28 November 2025

When “Set in Stone” Isn’t: Varying Maintenance and Escaping Old Undertakings in ABC v XYZ [2025] EWFC 370 (B)

Many clients think that once a financial order is made on divorce, that’s it forever. ABC v XYZ is a reminder that things are more flexible than that – but also that fighting over variation can be ruinously expensive.

District Judge Maddison in Birkenhead was asked to decide two linked questions:

  1. Should a former husband be released from undertakings given in a 2020 consent order?
  2. If so, how should the spousal maintenance now be set?

The case is a good opportunity to look at Birch v Birch, variation of periodical payments, “over-provision” through index-linking, and the sheer cost of taking a relatively narrow dispute all the way to a final hearing.

The original deal: tax planning dressed as maintenance

ABC (husband, now 61) and XYZ (wife, 59) had a long marriage of about 24 years, separating in 2016 and resolving finances by consent in 2020.

Key parts of that order:

  • The wife kept the former matrimonial home (a five-bed, three-reception property).
  • She also kept shares in the family company, F Limited, and received £50,000 per year in discretionary dividends, index-linked to RPI.
  • The husband undertook to use his “best endeavours” to make sure F Limited paid those dividends.
  • If the company didn’t, he undertook to “top up” via a nominal periodical payments order – effectively guaranteeing her income.
  • There were share transfers the other way and a pension share in her favour.

Everyone understood this as a continuation of a tax-efficient marital income structure: using her lower tax rate and allowances while he sacrificed salary.

Fast forward to 2025, and the picture looked different.

Back to court: when the company falters

By 2025, F Limited had had a very bad year – a seven-figure loss, redundancies, and a halt to bonuses and dividends. The husband argued that:

  • The dividends paid to his ex-wife were, in reality, simply being carved out of his own package.
  • With the business under pressure and his own debts rising (including a director’s loan and borrowing from his father), he couldn’t afford to keep propping up the arrangement.
  • He asked to be released from all undertakings and for the nominal maintenance to be replaced with £1,000 per month, non-indexed, on a joint lives basis.

The wife’s position was simple: the 2020 order should stand. She said:

  • The dividend structure was what he proposed at the time;
  • Her needs hadn’t gone away; and
  • The company’s poor year looked more like a blip than a permanent collapse.

However, she did accept one important point: if maintenance switched from taxable dividends to tax-free spousal maintenance, her income need would reduce by about £753 per month (which is what she currently paid in income tax on the dividends).

The legal framework: Birch, undertakings and variation of maintenance

The court can’t “vary” an undertaking in the way it can vary a periodical payments order – but it can:

  • Release a party from an undertaking; and
  • Impose different undertakings or a revised maintenance order in its place.

The Supreme Court in Birch v Birch confirmed that the court should approach release from undertakings via s.31(7) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, i.e.:

  • Has there been a significant change in circumstances?
  • Looking again at the s.25 factors, what is now fair?

District Judge Maddison also applied the modern guidance on varying income orders, including:

  • The focus is on needs, not relitigating capital.
  • The court can look at amortising capital, but it’s not automatic.
  • The burden is on the payee (here, the wife) to justify ongoing dependence and the level of provision.

What did the judge actually do?

First, the judge was not persuaded that F Limited had irreversibly collapsed. The 2024 accounts showed respectable performance; 2025 looked more like a bad year than a permanent new normal.

Second, the judge accepted:

  • The wife’s income needs were around £3,500 per month after some trimming of her budget (including council tax discount and modest economies).
  • She receives no earnings, has real health and age-related vulnerability and no realistic earning capacity.
  • She should not be required to start eating into her modest capital or pension to subsidise current living costs.

Third, the judge held that the wife was currently over-provided for:

  • The original £50,000, now RPI-linked to over £67,000 per year, plus tax effects, meant she was receiving more than she needs on her own case.
  • This justified a downward variation.

The final order:

  • The husband is released from all undertakings in the 2020 order.
  • The nominal periodical payments order is varied to £2,900 per month,
  • Index-linked going forward (but to CPI, not RPI),
  • On a joint lives basis.

In other words: the tax-driven dividend machinery is dismantled, but the wife keeps a secure, needs-based income stream for life.

The sting in the tail: £175,000 in costs

Perhaps the most striking passage in the judgment is the judge’s comment on costs:

  • Between them, the parties had spent £175,287.10 over less than 10 months.
  • That equates to about five years’ worth of maintenance at the newly ordered level.

This was, in the judge’s words, a “relatively simple dispute” about the level of maintenance and the form it should take. It was “eminently capable of settlement”, but both sides adopted rigid and unrealistic open positions, which blocked compromise.

Practical lessons

For practitioners and clients, ABC v XYZ underlines:

  1. Undertakings are not untouchable – they can be revisited where circumstances significantly change.
  2. Index-linking (especially to RPI) can drift into over-provision and may justify variation.
  3. Tax-driven structures may work well in the marriage, but can become distorted or unfair post-divorce.
  4. Courts are slow to force a non-earning, vulnerable spouse to live off capital where maintenance was plainly intended.
  5. And above all: the cost of litigating modest variations can very quickly outstrip the value of what’s in dispute.

For many separating couples, the smarter option is often to renegotiate sensibly with early legal advice, rather than spending years’ worth of maintenance arguing over the decimal points.

29 September 2025

Enforcing and Varying Financial Orders: What Collardeau v Fuchs Teaches Us

In family law, the term “final order” is sometimes misleading. The recent decision in Collardeau v Fuchs [2025] EWFC 307 shows how even a carefully crafted final financial remedy order can be revisited when enforcement problems and major breaches arise.

Background

This case is the latest in the long-running litigation between Alvina Collardeau and Michael Fuchs. Following the breakdown of their marriage, Mostyn J made a Final Order in June 2023, based heavily on the couple’s prenuptial agreement. W was granted continued occupation of the West London family home (“WLH”) until 2039, with H obliged to pay the mortgage and other household outgoings.

But H failed to comply. Mortgages went unpaid, properties were repossessed or sold off, and W faced mounting costs. In March 2025 she applied to enforce and vary the Final Order.

Enforcement – the limits of compliance

The Court heard evidence of repeated non-compliance by H. He failed to pay mortgage instalments, did not transfer properties as ordered, and even engaged in transactions designed to frustrate enforcement. Mr Justice Poole was blunt: H had been “prepared to see his children be compelled to leave their family home rather than comply with his obligations.”

Enforcement orders were therefore essential – requiring H to meet arrears, pay costs, and indemnify W in relation to certain liabilities .

Variation – section 31 MCA 1973 and the Thwaite jurisdiction

The more complex issue was whether the Final Order could be varied. Under s.31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, periodical payments orders (including those framed as undertakings) can be varied or capitalised into a lump sum. The Court applied the principles from Pearce v Pearce [2003], capitalising periodical payments using the Duxbury formula.

Separately, the Court considered the so-called Thwaite jurisdiction (Thwaite v Thwaite [1981] 2 FLR 280). Where an order is still executory (not yet fully implemented) and there has been a significant change in circumstances, the Court may vary it if it would be inequitable not to. Here, the loss of WLH through repossession and H’s persistent default amounted to just such a change .

What was ordered?

  • H’s undertaking to pay the mortgage until 2039 was discharged and replaced with a capitalised lump sum of £11m, reflecting what he should have paid.
  • Other claimed costs (such as legal fees and property expenses) were not included, as they went beyond the scope of the Final Order.
  • Periodical payments linked to staff and household costs were replaced with quantified orders, making enforcement simpler.

Practical lessons

  1. Final doesn’t always mean final – Where an order remains executory, the Court can revisit it under Thwaite if compliance breaks down.
  2. Evidence is key – W succeeded in part, but failed on some claims because she could not prove the sums were properly incurred. Even in high-value cases, documentary evidence matters.
  3. Capitalisation as protection – Courts may prefer a lump sum to uncertain periodical payments where a payer repeatedly defaults.
  4. Procedure is flexible – Although W’s application was technically issued under the wrong procedure, the Court cured the defect to avoid injustice.

Conclusion

Collardeau v Fuchs is a striking reminder that family law orders are living instruments. They can be enforced with teeth, but also adapted when circumstances fundamentally change. For practitioners, it reinforces the importance of distinguishing between true finality and executory obligations – and of ensuring applications are backed by clear, persuasive evidence.

13 May 2025

When Final Orders Don’t Mean Finality – Revisiting Joint Lives Maintenance GH v IH 2025 EWFC 120

The decision in GH v IH [2025] EWFC 120 (B) provides a revealing look at the long tail of family financial orders, where joint lives maintenance collides with real-life messiness: patchy compliance, unclear enforcement, varying income, and the challenge of aging parties still locked in litigation over a marriage that ended more than a decade ago.

District Judge Hatvany’s extempore judgment is a detailed and pragmatic application of section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, offering clarity on when variation is appropriate—and a cautionary note about maintenance orders that refuse to die quietly.

The Context: A Long Marriage, Long Orders, and Long Running Problems

The parties married in 1993 and divorced in 2012. The original financial order included joint lives maintenance of £2,000 per month, linked to RPI. But over a decade later, the wife brought enforcement proceedings claiming nearly £17,000 in unpaid RPI increases. The husband countered that he had “overpaid” by continuing to cover her private health insurance and mobile bills.

Meanwhile, both parties were approaching retirement age, the 2012 pension sharing orders hadn’t yet been implemented, and a jointly owned property was still awaiting sale. The wife lived mortgage-free; the husband remained self-employed with multiple properties and ongoing family obligations.

Notable Issues in the Judgment

  1. Joint Lives Maintenance Under Pressure

DJ Hatvany acknowledged that the original decision to order joint lives maintenance might not reflect modern practice, particularly where no long-term disability is involved. But with the wife nearing 66, holding a blue badge, and having health challenges, the original decision to make a joint lives order wasn’t inappropriate.

However, the judge was clear that indefinite £2,000 monthly payments were no longer justified, especially given the husband’s declining income and the wife’s own unacknowledged income from a solar farm.

  1. Credibility of Needs Claims

The wife claimed her needs were over £5,000 per month—including £900 for private health insurance—despite living alone in a mortgage-free property. The judge pegged her actual needs closer to £3,000 per month, noting that recent expenditures on kitchen renovations, new carpets, and landscaping were not indicative of hardship.

  1. What Counts as “Payment”?

The husband’s defence to the enforcement claim was novel but accepted: while he hadn’t paid the RPI-linked uplift, he had continued to cover the wife’s private health insurance, dental plan, and phone bills. On balance, the court found these payments exceeded what was due—so the enforcement application failed.

  1. Variation Principles and Forward Planning

From April 2025, the husband was ordered to pay £1,000 per month—not £2,000—reflecting the wife’s growing income from pensions and notional solar farm profit. But the judge expressed real concern about the lack of finality and urged the parties to consider agreeing a Duxbury-style capitalisation of the remaining maintenance obligation.

“Otherwise, I fear the door may be left open to the husband making a further variation application as he approaches retirement, or for the wife to make a further application if her circumstances change.”

Key Points for Family Law Practitioners

  • Maintenance variation must reflect needs and affordability. The court closely scrutinised both parties’ lifestyles and income, including under-declared income sources.
  • Creative compliance can be accepted. Payments made outside the strict terms of the order (e.g., health insurance) may still discharge the obligation if clearly linked and recorded.
  • Clean breaks are preferable. This case is a textbook example of the cost and stress of lingering maintenance obligations—especially with pensions and properties still unresolved more than a decade on.
  • Judicial restraint on costs. The judge pointedly asked for “no claim for costs” at the next hearing, to avoid incurring further legal expense over small differences.

Final Thought

GH v IH is a reminder that joint lives orders are often slow-burning sources of litigation, particularly when combined with unimplemented pension sharing, contested enforcement, and shifting needs as parties age. A Duxbury lump sum may not feel satisfying in the moment—but compared to another decade of claims, counterclaims, and spreadsheets—it can be a gift of finality.

14 April 2025

Posthumous Wealth and Divorce: Can a Financial Remedy Order Be Changed After Judgment?

In X v Y [2025] EWHC 727 (Fam), the Family Division of the High Court was asked to revisit a financial remedy order after a final judgment—but before the order was perfected—because of a significant change in circumstances: the death of the husband’s father, leaving a sizeable inheritance.

The decision is a rich case study in the limits of post-judgment variation, the principles of finality, and how the courts deal with the impact of newly realised wealth after a financial remedy determination. Although this wasn’t a classic Barder application (where a party dies), it touches on similar principles—namely, whether a major event shortly after judgment should allow the court to reopen and revise its decision.

Background

In December 2023, HHJ Spinks delivered a reserved judgment after a three-day final hearing. He awarded the husband 62.5% of the net proceeds of the former matrimonial home due to his significantly lower earning capacity and housing needs, less a modest adjustment.

Then, just three weeks later, the husband’s father died—leaving the husband an estimated interest worth over £1 million, held in trust. The wife made a so-called Barrell application to reopen the judgment before the order was sealed, arguing that fairness now required a more equal division.

The Legal Framework: Barrell Applications and the Finality Principle

The court reaffirmed the legal tests laid down in:

These confirm that:

  1. Courts have discretion to alter a judgment before the final order is perfected.
  2. The finality principle is important—particularly in financial remedy cases.
  3. Applications based on new evidence must meet a high threshold, including a test of due diligence.
  4. Courts must weigh these factors against the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly.

Judge Spinks was found to have correctly applied the law—especially by asking whether the new evidence justified reopening a carefully balanced judgment after a full trial.

The Appeal: Was the Inheritance Enough to Justify Reopening?

The wife argued that:

  • The husband’s inheritance substantially altered his financial needs.
  • She should not be left with a lesser share of the matrimonial home now that the husband had future security.
  • The new financial information wasn’t fully considered.

However, the court found:

  • The inheritance was uncertain, tied up in a trust and not immediately accessible.
  • The judge had already considered the likelihood of future family support.
  • A retrial would incur significant delay, cost, and stress.
  • The husband's trust interest, while valuable, did not clearly eliminate his current financial need.

Ultimately, Mr Justice Trowell upheld the original decision: finality and judicial discretion prevailed.

Key Practice Points for Family Lawyers

  1. The death of a relative is not enough on its own to reopen a financial order.
    If the person who dies is not a party to the proceedings, and their estate is held in trust or subject to delay, the impact may be too speculative.
  2. Inheritance prospects are not certainty.
    The court recognised that even a significant inheritance may not be realised in time to affect current needs.
  3. The ‘finality principle’ is weighty—especially post-judgment.
    Even before an order is sealed, courts are reluctant to unwind a carefully balanced decision unless clear injustice can be shown.
  4. Procedural fairness is key.
    The judge’s approach was upheld partly because both parties agreed the matter could be dealt with on paper, and there was no application for more time despite late-stage disclosures.
  5. Be cautious with tactical applications post-judgment.
    Clients who regret the outcome of a financial remedy hearing must show more than just a change in fortune to succeed on appeal.

Final Thoughts

X v Y is a cautionary tale: inheritance issues—especially post-trial—must be handled with extreme care. It shows how even substantial post-judgment developments may fall short of justifying a revision of the order.

For family law practitioners, the case is a reminder to:

  • Anticipate and explore inheritance issues during litigation;
  • Frame any post-judgment challenge within strict legal boundaries; and
  • Uphold the client’s expectations around finality and fairness.

If your client is considering challenging a financial remedy outcome due to a death or inheritance, make sure the evidence is strong, the timing is justified, and the proposed change truly meets the Barrell threshold.

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