VP v SP [2025] EWFC 447 (B) is a quietly important reminder of two things family lawyers sometimes take for granted: first, that jurisdiction in financial remedy proceedings is still anchored to decree nisi (or conditional order), and second, how profoundly adult dependent children can shape outcomes on “needs”, even after childhood has long passed.
An “indication” rather than an order
The most striking procedural feature of this case is that the court could not make a financial remedy order at all.
Despite a fully contested final hearing, the divorce had stalled. This was a pre-2022 fault-based petition, initially defended, and no decree nisi (or conditional order) had yet been pronounced. That created a hard jurisdictional stop. As the judge reaffirmed, any financial order made before decree nisi would be a nullity (Munks v Munks).
The solution was pragmatic but important: the judgment was framed expressly as an indication of outcome, to take effect only once decree nisi is pronounced, relying on the approach endorsed in JP v NP and FPR 29.15. No rehearing would be required; the court had done the work, but the order would wait for jurisdiction to crystallise.
For practitioners, this is a useful illustration of what happens when divorce procedure lags behind financial remedy proceedings. The court will not rescue parties from basic sequencing errors — but it may, where appropriate, indicate the result to avoid wasted costs and duplication.
Needs still dominate — even where sharing might suggest equality
On the substance, this was not a “big money” case. The net assets were modest, largely tied up in the former family home. Both parties broadly accepted that this was a needs-driven case rather than one involving surplus wealth.
Yet the outcome was far from equal. The wife ultimately received around 71–73% of the assets, a substantial departure from equality in a 12-year marriage.
Why? Because needs here were not theoretical. They were real, long-term and immovable.
Adult dependent children: not first consideration, but still decisive
The parties’ son was 18 — legally an adult — but profoundly disabled and extremely unlikely ever to live independently. He lived with the mother, who was his full-time carer and would be so indefinitely.
The judgment is careful on the statutory framework. Section 25’s “first consideration” (children under 18) no longer applied. But the court made clear that adult dependent children remain highly relevant when assessing a party’s financial needs, obligations and responsibilities.
This was not treated as a marginal factor. The mother’s caring role effectively extinguished her earning capacity, shaped her housing needs, and justified a much larger capital share to provide long-term security — not just for her, but for her son’s future care.
The court also recognised an uncomfortable reality: as the mother ages, her own ability to care will diminish, increasing future costs rather than reducing them.
Housing reality over housing theory
Another notable feature was the court’s realism about housing. Even with a majority share of the equity, the wife could not realistically buy suitable accommodation — particularly one capable of being adapted for her son’s needs. Renting with a substantial capital buffer was therefore treated as a legitimate and necessary outcome.
By contrast, the husband’s position was softened by the possibility (though not the certainty) of remaining in the former family home with the assistance of his adult son. That potential safety net mattered — even though the court was careful not to treat it as guaranteed.
Needs were assessed not in isolation, but in the context of what each party could realistically do with the resources available.
A reminder about conduct — and restraint
Although the background included findings of domestic abuse in children proceedings, and the litigation history was lengthy and fraught, this was not ultimately treated as a conduct case under s.25(2)(g). The judge drew a clear line between serious background issues and conduct so inequitable it should affect distribution.
That restraint is instructive. Even in emotionally charged cases, the court remains slow to weaponise conduct unless the statutory threshold is met.
Why this case matters
VP v SP is not a headline-grabbing decision, but it is an excellent example of careful, disciplined financial remedy decision-making:
- it shows how courts deal with jurisdictional roadblocks without derailing proceedings;
- it reinforces that needs still trump sharing where the facts demand it;
- and it underlines the enduring significance of adult dependent children in financial outcomes.
Above all, it reminds us that family law outcomes are not driven by abstract percentages, but by lived reality — and sometimes, the most important orders are the ones the court is not yet allowed to make.
