Family law arbitration has long been promoted as a private, efficient alternative to litigation. But what happens when an arbitration award collides with parallel High Court proceedings — and the losing party wants to use confidential arbitral material to defend their reputation in open court?

Mr Justice Peel's judgment in Rt Hon The Countess Karen Anne Spencer v Rt Hon The Ninth Earl Spencer [2025] EWFC 431 provides a rare and important look at the interface between family arbitration, confidentiality, media litigation, and the extent to which an arbitration award can be deployed outside the financial remedy arena. It also illustrates, in stark terms, that converting an arbitral award into a court order is usually straightforward — until external litigation and reputational concerns push against the protective walls of confidentiality.

The backdrop: Arbitration meets the King’s Bench Division

The Spencer divorce was referred to arbitration under the Family Law Arbitration Scheme (ARB1FS) in 2024. The parties chose arbitration for one obvious reason: privacy.

However, shortly afterwards, the husband’s partner, Professor Jarman, issued King’s Bench proceedings against the wife for alleged misuse of personal information. Offers were made, including a Part 36 offer, and these became entwined with the arbitration because:

• the arbitrator expected the wife to accept the Part 36 offer,
• the husband was required to indemnify her against any sums owed,
• and the financial outcome of that separate litigation would directly affect the arbitral award.

The arbitrator permitted a limited set of paragraphs from the award to be disclosed to the parties’ media lawyers and, if needed, into the King’s Bench proceedings. These paragraphs explained why the wife was being encouraged — financially incentivised, even — to accept the offer.

This limited disclosure would later become the battleground.

The problem: How much of an arbitration can you reveal?

When both parties applied to convert the arbitration award into a financial remedy order, the wife sought to go further. She wanted:

• disclosure of additional portions of the arbitral award,
• disclosure of the arbitrator’s explanatory email in full,
• permission to use arbitral material publicly to “defend her reputation”,
• and, at one point, permission to place the entire award in the public domain.

This was a bold request — and one that pushes directly against the foundational principle of family arbitration: confidentiality.

The law: Confidentiality is the rule, but not an absolute one

Peel J surveyed the key authorities:

• Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners — arbitration is private and confidential.
• Article 16.1 of the Family Arbitration Rules — confidentiality applies unless disclosure is necessary to challenge, enforce, or implement an award.
• The well-recognised exceptions: consent, court permission, necessity to protect legitimate interests, or the interests of justice.

He also analysed the competing Article 6, 8 and 10 rights:

• fair trial,
• privacy/reputation,
• freedom of expression.

In short: the court had to balance the wife’s right to defend herself in open litigation against the husband’s right to the private process both parties contracted for.

The decision: The award can become an order — but disclosure remains tightly controlled

Peel J allowed:

• the conversion of the arbitration award into a court order (uncontroversial),
• disclosure of the already-authorised paragraphs,
• and disclosure of parts of the arbitrator’s 24 July 2025 email, as they were “reasonably necessary” for the King’s Bench judge to understand the context of the settlement.

But he firmly refused:

• wider disclosure to the media,
• use of confidential arbitral material for general reputational management,
• disclosure of the full award into the King’s Bench proceedings,
• and any pre-emptive publication of arbitration documents before they were aired in open court.

To grant such requests, he said, would "drive a coach and horses through the confidentiality central to the arbitration process."

The message is unmistakable: arbitration confidentiality means something — and courts will defend it.

The wider lessons for family practitioners

This case is particularly important because it is unusual. Most arbitration awards sail smoothly into orders without any satellite litigation. But when reputational disputes spill over into open court:

• Arbitration confidentiality is not absolute, but the threshold for breaching it is high.
• Disclosure will only extend as far as is strictly necessary for fairness in linked litigation.
• Parties must think carefully about the interaction between arbitration and parallel civil claims, especially where media allegations are involved.
• Arbitration does not give licence for publicity battles. The court will not permit parties to weaponise confidential material to manage their public image.

Conclusion

Spencer v Spencer is a reminder that arbitration remains a robust and confidential alternative to court — but privacy is not invincibility. When external litigation forces its way in, the family court will allow disclosure only to the minimum extent required for justice, and no further. For separating couples considering arbitration, this judgment reinforces both its strengths and its limits: you can choose privacy, but you cannot always control the world outside it.