security against the lump sums, which the wife wanted increased to 100%. The judge declined, noting the husband had already paid £5 million early and was not shown to be a flight risk or unwilling to comply. The court endorsed the principle that perfect security is not always necessary where trustworthiness is evident.

Top-Up Maintenance in the HNW World

Both parties agreed the case warranted a CMS top-up order under section 8(6) of the Child Support Act 1991. But the figures were miles apart:

  • Wife’s position: £50,000 per child, per annum (£150,000 total).
  • Husband’s position: £20,000 per child, per annum (£60,000 total).

Judge Hess landed in the middle at £25,000 per child—totalling £75,000 per year—and made some trenchant comments about the inflated and unrealistic budget put forward by the wife. Among the claims: £120,000 on holidays, £6,000 for children’s computers, and £2,000 on Christmas gifts.

We are dealing with children aged six, six, and three... the needs of children must be finite whatever the payer’s income.”

This aligns with the James v Seymour approach—where top-up maintenance is assessed from first principles (s.25 MCA 1973) rather than simply applying a cap or CMS formula.

Key Lessons for Practitioners

  • Don’t leave “loose ends” in a Xydhias deal—spell out issues like interest, security, and assumptions about asset values at the time of agreement.
  • Final means final—the court won’t revisit a deal just because one side gets buyer’s remorse.
  • Avoid “aspirational” budgets—top-up child maintenance claims must be grounded in actual need, even in ultra-wealthy families.
  • Security must be proportionate—perfect cover isn’t always required if the payer has a history of compliance.

Final Word

THR v WAT is a textbook example of the messiness that can follow an expensive, high-stakes settlement reached too quickly. For those dealing with big numbers and complex structures, it’s a reminder: if you want clarity, earn it at the drafting table—not by asking the court to fix what you forgot to ask for.

13 May 2025

When Final Orders Don’t Mean Finality – Revisiting Joint Lives Maintenance GH v IH 2025 EWFC 120

The decision in GH v IH [2025] EWFC 120 (B) provides a revealing look at the long tail of family financial orders, where joint lives maintenance collides with real-life messiness: patchy compliance, unclear enforcement, varying income, and the challenge of aging parties still locked in litigation over a marriage that ended more than a decade ago.

District Judge Hatvany’s extempore judgment is a detailed and pragmatic application of section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, offering clarity on when variation is appropriate—and a cautionary note about maintenance orders that refuse to die quietly.

The Context: A Long Marriage, Long Orders, and Long Running Problems

The parties married in 1993 and divorced in 2012. The original financial order included joint lives maintenance of £2,000 per month, linked to RPI. But over a decade later, the wife brought enforcement proceedings claiming nearly £17,000 in unpaid RPI increases. The husband countered that he had “overpaid” by continuing to cover her private health insurance and mobile bills.

Meanwhile, both parties were approaching retirement age, the 2012 pension sharing orders hadn’t yet been implemented, and a jointly owned property was still awaiting sale. The wife lived mortgage-free; the husband remained self-employed with multiple properties and ongoing family obligations.

Notable Issues in the Judgment

  1. Joint Lives Maintenance Under Pressure

DJ Hatvany acknowledged that the original decision to order joint lives maintenance might not reflect modern practice, particularly where no long-term disability is involved. But with the wife nearing 66, holding a blue badge, and having health challenges, the original decision to make a joint lives order wasn’t inappropriate.

However, the judge was clear that indefinite £2,000 monthly payments were no longer justified, especially given the husband’s declining income and the wife’s own unacknowledged income from a solar farm.

  1. Credibility of Needs Claims

The wife claimed her needs were over £5,000 per month—including £900 for private health insurance—despite living alone in a mortgage-free property. The judge pegged her actual needs closer to £3,000 per month, noting that recent expenditures on kitchen renovations, new carpets, and landscaping were not indicative of hardship.

  1. What Counts as “Payment”?

The husband’s defence to the enforcement claim was novel but accepted: while he hadn’t paid the RPI-linked uplift, he had continued to cover the wife’s private health insurance, dental plan, and phone bills. On balance, the court found these payments exceeded what was due—so the enforcement application failed.

  1. Variation Principles and Forward Planning

From April 2025, the husband was ordered to pay £1,000 per month—not £2,000—reflecting the wife’s growing income from pensions and notional solar farm profit. But the judge expressed real concern about the lack of finality and urged the parties to consider agreeing a Duxbury-style capitalisation of the remaining maintenance obligation.

“Otherwise, I fear the door may be left open to the husband making a further variation application as he approaches retirement, or for the wife to make a further application if her circumstances change.”

Key Points for Family Law Practitioners

  • Maintenance variation must reflect needs and affordability. The court closely scrutinised both parties’ lifestyles and income, including under-declared income sources.
  • Creative compliance can be accepted. Payments made outside the strict terms of the order (e.g., health insurance) may still discharge the obligation if clearly linked and recorded.
  • Clean breaks are preferable. This case is a textbook example of the cost and stress of lingering maintenance obligations—especially with pensions and properties still unresolved more than a decade on.
  • Judicial restraint on costs. The judge pointedly asked for “no claim for costs” at the next hearing, to avoid incurring further legal expense over small differences.

Final Thought

GH v IH is a reminder that joint lives orders are often slow-burning sources of litigation, particularly when combined with unimplemented pension sharing, contested enforcement, and shifting needs as parties age. A Duxbury lump sum may not feel satisfying in the moment—but compared to another decade of claims, counterclaims, and spreadsheets—it can be a gift of finality.

12 May 2025

Boardrooms and Breakups: What BR v BR Teaches Us About Valuing Complex Businesses in Divorce

How do you divide a £263 million fortune when over £200 million of it is tied up in private companies? In BR v BR [2025] EWFC 88, Mr Justice Peel was faced with exactly that question—offering a masterclass in handling complex business valuations in financial remedy proceedings.

This was no ordinary divorce. Over a 30-year marriage, the husband (H) built a tech empire from scratch while the wife (W) supported him and later challenged the value he ascribed to his business empire. The case turned on one key issue: how much were the businesses worth—and could the wife's team challenge the agreed Single Joint Expert (SJE) valuation?

SJE Valuations: What Are They and Why Do They Matter?

In financial remedy cases, parties often instruct a Single Joint Expert (SJE)—typically an accountant—to value business interests. This approach:

  • Saves time and cost by avoiding duelling experts.
  • Ensures impartiality and transparency.
  • Provides a common evidential base for the court.

In BR v BR, the SJE was instructed early on, producing a detailed (and expensive—over £1 million!) report on C Ltd, D Ltd, and E Ltd. W later attempted to undermine the findings using her own “shadow” expert. The judge was unimpressed, emphasising that:

“Expert evidence is only admissible with the court’s permission under Part 25 FPR. You cannot sneak it in via witness statements or offers.”

This serves as a critical reminder: Don’t rely on backdoor expert opinion. If you want to challenge the SJE, apply under Daniels v Walker and do it early.

Why Valuing Private Companies Is So Difficult

Justice Peel quoted Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] EWCA Civ 1050 to describe business valuations as “among the most fragile valuations which can be obtained.” And for good reason:

  • No obvious market exists for many private companies.
  • Share value depends heavily on who’s buying, and under what conditions.
  • Even small adjustments in projections or multipliers can swing the valuation by tens of millions.

In BR v BR, H argued for a buyout based on the SJE’s valuation. W insisted the businesses were worth significantly more—but her claim lacked evidential support. The court accepted the SJE’s figures, increasing the valuation slightly to reflect a corrected comparable sale.

Clean Break vs. Wells Sharing

W proposed a Wells v Wells sharing structure, where she'd keep shares and cash out later. The court declined:

  • There was a high risk of ongoing conflict between the parties.
  • H’s role in the businesses was irreplaceable—splitting ownership would destabilise the companies.
  • Wells sharing would require costly ongoing oversight, with uncertain value and high legal and commercial risk.

Justice Peel preferred a clean break, ordering H to buy out W’s interests based on the adjusted SJE values. He stressed that a clean break is both desirable and achievable, particularly where the party retaining the business can raise funds.

Key Points for Family Law Practitioners

  1. Use SJE evidence wisely – It remains the gold standard. If you want to challenge it, seek permission early under Daniels v Walker.
  2. Don’t smuggle expert views into witness statements or open offers – They won’t be admitted.
  3. Wells sharing is the exception, not the rule – It should be avoided unless a clean break is clearly impracticable.
  4. Valuation fragility doesn’t mean unreliability – Judges will accept SJE valuations unless there’s a compelling reason not to.
  5. Commercial reality matters – The impact of share dilution, liquidity discounts, and control rights all weigh heavily on the outcome.

Final Thought

BR v BR reminds us that when divorce meets boardroom, family courts are ready—but they demand rigour, realism, and procedural discipline. If you're advising clients with complex business interests, this case should be essential reading.

9 May 2025

MPS or Misstep? The Costs Trap in Maintenance Pending Suit

In DSD v MJW [2025] EWFC 119 (B), Deputy District Judge David Hodson delivers a candid—and cutting—judgment on a £500-a-month maintenance pending suit (MPS) application that cost nearly £13,000 in legal fees to argue. The case is a cautionary tale for lawyers and litigants alike: just because an interim application can be made doesn’t mean it should be.

What is Maintenance Pending Suit?

MPS is a form of interim financial support paid by one spouse to another after separation but before the final financial remedy order. It’s designed to meet genuine short-term needs and preserve fairness while financial issues are resolved. The test is reasonableness, but this case shows that reasonableness isn’t just about the recipient’s budget—it includes timing, proportionality, and commercial sense.

The Application: A £500-a-Month Dispute That Cost £13,000

In this case, the wife sought £500 per month in MPS for three months—at most £2,000 including any backdating. By the hearing date, she had incurred £8,716 in costs, and the husband had spent £4,170 responding. That’s almost £13,000 in legal fees for a claim worth, on paper, a tenth of that. The judge’s conclusion? “How can that ever be?”

Judge Hodson made clear that while MPS applications can be justified in situations of genuine need—such as pending homelessness or the sudden loss of income—this was not such a case. The wife had:

  • A stable income of around £38,000 from the armed services.
  • Subsidised housing.
  • Shared child arrangements (and expenses) with the husband.
  • Support from her parents, who were funding her litigation.

What tipped the scale, however, was the lack of urgency and the lateness of the application. The FDR had taken place four months earlier, and the final hearing was just three months away. If support had truly been needed, it should have been raised at the FDR or immediately afterwards—not two months later.

Judicial Frustration: “This Was a Bad Application”

Judge Hodson did not mince words:

“This was a bad application to make at this late stage in the case. It should not have been made.”

He went on to note that the application had not only failed the legal test, but it had:

  • Diverted time and resources from trial preparation.
  • Increased animosity between the parties.
  • Brought the family courts—and family lawyers—into disrepute due to the absurd costs.

Could It Have Been Avoided? Yes.

The judge suggested a practical workaround: with over £700,000 held on account, why didn’t either party propose that £2,000 be paid out to each side to tide them over until trial? That would have been quicker, cheaper, and would have avoided the hearing entirely. Instead, litigation strategy took precedence over common sense.

Key Lessons for Family Lawyers and Clients

  • Think twice before pursuing small MPS claims late in proceedings. If the final hearing is imminent, courts are unlikely to intervene unless there’s a pressing change in circumstances.
  • Proportionality matters. Costs must bear some relation to what is at stake. Spending £9,000 to pursue £2,000 isn’t litigation—it’s financial self-sabotage.
  • Use interim funds creatively. Withheld capital can sometimes be released by consent to avoid unnecessary interim disputes.
  • Don’t expect courts to rubber-stamp late-stage tactics. If the application appears to be part of a broader litigation strategy (e.g., to inflate future capitalised maintenance), expect scrutiny.

Final Thought

DSD v MJW is a sharp reminder that MPS applications must be rooted in genuine need, made in good time, and pursued with commercial realism. Interim applications are not free hits—they come with cost consequences, strategic risks, and, sometimes, judicial rebuke.

28 April 2025

Setting Aside to Set Things Right: Lessons from AB v CD

In the financial remedy case of AB v CD & Ors [2025] EWFC 958, His Honour Judge Richard Williams provides a detailed, forensic examination of when and how a financial remedy applicant can succeed in setting aside transactions designed to defeat their claim. The judgment is a masterclass in navigating section 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973)—and a warning about the complexity of proving your case when the evidence is murky.

The Basics: What is a Section 37 Application?

Section 37 MCA 1973 allows a party to apply to set aside transactions made by their spouse if they were done with the intention of defeating a financial remedy claim.
The court must consider three key questions:

  1. Was there a disposition?
  2. Was it made with the intention of defeating the applicant’s claim?
  3. Would different (or greater) financial relief have been possible without the disposition?

If a transaction took place within three years of the application, the burden shifts to the transferring party to prove they did not intend to defeat the claim.

The Facts: Family Fallout and a Share Transfer

Following their separation in 2019, CD transferred his shares in a family-run caravan park business (Guthrum Ltd) equally to his mother (EF) and brother (GH). His estranged wife (AB) alleged that the transfer was a deliberate ploy to defeat her financial claims on divorce.

Initially, CD agreed with AB’s case—but on the morning of the trial, he switched sides, supporting his mother’s claim that he had always held the shares on trust for her. The judge was unimpressed, noting deep family divisions and “shifting sands” in the parties’ evidence.

The Court’s Approach

Judge Williams meticulously applied the section 37 framework:

  • Disposition: The share transfers were clearly a disposition.
  • Intention: Despite CD’s last-minute volte-face, the judge found sufficient evidence to infer that the transfers were intended to defeat AB’s claim, particularly given the timing (shortly after separation) and surrounding circumstances.
  • Consequences: Crucially, even if the transferred shares had no significant value at the time (based on expert valuation), the court could still find that AB’s potential award was frustrated.

The judgment emphasised that “defeating” a claim isn’t limited to hiding valuable assets; it includes making enforcement harder or reducing the resources available for distribution.

Practical Lessons for Family Law Practitioners

  • Timing is Critical: Dispositions made within three years of an application automatically trigger a rebuttable presumption of wrongful intent.
  • Burden of Proof: The party seeking to defend the transaction must present a convincing, coherent explanation backed by evidence—shifting stories damage credibility.
  • Valuation Battles: Valuing family businesses is notoriously fragile. Courts prefer solid, contemporaneous documents over fallible human memory.
  • Parallel Litigation Risk: Efforts to game insolvency or corporate structures in parallel proceedings may unravel under scrutiny in family courts.

Final Thought

AB v CD shows that setting aside dodgy transactions is far from straightforward. Courts will apply a fact-sensitive and forensic analysis, and applicants need to present clear evidence of motive, effect, and loss. Tactical share transfers or “paper moves” shortly after separation may not be enough to defeat a determined applicant—or a sceptical judge.

In short: trying to outsmart the family court with clever asset shuffling rarely ends well.

25 April 2025

Smoke Without Fire? When Foreign Judgments Cloud Financial Disclosure

In VTY v GDB [2025] EWFC 110 (B), Recorder Rhys Taylor faced one of the more unusual and unsettling examples of non-disclosure in recent family law decisions. At the heart of the case was not just the usual dispute over hidden assets, but the involvement of litigation in a foreign court that appeared to undermine the very basis of the English proceedings.

The result is a fascinating insight into the limits of judicial intervention when non-disclosure borders on litigation fraud but doesn't quite cross the evidential line.

The Background: "The Farm" and a Foreign Twist

During the original financial remedy proceedings, the husband (H) agreed that a valuable property—referred to as The Farm—was held on trust for him. It was included in the matrimonial asset base.

But post-settlement, H engaged in litigation in a foreign jurisdiction (Country X) that purported to challenge this very assumption. The result? A judgment from a court abroad that he attempted to use to say, effectively, “I no longer own that asset.”

The wife (W), understandably, argued this was a case of deliberate material non-disclosure—that the foreign litigation had been manipulated, or even manufactured, to create a paper trail separating H from his declared asset.

The Suspicion — But Not the Finding

Recorder Taylor was clearly sceptical. The judgment references:

  • Procedural irregularities in the foreign case;
  • The appearance that the husband may have been controlling both sides of the litigation;
  • An absence of proper notice to the wife;
  • Timing that raised eyebrows, coinciding with enforcement activity in England.

And yet, at paragraph 119, the judge declined to go all the way:

“Whilst I recognise all of the well-made points... I am not prepared to say that the judgment of a foreign court should not be recognised on the grounds that it has been obtained by fraud. There are too many imponderables at play, notwithstanding my suspicions.”

This is the core of the legal tension: the English court clearly felt the foreign proceedings were at least questionable, but it stopped short of declaring them fraudulent. In family law, suspicion is not enough. Proof remains paramount—even where red flags abound.

Why This Matters

This case illustrates a rare but increasingly relevant challenge in modern family litigation: the use (or misuse) of foreign legal systems to cloud beneficial ownership or frustrate enforcement.

What makes VTY v GDB so valuable for practitioners is that it shows the court's:

  • Willingness to scrutinise foreign judgments, especially where they emerge post-order;
  • Careful adherence to the principle that fraud must be clearly established—not merely inferred;
  • Recognition of the strategic use of litigation abroad, even when it stops short of formal condemnation.

Practical Pointers for Lawyers

  • Be alert to developments abroad. If a party engages in litigation that appears to unwind or contradict earlier disclosures, question the timing and intent.
  • A foreign judgment is not immune to challenge—but overturning it on fraud grounds is a high bar.
  • Build the evidential picture carefully. Courts will not declare fraud lightly, even if they share your suspicions.
  • Even if the foreign judgment stands, the English court still has wide discretion to apportion assets as between the parties, particularly in ‘needs’ cases, as it did here.

Final Thought

VTY v GDB is a masterclass in judicial restraint. The court clearly saw through the smoke but resisted declaring a fire without hard proof. For family lawyers, the message is clear: suspicion alone is not enough—but it’s often the start of a story the court is willing to hear.

york-skyline-color
york-skyline-color
york-skyline-color

Get in touch for your free consultation

James-Thornton-Family-Law_white

Where innovation meets excellence

Our mission is clear: to redefine the standards of legal representation by seamlessly integrating unparalleled expertise with cutting-edge innovation.

01904 373 111
info@jamesthorntonfamilylaw.co.uk

York Office

Popeshead Court Offices, Peter Lane, York, YO1 8SU

Appointment only

James Thornton Family Law Limited (trading as James Thornton Family Law) is a Company, registered in England and Wales, with Company Number 15610140. Our Registered Office is Popeshead Court Offices, Peter Lane, York, YO1 8SU. Director: James Thornton. We are authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, SRA number 8007901, and subject to the SRA Standards and Regulations which can be accessed at www.sra.org.uk

Privacy Notice  |  Complaints  |  Terms of Business

Facebook
X (Twitter)
Instagram

©2024 James Thornton Family Law Limited