23 June 2025

Dissipation in a Modest Pot: Add-Back in MNV v CNV [2025] EWFC 176 (B)

When we think of asset dissipation and the “add-back” principle, we often picture yachts, casinos, or private jets. But in MNV v CNV [2025] EWFC 176 (B), Deputy District Judge Bradshaw dealt with these concepts in a far more relatable setting: a modest Midlands home, a VW van, and a husband who moved abroad to care for his elderly mother—taking a substantial slice of the matrimonial assets with him.

This case is a masterclass in how serious the consequences of financial decisions can be, even in low-asset cases. And it clarifies how the courts handle claims of dissipation and the potential for add-back when the matrimonial pot is small.

The Setup

The parties were long-term LGV drivers with a 14-year relationship and a teenage son. Their principal asset was the former matrimonial home, valued at around £181,000, with equity of £138,814. At separation, the husband held various assets—savings, a van, and a motorbike—amounting to approximately £50,000.

Post-separation, he transferred £17,000 to his brother abroad, later recovered it, sold the van for £27,000, and moved permanently to Country X to care for his mother, bringing the money (and some chattels) with him. The wife argued he had dissipated those funds and should not receive a further share of the remaining matrimonial assets.

The Add-Back Argument

The judge applied the established authorities on add-back, including Martin v Martin [1976], Norris v Norris [2003], Vaughan v Vaughan [2008], and MAP v MFP [2016]. From these, the following modern test was distilled:

  1. Was the expenditure reckless or wanton?
  2. Did it disadvantage the other spouse?
  3. Can the add-back be applied without frustrating the court’s ability to meet needs?

The judge found that the husband’s removal of £47,000 was:

  • Reckless: He took the only liquid assets while knowing there were none left for his wife or child.
  • Wanton: He prioritised his mother’s needs (post-separation) over those of his spouse and child.
  • Disadvantageous: His actions left the wife with no accessible funds.

Yet, the court did not add the £47,000 back into the schedule for distribution. Why? Because this was a “needs” case, and doing so would have left the husband with no ability to meet his own housing need. Still, the judge notionally treated the £47,000 as received for purposes of fairness—not to be repaid, but to calibrate how much more (if any) the husband should receive.

The Result

The husband received a modest lump sum of £6,500 to help rehouse himself in Country X—where property prices were far lower—and the wife retained the FMH. She was not ordered to pay ongoing maintenance, and a clean break was achieved.

Had the wife not raised dissipation and add-back arguments effectively, the result may have looked quite different.

Key Lessons for Practitioners

  • Dissipation can be found even in modest cases—it’s not just for HNW disputes.
  • “Add-back” is a powerful tool, but not always one that leads to pound-for-pound redistribution.
  • Judges may recognise dissipation but still decline a strict add-back if doing so would frustrate fairness or needs.
  • Evidence of reckless or wanton conduct must be clear—but moral culpability is not always enough (see MAP v MFP).
  • Consider proportionality of legal costs: here, the judge adjusted the husband's debt to reflect overspending on legal fees, citing YC v ZC [2022].

Final Thought

MNV v CNV demonstrates that even modest financial decisions can carry disproportionate consequences—and that the family court will examine behaviour with just as much scrutiny in a £150,000 case as in a £15 million one. For litigants and advisors alike, the message is this: the smaller the pot, the bigger the impact of each mistake.

20 June 2025

When “No” Means the Court Says It for You: DH v RH and the Power to Sign

In DH v RH [2025] EWFC 175, Mr Justice MacDonald delivered a powerful message to recalcitrant litigants in financial remedy cases: refusal to cooperate doesn’t stop the court—it just means the court steps in for you.

This case wasn’t about redrawing financial lines or recalculating assets. It was about enforcement—getting a final order actually implemented. And in this case, that required the court to sign property transfer documents on behalf of the non-compliant party.

The Background: A Final Order Ignored

The court had already made a comprehensive final financial remedy order in May 2024, awarding the wife around £6.2 million, structured carefully to provide both parties with housing and financial security. But one year later, the wife had refused to implement the order, particularly the transfers of real estate in the US, despite repeated attempts by the husband to resolve matters.

Her conduct was described as “deliberately obstructive”, and included:

  • Ignoring orders to engage in joint tax mitigation;
  • Filing a blizzard of unmeritorious applications, some without notice;
  • Refusing to sign key documents needed to transfer the properties; and
  • Even failing to attend the final enforcement hearing—offering no credible medical reason not to.

The Court's Response: Signing for Her

Relying on section 39 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court did what had to be done: it signed the property transfer documents itself, in her place.

This was not a surprise. The final order had anticipated this possibility and included a specific clause (paragraph 27(g)) allowing for judicial execution of documents in default of cooperation. As Mr Justice MacDonald put it, the court’s intervention was the only way to ensure the order had meaning:

“Without the court using its powers… the wife will continue to refuse to implement the order.”

This wasn’t punitive—it was practical justice, delivered with precision.

Not Just About Signatures: The Cost of Non-Compliance

The judgment also tackled the wife’s application to set aside the final order, citing claims of tax miscalculation, asset undervaluation, and fraud. But these were found to be recycled arguments from her dismissed appeal, unsupported by any credible new evidence.

In dismissing that application, the court emphasised:

  • The high threshold for set-aside: fraud, mistake, non-disclosure, or a Barder event.
  • The strong public policy in finality of litigation, especially where delay is self-inflicted.
  • Her repeated breaches of directions, especially on the tax issues she claimed to contest.

She was also ordered to pay indemnity costs, reflecting the court’s frustration with her litigation conduct.

Why This Case Matters for Family Lawyers

  1. Enforcement is real. If you build contingencies into your final order (as here), you can save months of delay when one party drags their feet.
  2. Section 39 is powerful. The court’s ability to execute documents has real teeth. It’s a crucial clause to include in orders involving property transfers.
  3. Adjournments require more than just a letter. The court showed a firm approach to late medical-based adjournment requests, especially where there's a history of obstruction.
  4. The limits of set-aside. You can’t relitigate a final order just because you don’t like the outcome—especially if the problems were caused by your own non-compliance.

Final Thought

DH v RH is a masterclass in how the court enforces finality, not just by dismissing baseless set-aside applications, but by stepping in to sign the dotted line when necessary. It’s a reminder that in family law, “final order” means just that—and if you refuse to cooperate, the court has a pen ready to take your place.

18 June 2025

Disclosure or Detention? A Stark Warning from Ozturk v Ozturk

In Ozturk v Ozturk [2025] EWFC 162 (B), Her Honour Judge Moreton handed down a judgment that should ring loud alarm bells for any party tempted to ignore court orders in divorce proceedings.

This was not a case about big money or complex asset structures—it was about a basic, foundational requirement of every financial remedy case: filing Form E. The husband didn’t file his Form E. He didn’t attend court. He didn’t engage. The result? A suspended prison sentence and a very public warning.

What Happened?

Mr Ozturk was ordered to file his Form E—with supporting documents—by 12 November 2024. That deadline came and went. The order had been personally served on him. He did nothing.

He ignored:

  • The initial directions to file Form E by 3 September 2024.
  • The First Directions Appointment (FDA) on 8 October 2024.
  • A further adjourned FDA in December 2024.
  • All attempts to resolve matters out of court.
  • The hearing on 8 May 2025 to determine whether he should be committed to prison for contempt.

Despite being properly served with the application and the hearing notice, he simply didn’t show up. The judge concluded that his non-engagement was deliberate and sustained.

The Sentence: 28 Days in Prison – Suspended

The court found Mr Ozturk in contempt of court for breaching a clear, personally served order that carried a penal notice. A custodial sentence of 28 days was imposed, but suspended on the condition that he finally complies and files a proper Form E within 28 days.

The judge made clear: this is his last chance.

Key Takeaways for Practitioners and Clients

  1. Form E Is Not Optional

Financial disclosure—via Form E—is the bedrock of fair outcomes in divorce. Without it, the court can’t evaluate needs, assets, or obligations. Non-compliance isn’t a strategy; it’s a contempt of court.

  1. Deliberate Non-Engagement Will Not Be Tolerated

The court described Mr Ozturk’s conduct as “wilful and repeated breaches.” This is what distinguishes late compliance from contempt. Judges will give latitude for mistakes or delay—but not for defiance.

  1. Committal Is Real

This case is a reminder that the penal notice isn’t an idle threat. Imprisonment for failure to comply with a financial remedy order is rare, but absolutely possible—especially where the party has received repeated opportunities to engage.

  1. Litigants in Person Are Not Exempt

Mr Ozturk was unrepresented, but that didn’t excuse his conduct. The court was satisfied that he understood his obligations and had simply chosen to ignore them. The court took steps to ensure he’d been served and had notice, which made his absence all the more serious.

  1. Costs Follow Non-Compliance

The court also awarded costs of £2,210.40 against Mr Ozturk, payable within 14 days. Delay and obstruction don’t just slow the process—they cost money, and the court will not hesitate to make non-compliant parties pay.

Final Thought

Ozturk v Ozturk isn’t about high finance—it’s about high stakes. If you don’t comply with disclosure obligations, you risk not just a worse financial outcome, but potentially your liberty. For lawyers, this case is a powerful tool to explain to reluctant clients why Form E isn’t a bureaucratic nuisance—it’s a legal obligation.

And now, thanks to this judgment, we can say with absolute clarity: ignore it at your peril.

16 June 2025

When Child Maintenance Crosses Borders : CA v UK

In CA v UK [2025] EWFC 117 (B), His Honour Judge Watkins delivered a sharp, thoughtful decision on an increasingly familiar scenario: how and where to resolve international child maintenance disputes when parents, assets, and court orders span multiple continents. At the heart of this case was an issue that’s rarely litigated but often debated: can a parent apply under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 to make an order against themselves?

Spoiler: no—but not for the obvious reasons.

The Background: From New York to Nottingham via California

The mother and father, both British nationals, divorced in New York. That court ordered the father to pay around £3,800 per month in child support. The mother and children later relocated to the UK, where the children became habitually resident. Meanwhile, the father moved to California.

This geographic triangle gave rise to a jurisdictional dilemma:

  • The mother initiated enforcement proceedings in New York, which eventually ceded jurisdiction.
  • The father then applied under Schedule 1 in England, not to resist maintenance, but (unusually) to formalise an English-based child support order—presumably to simplify the arrangements and reflect his current earnings.

The mother objected, arguing that:

  1. California was the more appropriate forum, especially as she had now registered the New York order there.
  2. The father's Schedule 1 application was procedurally flawed, since a parent cannot, under the plain wording of the statute, apply for an order against themselves.

Key Legal Issues and What the Court Decided

  1. Forum Conveniens

Following Spiliada Maritime v Cansulex, the judge asked: is there another more appropriate forum for resolving this dispute?

Yes—California.

  • The father’s income was generated there.
  • Child maintenance calculations in California are formulaic and tailored to local tax structures.
  • Proceedings were already underway there.
  • Any English order would still require registration and enforcement in California, with associated risk and delay.
  • Multiple proceedings across jurisdictions risked fragmented and inefficient litigation.

The court therefore stayed the father's Schedule 1 application.

  1. Can You Apply Against Yourself under Schedule 1?

The father’s application sought an order requiring himself to pay child maintenance—presumably into the UK court framework. This was procedurally innovative, perhaps even well-meaning, but ultimately misconceived.

Judge Watkins concluded that Schedule 1 does not permit a parent to apply for an order against themselves. The statutory language is clear: an order must be made to the applicant, or directly to the child. Legal gymnastics were suggested to get around this—such as the court making an order to the mother or the children—but the judge rejected these as inconsistent with the legislation.

This rare ruling may close the door on a growing workaround sometimes used in cross-border support cases.

Why This Matters for Practitioners

  • International enforcement is not just a technicality. Even cooperative parties may face difficulties when orders must be enforced abroad, particularly when defaulting parties live in the US or elsewhere.
  • Schedule 1 has limits. The statute wasn’t designed for mutual applications or administrative regularisation. Lawyers should resist the temptation to stretch its wording for convenience.
  • The child's habitual residence is important—but not always determinative. Even where children live in England, enforcement and variation of child support may best be resolved where the paying parent resides.
  • Think strategically about forum. Enforcement, taxation, and evidence all favour the payer’s jurisdiction in some cases, especially where courts apply fixed child support guidelines, as in California.

Final Thought

CA v UK offers more than a tidy lesson in forum conveniens—it’s a reminder that statutory frameworks must be respected, even in creative international family law scenarios. As cross-border parenting becomes increasingly common, clarity about what the English courts can—and cannot—do under Schedule 1 becomes all the more important.

For practitioners handling international cases, the takeaway is clear: pick your forum wisely, and don’t ask the court to order what it has no power to give—even if it sounds fair.

13 June 2025

Disclosure, Costs, and Fairness in OS v DT

In OS v DT [2025] EWFC 156 (B), His Honour Judge Edward Hess presided over a high-net-worth financial remedy dispute that, beneath its glittering spreadsheets and asset schedules, boiled down to something less glamorous—but no less vital: transparency, trust, and the true cost of confusion.

The case concerned a couple whose finances spanned multiple jurisdictions and asset classes. Yet what set it apart was not simply the scale (assets exceeding £9m), but the obstacle course the wife had to navigate in order to understand what was truly matrimonial property—a problem that stemmed from the husband’s management of his parents’ finances, and his initial resistance to fully explaining them.

The Disclosure Debacle

At the heart of the dispute was the husband’s assertion that various funds and investments were not his, but were held on behalf of his parents—particularly his father. This claim, he argued, exempted significant sums from the wife’s sharing claim.

But Judge Hess was unimpressed by how long it took the husband to present a coherent and well-evidenced account of these financial arrangements. In one striking paragraph, the judge wrote:

“The husband’s attitude could be characterised as being ‘just trust me, why are you troubling me with these unnecessary questions’ rather than attempting a proper explanation of a confusing situation with, potentially, significant amounts of money at stake.”

The eventual resolution of many of these issues only came after the failed private FDR, which significantly increased legal costs on both sides. Despite this, the judge declined to penalise either party in costs—finding that the wife had been justified in pursuing answers, and the husband had eventually provided clarity, albeit belatedly.

Costs: Not Just a Bottom Line

A particularly notable element of the case was the disparity in legal costs: the husband spent almost £490,000 on legal fees, while the wife spent £244,000. Both figures are eye-watering, but the difference between them sparked a debate: should the court adjust the asset division to reflect one party’s overspend?

The court ultimately said no—at least, not here. Despite citing established authority on adjusting for disproportionate costs (RH v RH, LS v SJ, YC v ZC), HHJ Hess found this wasn’t one of the “obvious” cases where penalising a party for excessive costs was justified.

This illustrates a key point for practitioners: the threshold for adjusting distribution due to costs is high, even when one party’s spending is arguably excessive. The court needs more than just a large figure—it needs clear evidence that those costs were wasteful or incurred unreasonably.

Practical Pointers

For family lawyers, the case offers several practical lessons:

  • Third-party wealth is a red flag: If a party claims to manage assets on behalf of relatives, press for clarity early—and get it in writing. Vague assertions of “it’s not mine” won’t fly.
  • Cost disparity alone won’t justify an adjustment: But a confusing or uncooperative approach to disclosure might.
  • Transparency pays dividends: The husband’s eventual transparency helped his case—but only after significant financial and procedural cost.

Final Thought

OS v DT reminds us that even in high-value cases, the bedrock of fairness is procedural clarity. In a world of RSUs, offset accounts, and startup investments, the simplest principle still applies: if you're holding someone else’s money, you'd better be able to prove it. And if you can’t—or don’t try—you may end up paying for the confusion, one way or another.

12 June 2025

When Borrowing Blurs the Lines: Can a Mortgage Make a Gifted Property Matrimonial?

In C v C [2025] EWFC 152 (B), Recorder Christopher Stirling tackled a complex and increasingly common issue in modern financial remedy proceedings: what happens when a party borrows against non-matrimonial property for matrimonial purposes? Does that make the borrowing—and perhaps the asset itself—matrimonial?

The facts involved a London husband (H) who inherited a property, 27 R Avenue, from his mother. The property was clearly non-matrimonial, being a pre-marital gift. However, H raised a significant mortgage against it during the marriage, using the funds to support the family. He then argued the mortgage itself should be considered a matrimonial liability, separate from the property it was secured against.

The Core Issue: Can You “Matrimonialise” a Mortgage?

The husband’s logic was superficially compelling: the loan was used to support the family, so it should count as a joint debt. But the judge wasn’t persuaded. Stirling rejected the idea of severing the debt from its security, noting that treating the mortgage as matrimonial while leaving the asset non-matrimonial would be “wholly artificial.”

Instead, he adopted a more integrated approach: the mortgage reduces the value of the non-matrimonial asset, and therefore doesn’t create a separate matrimonial liability. Nor does the use of borrowed money, even for family purposes, override the fundamentally non-matrimonial nature of the asset itself.

Why This Matters

This decision is important because it helps clarify the often-murky area of borrowing against non-matrimonial assets. We frequently see parties leveraging inherited or pre-acquired property to raise funds—sometimes to support the household, sometimes to pay legal fees, or other costs. It is tempting to argue that the act of borrowing “transforms” part of the asset into something matrimonial.

But C v C is clear: you can't isolate a debt from its security just because the money was used for the family. This ties in with recent guidance in WX v HX and ND v GD, which emphasise that the application of income or value from non-matrimonial property doesn’t automatically convert the underlying capital into a matrimonial asset.

The Subtler Argument: Unmatched Contributions

That said, the judge did recognise that using non-matrimonial assets (or loans secured against them) can be relevant in the overall discretionary exercise. Such use may be seen as an unmatched contribution—a factor which might justify a departure from equality in the division of matrimonial assets. But in this case, W had also made substantial unmatched contributions, including from her inherited wealth.

The result? The borrowing and counter-contributions effectively cancelled each other out.

Key Points for Practitioners

  • Don’t assume that using non-matrimonial property for family needs “converts” it into matrimonial property. It doesn’t—unless there’s mingling, use as a family home, or other transformative steps.
  • Be cautious about arguing that borrowing creates a standalone matrimonial debt. Courts are unlikely to separate a secured liability from the asset it’s secured against.
  • The discretionary power of the court remains broad. Even if an asset stays non-matrimonial, its use may be relevant in adjusting the division of matrimonial property.
  • Focus on overall fairness, not just legal categorisation. The court will always look at the totality of contributions and resources in arriving at its decision.

Final Thought

C v C offers timely clarity on an issue that arises in many divorce cases—particularly where family wealth and inherited assets are in play. It reminds us that even where the parties dance around the legal labels of “matrimonial” and “non-matrimonial,” the court’s focus remains firmly on fairness, nuance, and context.

11 June 2025

Expert Evidence in Divorce: When Is One Report Not Enough?

In financial remedy proceedings, expert valuation of businesses can make or break a case. But what happens when one party no longer agrees with the expert they jointly instructed? That was the question at the heart of JMD v SPD [2025] EWFC 154 (B), where the husband sought to challenge the Single Joint Expert (SJE)’s valuation of his business and persuade the court to allow him to instruct his own.

The case is a valuable reminder of how carefully the court guards the integrity and efficiency of financial remedy litigation—especially when it comes to expert evidence.

Background: A Joint Expert Disputed

The parties jointly instructed a forensic accountant to value the husband’s property development business. The SJE’s valuation (at £18.2 million) differed sharply from the husband’s own expectations, largely because the expert chose not to accept the valuations of the company’s property assets from a separate property valuer. The SJE took the view that these incomplete developments would not be sold at a forced sale value and based their assessment on full, completed values.

The husband’s position: this approach inflated the company’s value and failed to reflect the true economic reality. He argued that this divergence—plus the failure to communicate with the property valuer—was so significant that it justified a fresh expert.

The Legal Framework: Daniels v Walker and Beyond

District Judge Parker carefully applied the principles from Daniels v Walker [2000] and other authorities, including GA v EL [2023] EWFC 187 and Cosgrove v Pattison. The key points?

  • A party may seek permission to instruct a further expert only where the original SJE’s report is deficient in a way that can’t be addressed through questions or cross-examination.
  • It is a discretionary exercise, and courts will consider factors such as:
    • The importance and centrality of the issue;
    • Proportionality and costs;
    • The ability to challenge the existing report;
    • Whether there would be an "understandable sense of grievance" if permission were refused.

In this case, DJ Parker found the SJE had disregarded the valuations from the property expert—an expert whose input was supposed to form the foundation of the business valuation. That, said the judge, was “concerning” and justified a second expert.

What This Means for Practitioners

  1. Don’t treat SJE reports as untouchable—but tread carefully.

Courts are open to allowing further expert evidence where there's a real risk of injustice, especially if a joint expert has stepped outside their remit or failed to consult appropriately.

  1. Shadow expert opinions are not enough.

You’ll need more than dissatisfaction or a critique. Courts will expect a structured approach: questions first, application second.

  1. Proportionality still matters.

The husband in JMD v SPD was ordered to fund the second expert himself, a reminder that if you ask for more evidence, you may foot the bill.

  1. Coordination between experts is key.

This case shows the risks of siloed reporting—where one expert disregards another’s work. Joint expert coordination can prevent disputes later on.

Conclusion

JMD v SPD reminds us that even a single joint expert can get it wrong—or at least raise enough doubt to justify a second opinion. But courts will protect the discipline of the Daniels framework, requiring a structured, proportionate approach. The lesson for family lawyers? If you want a new expert, you’ll need a better reason than just a bad result.

29 May 2025

Set Aside or Sit Tight? When Market Shifts Don’t Justify Reopening Financial Orders

In X v Y [2025] EWFC 144 (B), District Judge Stone delivered a forensic and educational judgment on a topic that regularly vexes family lawyers: can a final financial remedy order be reopened or varied simply because the property market dips?

Spoiler alert: the answer is no—at least not on the facts of this case.

Background: A House, a Fixed Sum, and a Change of Heart

The parties had agreed (and the court ordered) that the former matrimonial home in Cornwall would be sold, with the wife (Mrs Y) receiving £410,000 and the husband (Mr X) receiving the balance, after deducting various sale-related costs and a minor costs award.

At the time of the final hearing in December 2023, the property was valued at £800,000 based on a joint expert report. Both parties expected it might sell for more, but the court stuck with the expert figure. Notably, both had opted for fixed sums rather than percentage-based awards—Mr X specifically proposing to take the risk (or gain) if the property sold for less (or more).

When the market softened and the best offer received was £795,000, Mr X brought an application to set aside or vary the order, arguing that the change in property value was a material development rendering the order inequitable. He framed the claim under the Thwaite jurisdiction.

The Legal Framework: Barder and Thwaite

  • Barder v Caluori [1988] AC 20 sets a high bar: to set aside a financial order due to a supervening event, the event must be unforeseen, exceptional, and undermine the basis of the order. It must occur shortly after the order and not prejudice third parties.
  • Thwaite v Thwaite [1982] Fam 1 is a narrower route, applicable only where the order remains executory (i.e. not fully implemented) and it would be inequitable to enforce it due to a significant change of circumstances. Crucially, if parties’ claims have already been dismissed, the court cannot substitute a new order, only refuse enforcement.

Here, Mr X had opted for Thwaite, recognising Barder was doomed to fail.

The Decision: Variation Refused, Order Upheld

DJ Stone dismissed the application. He found:

  • The property’s small reduction in value was not a sufficiently significant change. Mr X stood to lose a maximum of £13,000, and in some scenarios might even benefit due to elapsed mortgage penalties.
  • Mr X had proposed this very model of fixed-sum order—he took the upside risk, and must also accept the downside.
  • There was no suggestion of wrongdoing or delay by Mrs Y.
  • There was no expert evidence that the property’s value had truly dropped—just a single estate agent letter referencing a hesitant buyer.

Most importantly, the judge noted that even if he found the order inequitable, the court lacked jurisdiction to replace it because both parties’ financial claims had been dismissed outright in the original order. The application had nowhere to go.

Key Points for Family Lawyers

  1. Be careful with fixed-sum orders based on property values. If the market shifts, there's no guarantee the court will reopen the deal—particularly where a percentage-based award might have self-adjusted.
  2. Barder remains a high bar—it requires a genuinely unforeseen, devastating event.
  3. Thwaite is alive but limited: It applies only to executory orders and mainly allows courts to refuse enforcement—not rewrite orders—unless claims remain live.
  4. Dismissing claims outright? Double-check that the structure of your order doesn’t box your client out of relief if the sale goes awry.
  5. Market changes are not enough on their own—courts expect parties to accept ordinary risks.

Conclusion

This judgment is a useful clarification of the narrow—and narrowing—routes by which parties can revisit final orders. Mr X gambled on the market and lost slightly, but the court refused to let him reshuffle the deck. For family lawyers, the message is clear: structure settlement orders carefully, and don’t assume market movements will justify a second bite at the cherry.

23 May 2025

Unequal but Fair: When the Breadwinner Pays the Price in Divorce

In GR v AR [2025] EWFC 143 (B), His Honour Judge Edward Hess handed down a comprehensive judgment that serves as a reminder: the sharing principle may start at 50:50, but it doesn’t always end there—especially when one spouse brought significantly more wealth to the marriage.

This case is a textbook example of non-matrimonial property, the nuance of contributions, and the real-world difficulty of assigning mathematical fairness in long marriages where wealth is complex and pre-acquired.

Case Summary

  • Marriage length: Just over 9 years (including long cohabitation).
  • Parties: A high-earning wife with substantial pre-marital wealth, and a husband who stepped away from work to focus on parenting after a successful business career.
  • Total asset base: Over £41 million, largely held by the wife (£36m).
  • Outcome: Husband awarded a lump sum of £11 million, or 39% of the total liquid assets.

Key Issues and Judicial Reasoning

  1. Matrimonial vs Non-Matrimonial Property

The core of the dispute was how much of the wife’s wealth should be shared. She had accumulated significant wealth before marriage, mostly via shares in a major investment company. The judge rejected strict mathematical models offered by each side and instead followed Hart v Hart [2017] and Miller/McFarlane [2006], applying a broad evaluative approach. Ultimately, approximately two-thirds of her Swiss bank holdings and investments were deemed matrimonial acquest.

  1. The Family Home Counts—Even in Sole Names

The wife bought the home in her sole name, but Judge Hess followed well-established principles (Miller, Standish v Standish [2024]) that the family home—even if pre-owned—generally counts as matrimonial property. The husband was awarded 50% of the equity, adding over £1 million to his award.

  1. The "Sharp" Argument Rejected

The wife’s legal team leaned on Sharp v Sharp [2017] to argue that their separate finances during the marriage (splitting bills down the middle, etc.) should reduce any claim by the husband. But the judge declined to apply Sharp-style logic to a long marriage with a child, instead preferring the broader fairness lens of XW v XH [2020].

  1. Add-Backs and Alleged Spending

The husband sought “add-backs” for post-separation spending, including a watch and a gift from the wife to her mother. The court declined, emphasising that these were not so exceptional as to warrant financial penalty, and mirrored the husband’s own discretionary spending.

  1. Career Choices and Earning Capacity

The husband had declined work offers post-separation, citing a desire to focus on co-parenting. The wife suspected strategic unemployment. The court struck a balanced tone, noting his continued high earning capacity—but not penalising him for past choices. This aligns with the non-discriminatory approach of White v White [2000].

Practical Points for Practitioners

  • Tracing the marital element in complex investments requires realism: Judges are increasingly wary of "spreadsheet wars" that mask rather than reveal fairness.
  • Family homes remain special—even if owned in one name.
  • Pre-marital wealth still matters, but courts don’t always leave it untouched if it’s been mixed, grown, or relied on.
  • Keeping finances separate during marriage doesn't always carry the weight separating parties hope for—context is king.
  • Reasonable needs are not the only measure in HNW cases; sharing and fairness remain central.

Conclusion

GR v AR is a reminder that even in cases involving immense wealth, the court still wrestles with human judgment, not just arithmetic. The wife, whose fortune dwarfed the husband’s, retained the lion’s share—but not all of it. A clean break was achieved with a substantial lump sum that reflected the marriage's shared economic life, without punishing pre-marital success.

The result? Not 50/50, but fair—and that, ultimately, is the goal.

20 May 2025

“Covert Recordings, Public Consequences” — What Family Lawyers Need to Know About the New FJC Guidance (May 2025)

In May 2025, the Family Justice Council (FJC) released long-awaited guidance on covert recordings in family proceedings concerning children. As Sir Andrew McFarlane acknowledges in the foreword, this is a “growing area for the courts” with limited prior guidance — and increasing complexity due to modern technology.

Whether it’s a parent bugging a child’s backpack, secretly taping social workers, or a covert smartphone recording mid-contact handover, this document seeks to bring clarity — and consistency — to a controversial but increasingly common issue.

What’s the Big Deal?

Covert recordings are often born of mistrust: parents feeling disbelieved, professionals under scrutiny, and children caught in the crossfire. The court is now regularly asked to weigh the evidential value of a secret tape against the ethical and emotional damage its making may cause — especially to children.

The new guidance covers:

  • The legal framework (including data protection and human rights concerns)
  • Case management issues around admissibility
  • The welfare implications for children
  • The views of young people, who overwhelmingly find the idea intrusive and upsetting

Key Principles for Practitioners

  1. Lawfulness Isn’t Enough

Just because a recording might not be illegal doesn’t mean it’s admissible — or wise. In family proceedings, the court is guided by welfare and fairness, not simply evidence-gathering tactics.

  1. Children Should Almost Never Be Recorded

The guidance is blunt: recording children is rarely justifiable. Peter Jackson J described it as “almost always likely to be wrong.” Not only are these recordings usually unhelpful in content, but the fact that a parent spied on a child may itself be damaging evidence of their inability to prioritise the child’s welfare.

  1. Covert Recordings of Professionals Are a Mixed Bag

Some famous cases (Medway Council v A & Ors (Learning Disability; Foster Placement) [2015] EWFC B66 (2 June 2015), Re F (Care Proceedings: Failures of Expert) [2016] EWHC 2149) show that recordings have exposed malpractice. But many are partial, misleading, or simply time-wasting. Courts are urged to ensure proper case management and avoid “satellite litigation” over admissibility.

  1. Publication is a Legal Minefield

Sharing recordings — especially on social media — could breach data protection law, amount to contempt of court, or even attract civil or criminal liability. The risks are real and rarely worth the perceived reward.

  1. Professionals Should Develop Overt Recording Policies

Rather than fearing every phone in a parent’s pocket, the FJC recommends agencies consider transparent recording policies, allowing agreed recordings with safeguards. This could reduce tensions and avoid covert behaviour entirely.

A Practical Checklist for Lawyers

If your client has made or received a covert recording:

  1. Advise caution: It could backfire in court.
  2. Assess intent and content: Why was it made? What does it actually prove?
  3. Disclose early: Avoid ambush. The court expects transparency.
  4. Beware of data risks: Storing or sharing personal data without basis could breach GDPR.
  5. Consider the impact on the child: Not just legally, but emotionally and relationally.

Final Thought

The FJC’s guidance doesn't ban covert recordings, but it issues a clear warning: use with extreme care. In most cases, it is the act of recording — not what is recorded — that matters most.

For lawyers, this means stepping back from the adrenaline rush of “gotcha” evidence and reminding clients that in family proceedings, trust, welfare, and fairness remain the watchwords.

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