18 September 2025

Child Maintenance Beyond 18

A recent High Court decision, Re H (A Child) [2025] EWHC 2361 (Fam), provides useful guidance on when child maintenance can be extended beyond the age of 18, and how this interacts with the Child Maintenance Service (CMS) regime.

The Case

The dispute arose after HHJ Oliver extended an existing child maintenance order until August 2028, covering the child’s tertiary education. The father appealed, arguing he had not been properly notified of the application to extend the order, and that the order went beyond what the law allowed.

On appeal, Ms Justice Henke dismissed his arguments. She found that:

  • Although the application to extend was made informally, it was clearly flagged in the mother’s skeleton argument and discussed in open court before the child turned 18.
  • Section 29 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 allows the court to extend maintenance while a child remains in education or training.
  • The order to August 2028 matched the expected end of the child’s university course and was therefore justified.

The Legal Framework

In most cases, child maintenance is dealt with by the CMS, which has exclusive jurisdiction once an assessment is in place. However, the court retains limited powers:

  • Under s.29 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (and similarly under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989), maintenance orders can be extended beyond 18 if a child is in education or training, or where there are exceptional circumstances (e.g. disability).
  • The court can only step in where there is no CMS assessment in force or where specific circumstances justify an order.
  • Case law such as UD v DN [2021] EWCA Civ 1947 confirms that an application made before the child turns 18 can still lead to an order covering the period beyond majority.

Informal Applications – Are They Enough?

One striking feature of this case was that the mother’s application was made within her skeleton argument for an enforcement hearing, rather than by formal application notice. The father argued this was procedurally unfair. The court disagreed, holding that:

  • Informal applications can suffice, provided the other party is aware of them and has the chance to respond.
  • This echoes earlier authorities, including Tattersall v Tattersall [2018] EWCA Civ 1978, where the Court of Appeal recognised the flexibility of the family courts when dealing with variation or extension applications.

Why It Matters

For parents and practitioners, the case reinforces several points:

  • Child maintenance doesn’t necessarily end at 18 – support often continues while a child is at university or in vocational training.
  • Timing is crucial – an application made before the 18th birthday preserves the court’s jurisdiction, even if determined later.
  • Informality has limits – while the court allowed an application raised in a skeleton argument here, best practice remains to make a clear, formal application.

The CMS vs Court Orders

The interplay between the CMS and the court remains complex. The CMS generally has priority, but the court retains a role where:

  • There is already a court order in place (as here), or
  • The case involves education beyond 18, or
  • There are exceptional needs that fall outside CMS jurisdiction.

Final Thought

This case underlines the flexibility but also the discipline of the family courts: they will extend child maintenance beyond 18 where justified, but applications must be grounded in evidence and raised in time. For separated parents, it is a reminder not to assume financial responsibility ends on a child’s 18th birthday—especially where university or further training lies ahead.

15 May 2025

Top-Up Child Maintenance in HNW Cases: Where Lifestyle Meets Logic

For family lawyers advising high-net-worth clients, the concept of “top-up” child maintenance is often one of the most contested elements in financial proceedings. The decision in James v Seymour [2023] EWHC 844 (Fam) adds further clarity (and complexity) to the landscape—reconciling parental affluence, fairness, and legislative boundaries.

But what exactly is a top-up order? And how far should the English courts go to ensure that a child’s lifestyle mirrors that of the richer parent?

What Is a “Top-Up” Order?

Under the Child Support Act 1991, the Child Maintenance Service (CMS) calculates maintenance obligations up to a gross annual income of £156,000. For earnings above this cap, the court regains jurisdiction under section 8(6), allowing it to make “top-up” orders. The rationale? In ultra-wealthy cases, CMS figures don’t touch the sides of the child’s actual needs or expectations.

James v Seymour: Conventional Awards vs Lifestyle Claims

In James v Seymour, the mother sought to increase maintenance to over £2,000 per month per child based on a “disparity of lifestyle” with the father, a successful private equity executive. But Mr Justice Mostyn wasn’t persuaded, stating:

“The amount that would be payable under the formula... is plainly excessive and not reasonably proportionate.”

Mostyn J preferred a conventional needs-based assessment, applying what he termed an “Adjusted Formula Methodology” (AFM) for high-income cases up to £650,000, acknowledging both its utility and its flaws.

CB v KB [2019]: Enter the Formula

This earlier case set the ball rolling. Mostyn J suggested that the CMS formula should provide a logical starting point—even for incomes up to £650,000. The so-called “Mostyn formula” offered predictability, but it was soon criticised for producing arbitrary per-child results and failing to reflect economies of scale in larger families.

Collardeau-Fuchs v Fuchs [2022]: Introducing HECSA

In Collardeau-Fuchs, the court made a crucial distinction between:

  • Conventional child support awards, calculated by reference to proportionate expenses.
  • Household Expenditure Child Support Awards (HECSAs), where the award reflects broader household running costs and lifestyle parity.

Top-up orders in HECSA cases go beyond food and clothing—they cover multiple properties, drivers, nannies, and international schooling. But such awards must still meet the fairness test under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

What Did James v Seymour Add?

Mostyn J’s most valuable contribution may be his proposed AFM framework, with adjustments based on:

  • School fees and other grossed-up costs;
  • Pension contributions;
  • Number of children and level of shared care.

This model aims to avoid disproportionate outcomes and offers guidance for incomes between £156,000 and £650,000.

He also acknowledged its limits:

  • It shouldn’t apply to variation applications;
  • It doesn’t work well for unearned income or capital-rich respondents;
  • It mustn’t override the discretionary test under s.25.

Practical Tips for Practitioners

  1. Budget First: A detailed child-focused budget remains the cornerstone of any claim. Don’t assume income alone drives quantum.
  2. HECSA or Not?: Be clear whether the claim is for a HECSA-style award (lifestyle parity) or a conventional needs-based sum.
  3. Use the AFM Sparingly: As a reference tool—not a rule.
  4. Don’t Overreach: Courts are alive to inflated claims. In James v Seymour, the court saw through attempts to use the father’s wealth as a blank cheque.
  5. Equalisation Isn't a Goal: Lifestyle parity may be a factor, but it's not the legal test. The court won’t iron out every disparity, particularly post-divorce.

Conclusion

In the HNW world, child maintenance can range from the modest to the majestic. But James v Seymour reminds us that fairness, not fortune, is the measure—and that clear, proportionate claims still carry the day. Practitioners should embrace the guidance while remembering that even in luxury, legal principles must still apply.

14 May 2025

Tying Up Loose Ends: THR v WAT and the Realities of High-Net-Worth Divorce

In THR v WAT [2025] EWHC 1125 (Fam), His Honour Judge Hess was faced with the unenviable task of transforming a multi-million-pound Xydhias agreement into a final financial remedy order—navigating disputed terms, hidden costs, forgotten interest, and inflated child maintenance schedules. The judgment offers practitioners a rare insight into the pitfalls of rushed settlements and the court’s insistence that “a deal is a deal”—even if you think you left something out.

The Context: A Quick Settlement in a Heavyweight Case

This was a “big money” case with substantial assets on both sides. The parties had six bundles of documents and a 10-day final hearing listed, but they reached an agreement on day one—what both sides called a binding Xydhias agreement. The problem? Not everything was spelled out clearly.

Over the next few days, the drafting revealed five points of contention:

  1. Whether a company loan should reduce the wife's lump sum.
  2. Whether estimated legal fees should be adjusted post-settlement.
  3. Whether the lump sums should attract interest.
  4. Whether the wife should receive additional security.
  5. What level of child periodical payments (CMS top-up) the husband should pay.

Xydhias Means Finality, Not Flexibility

The husband had agreed to pay the wife £36 million, less “what she already had”—a sum which his own documents put at £2.09 million. But he later argued this was a mistake, particularly because it didn’t reflect the (supposed) value of the wife’s interest in a company called X Ltd or her reduced legal fees.

The court disagreed.

Judge Hess reminded both parties that once they reached a Xydhias agreement, the court’s role was not to re-write the deal unless there had been fraud or clear mistake. The husband, having made a firm offer based on £2.09 million, was held to it. His Honour was clear:

“There was time to raise this if it was important... a deal is a deal.”

No Interest Means... No Interest

The wife’s team attempted to insert a clause for interest on the deferred lump sums—months after the deal was struck. Judge Hess ruled this was an afterthought, not part of the agreed terms. Despite being asked to add 3.75% interest on unpaid instalments, he refused:

“If the wife’s team wanted those to be an essential part of the deal, there was plenty of time... They did not.”

Security Provisions: Reasonable, Not Total

The husband offered partial security against the lump sums, which the wife wanted increased to 100%. The judge declined, noting the husband had already paid £5 million early and was not shown to be a flight risk or unwilling to comply. The court endorsed the principle that perfect security is not always necessary where trustworthiness is evident.

Top-Up Maintenance in the HNW World

Both parties agreed the case warranted a CMS top-up order under section 8(6) of the Child Support Act 1991. But the figures were miles apart:

  • Wife’s position: £50,000 per child, per annum (£150,000 total).
  • Husband’s position: £20,000 per child, per annum (£60,000 total).

Judge Hess landed in the middle at £25,000 per child—totalling £75,000 per year—and made some trenchant comments about the inflated and unrealistic budget put forward by the wife. Among the claims: £120,000 on holidays, £6,000 for children’s computers, and £2,000 on Christmas gifts.

We are dealing with children aged six, six, and three... the needs of children must be finite whatever the payer’s income.”

This aligns with the James v Seymour approach—where top-up maintenance is assessed from first principles (s.25 MCA 1973) rather than simply applying a cap or CMS formula.

Key Lessons for Practitioners

  • Don’t leave “loose ends” in a Xydhias deal—spell out issues like interest, security, and assumptions about asset values at the time of agreement.
  • Final means final—the court won’t revisit a deal just because one side gets buyer’s remorse.
  • Avoid “aspirational” budgets—top-up child maintenance claims must be grounded in actual need, even in ultra-wealthy families.
  • Security must be proportionate—perfect cover isn’t always required if the payer has a history of compliance.

Final Word

THR v WAT is a textbook example of the messiness that can follow an expensive, high-stakes settlement reached too quickly. For those dealing with big numbers and complex structures, it’s a reminder: if you want clarity, earn it at the drafting table—not by asking the court to fix what you forgot to ask for.

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