4 December 2025

Fraud, Delay and Final Orders: Lessons from Silberschmidt v Richards [2025] EWHC 2841 (Fam)

Setting aside a final financial order is one of the most serious steps the Family Court can take. It disrupts finality, unravels what the parties thought was settled, and reopens litigation that may have been dormant for years. Because of this, the bar for reopening a case is high — but not insurmountable, particularly where there is fraudulent non-disclosure.

The recent decision in Silberschmidt v Richards addresses a question that regularly troubles practitioners: If a spouse discovers fraud years after the final order, but waits before issuing their application, can delay alone defeat an otherwise meritorious claim?

The answer from the High Court: Yes — in theory. But only where the delay makes a fair trial impossible. And on the facts of this case, the appeal against reopening the order was dismissed.

The Background: Fraudulent Non-Disclosure at the Heart

The wife applied to set aside a consent order years after it had been made, arguing that the husband had suppressed key financial information during the original proceedings. The judge at first instance accepted that her application had merit and that there was a real prospect that the husband had fraudulently failed to disclose significant assets.

The husband appealed, but not on the fraud issue. Instead, he argued:

  • The wife waited too long to bring the application once she suspected wrongdoing;
  • This delay meant the court should not have reopened the final order; and
  • The judge had not properly addressed whether the delay was, in itself, fatal.

This made the case a perfect vehicle for clarifying the law on delay in fraudulent non-disclosure set-aside claims.

Fraud Still Trumps Finality — But Only If a Fair Trial Is Possible

Mr Justice Poole, dismissing the appeal, reaffirmed the classic starting point:

  • Fraud “unravels all” — but not at any cost.
  • Delay may defeat a set-aside application, but only where it renders the litigation unfair or the evidence impossible to evaluate.

The High Court emphasised three guiding principles:

  1. The Court Must Balance Finality Against Justice

Finality is important, but it cannot be used as a shield for a spouse who deliberately misled the court.

  1. Delay Is Not Determinative Unless It Causes Irredeemable Prejudice

The key question is prejudice, not simply the passage of time.

The court looks at:

  • Has evidence been lost?
  • Are witnesses no longer available?
  • Has the factual landscape changed so much that truth can no longer be established?
  • Would the fraudster suffer unfairness if the matter is reopened?
  1. A Meritorious Claim Should Not Be Shut Out Without Good Reason

Even if delay is long, the court will not bar a claim where:

  • the fraud can still be fairly investigated;
  • the spouse did not reasonably discover the fraud earlier;
  • the alleged wrongdoer caused or contributed to the delay;
  • the integrity of the original order is fundamentally compromised.

In Silberschmidt v Richards, despite the gap in time, none of the husband’s alleged prejudice was enough to prevent a fair hearing. The wife’s application was therefore properly allowed to proceed.

Why the Appeal Failed

The High Court held that the judge at first instance had:

  • applied the correct legal test,
  • acknowledged the delay,
  • weighed it appropriately within the overall justice of the case, and
  • concluded (rightly) that a fair investigation was still possible.

In other words, the husband could not convert his own alleged fraudulent non-disclosure into a procedural shield.

Why This Case Matters

This appeal provides valuable clarity for lawyers and clients alike:

  • Delay can be fatal — but it usually won’t be.

Only where delay makes a fair trial impossible will the court refuse to reopen a consent order tainted by fraud.

  • Fraud remains the highest-ranking threat to finality.

The overriding objective remains doing justice, not preserving an order built on deceit.

  • Applicants must act promptly once they have evidence.

A meritorious application will not automatically succeed if a party sleeps on their rights.

  • Respondents cannot rely on delay they contributed to.

A spouse who has hidden assets cannot complain when the truth eventually emerges.

Closing Thoughts

Silberschmidt v Richards reinforces a simple but crucial principle:
Final orders matter — but honesty matters more.

Where fraud is alleged, the court will look carefully at whether the truth can still be uncovered. If it can, delay will rarely be decisive. For anyone facing the discovery of non-disclosure years after the ink has dried on a consent order, this decision offers clarity — and a fair chance to put things right.

25 April 2025

Smoke Without Fire? When Foreign Judgments Cloud Financial Disclosure

In VTY v GDB [2025] EWFC 110 (B), Recorder Rhys Taylor faced one of the more unusual and unsettling examples of non-disclosure in recent family law decisions. At the heart of the case was not just the usual dispute over hidden assets, but the involvement of litigation in a foreign court that appeared to undermine the very basis of the English proceedings.

The result is a fascinating insight into the limits of judicial intervention when non-disclosure borders on litigation fraud but doesn't quite cross the evidential line.

The Background: "The Farm" and a Foreign Twist

During the original financial remedy proceedings, the husband (H) agreed that a valuable property—referred to as The Farm—was held on trust for him. It was included in the matrimonial asset base.

But post-settlement, H engaged in litigation in a foreign jurisdiction (Country X) that purported to challenge this very assumption. The result? A judgment from a court abroad that he attempted to use to say, effectively, “I no longer own that asset.”

The wife (W), understandably, argued this was a case of deliberate material non-disclosure—that the foreign litigation had been manipulated, or even manufactured, to create a paper trail separating H from his declared asset.

The Suspicion — But Not the Finding

Recorder Taylor was clearly sceptical. The judgment references:

  • Procedural irregularities in the foreign case;
  • The appearance that the husband may have been controlling both sides of the litigation;
  • An absence of proper notice to the wife;
  • Timing that raised eyebrows, coinciding with enforcement activity in England.

And yet, at paragraph 119, the judge declined to go all the way:

“Whilst I recognise all of the well-made points... I am not prepared to say that the judgment of a foreign court should not be recognised on the grounds that it has been obtained by fraud. There are too many imponderables at play, notwithstanding my suspicions.”

This is the core of the legal tension: the English court clearly felt the foreign proceedings were at least questionable, but it stopped short of declaring them fraudulent. In family law, suspicion is not enough. Proof remains paramount—even where red flags abound.

Why This Matters

This case illustrates a rare but increasingly relevant challenge in modern family litigation: the use (or misuse) of foreign legal systems to cloud beneficial ownership or frustrate enforcement.

What makes VTY v GDB so valuable for practitioners is that it shows the court's:

  • Willingness to scrutinise foreign judgments, especially where they emerge post-order;
  • Careful adherence to the principle that fraud must be clearly established—not merely inferred;
  • Recognition of the strategic use of litigation abroad, even when it stops short of formal condemnation.

Practical Pointers for Lawyers

  • Be alert to developments abroad. If a party engages in litigation that appears to unwind or contradict earlier disclosures, question the timing and intent.
  • A foreign judgment is not immune to challenge—but overturning it on fraud grounds is a high bar.
  • Build the evidential picture carefully. Courts will not declare fraud lightly, even if they share your suspicions.
  • Even if the foreign judgment stands, the English court still has wide discretion to apportion assets as between the parties, particularly in ‘needs’ cases, as it did here.

Final Thought

VTY v GDB is a masterclass in judicial restraint. The court clearly saw through the smoke but resisted declaring a fire without hard proof. For family lawyers, the message is clear: suspicion alone is not enough—but it’s often the start of a story the court is willing to hear.

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